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According to documents in the presidential library of Bill Clinton, from which the confidentiality mark was removed, to “stop the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and prepare a political solution,” he proposed “a credible threat of NATO military action.”
– That implies pressuring NATO to issue an ultimatum with a request to Milosevic to take concrete measures to resolve the humanitarian and political crisis, or he will face a military response. For the ultimatum to be credible, we and our allies must be prepared to carry out limited rocket attacks if Milosevic refuses to comply. If it persists, we should be prepared to carry out more extensive airstrikes to prevent its ability to conduct military and security operations in Kosovo, Berger recommends.
The US foreign policy team, Berger says, agrees that relying solely on humanitarian action and diplomatic negotiations has no prospect of success. He claims that Ambassador Hill’s negotiation process with Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians will not produce an acceptable agreement as long as the violence continues, “through brutal actions by Serbian security forces combined with occasional KLA attacks.”
PINGPONG AROUND MILOSEVIC
Six days after the FRY presidential elections, in which the opposition DOS candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, won a majority in the first round and Milosevic tried to run a second round, Clinton spoke by phone with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on 30 September 2000 and agreed that the President of the FRY goes with the authorities.
Clinton told Putin that he was the only person who could convince Milosevic to admit defeat, that he had better leave. Putin replied that he thought the time was right for Milosevic to leave peacefully, but that he was not sure he would.
Not even Clinton’s question on how to get Milosevic out, Putin replied, “Do you think we should move him somewhere?” and stated that the best thing for everyone is to stay in Serbia. “We don’t need it as a gift. Why don’t we send it to America?” Putin asked.
– The UN Security Council resolution, adopted at 14 to zero, with China’s restraint, and NATO’s decision to begin gathering forces are important steps in our political and military preparations to issue an ultimatum, while at the same time they send strong signals to Milosevic. The UN resolution helps create a political basis for the use of force for many of our allies, but it explicitly does not allow the use of force, he admits.
Therefore, Berger cautions Clinton that this approach has its price and risks, both political and military. The document shows that the leadership of the United States was aware of numerous obstacles in America, among the allies, as well as in the world, for the implementation of this plan.
– Supporting the allies will require a great effort, especially with Russia, which strongly opposes the use of force. Many allies will want to try another UN resolution authorizing the use of force before NATO issues an ultimatum, Berger was aware.
However, he adds that the new resolution is less of a problem than the decision of some allies to give up participating in the operation. He is aware, he says, that maintaining consensus is problematic, especially if Milosevic partially agrees with the terms of the ultimatum.
“We will have to consult in detail with Russia on a bilateral basis, as well as through NATO, to limit the damage to our relations,” says Berger.
He also warns the president of the difficulties of an ultimatum in America itself:
– Most members of Congress, as well as the general public, have a limited interest in Kosovo and we already have difficulties participating in SFOR. Congress will be concerned about military action that endangers US forces or leads to a long-term commitment in support of “Kosovo autonomy.” Congress will be especially concerned if the United States turns out to be more committed to military action than its European allies, he warned.
Slobodan milosevic
Berger also realizes that the use of force leads to more complications:
– The use of military force forces us to play a later role in the implementation of the agreement, which is also an issue that Congress will likely focus on. NATO has not done detailed force planning for this option, and the question is whether the allies will be ready to make the necessary contribution. We are now examining other options for implementing the agreement, with a greater emphasis on local police and other institutions, and less on a large international, and especially American, military presence, Berger says.
He concludes that “the threat of force has much more prospect of success compared to the humanitarian and diplomatic approach.
– Perhaps only the preparation for the use of force could be enough to force Milosevic to give in and negotiate seriously – Berger hoped.
TAČI ENGAGED WITH CLINTON
On June 20, 1999, CLINTON congratulated then-Kosovo leader Hashim Thaci on the agreement on the demilitarization and transformation of the Hyatt Hotel KLA in the German city of Cologne, expressing satisfaction that “it happened on the same day that Serbian forces they completed their withdrawal from Kosovo. “
Thaci responds to Clinton that it is “his success too”, that it was a commitment to achieve peace and stability in Kosovo.
– We can guarantee that we will respect human rights and the rights of minorities in Kosovo. We are committed to achieving freedom, peace and democracy for all ethnic groups in Kosovo, Thaci promised.
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