[ad_1]
Until then, the EU could become a very different community and the UK could no longer exist. With a new referendum likely to take place in the next few years, the Scots will decide whether to leave the 300-year union with England and rejoin the European Union. If they vote for independence, despite the economic problems associated with it, then the UK will effectively become non-existent.
Any British politician who wants the Scots to stay with the British will soon have to present another, federal model of the British Union as an alternative to independence. So the choice will be between the demise of the Kingdom and a Federal Kingdom of Great Britain (Federal United Kingdom would result in an unfortunate acronym [„FUK” – n.trad.]). The path from the 2016 referendum to this tough Brexit has been littered with broken promises: from the article published by Boris Johnson in the Daily Telegraph four days after the vote, which clearly says that “there will continue to be free trade and access to the single market.” , and even the declaration of the then Secretary of Commerce, Liam Fox, that a free trade agreement with the EU “should be one of the easiest in the history of mankind.”
In a triumph of cognitive dissonance, Brexiters managed to simultaneously think of two incompatible thoughts: that “Europe” is a hideous Franco-German plot to bury England in a Napoleonic empire; but also that exactly the same new Napoleons would have to (at the behest of the German auto industry) grant the Kingdom privileged and unlimited access to the single market, so that the British would see themselves with bacon in the attic and greasy cabbage.
The question now is whether there will be a dynamic of convergence or divergence between the EU and the Kingdom. Any plausible alternative to the current populist British government would prefer a softer Brexit. Which would mean a more pragmatic and competent conservative government under a new leader like Rishi Sunak, the current chancellor. [ministrul finanțelor – n.trad.]. It would be even more valid in the case of a Labor, or Labor-led cabinet, under Keir Starmer.
These, together with the logic of its own economic interest, suggest that the Kingdom will approach the EU again, gradually, over time, field by field and subject by subject. On the other hand, the tougher Brexit, the more the Kingdom will have to seek an alternative business model. As the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine for Covid-19 demonstrates, even England and Wales alone still have significant strengths: financial services, excellent universities, biotech, DeepMind. [companie de inteligență artificială – n.
trad.], alternative energies and creative industries. The economy will be smaller than it would have been without Brexit, but it could develop a new and more competitive profile over time. These indicate divergence. And the mutual resentments and accusations surrounding a no-deal Brexit, if reached, will likely infect and obstruct cooperation in other areas, such as foreign and security policy, for a long time to come.
However, the future of Brexit will depend so much on developments on the mainland coast of the English Channel. [Mânecii]. People in Germany, France or Italy now talk very little about Brexit, not only because they are fed up with it, but also because the EU is facing two other major crises, which will no doubt be discussed at the European Council this week. The EU must urgently adopt its impressive budget and recovery fund totaling 1.8 trillion euros, as without them the post-pandemic recovery will be more difficult and north-south tensions in the eurozone could again escalate.
But to do so, it must defeat veto threats from Hungary and Poland, which have taken the rest of the EU hostage to further dilute the proposed conditionality of those funds by the rule of law. Some have argued that Brexit could help the EU as it has now escaped the uncomfortable Anglo client, and other member states will be able to move smoothly toward deeper integration.
But it is only an illusion. This summer a five-day marathon conference was needed to agree on the budget and recovery fund, due to the fierce resistance of the “four frugals” (Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands), with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte playing the role of Thatcher. What Hungarian and Polish Prime Ministers Viktor Orbán and Mateusz Morawiecki, respectively, are doing with their EU partners now makes Thatcher seem like a friendly Europhile.
The former British prime minister may have yelled “I want my money back”, but at least the UK was a big net contributor to the EU budget. After getting his discount, he vigorously promoted a fundamental project of European integration: the single market whose “level playing field” (an eminently British metaphor) now insists that the EU must accept it. Hungary and Poland, on the other hand, will be large net beneficiaries of the two funds, which together could contribute more than 6% to Hungary’s GDP.
And yet they refuse to accept minimum conditions of the rule of law, without which the EU would gradually cease to be a community of democracies and a unified legal order. In fact, the message that Hungarian and Polish leaders are sending to German and Dutch taxpayers is: we will not allow them to make those desperately needed financial transfers to southern eurozone states like Italy and Spain, both severely affected by Covid. – 19, unless you allow us to continue using large sums of money without any significant conditions.
In Hungary, this would mean redistributing money to strengthen Orbán’s increasingly undemocratic regime, not to mention that it will most likely benefit from family and friends. If this shameless blackmail succeeds, the ruling populist, xenophobic and nationalist parties of Hungary and Poland will be able to continue to do practically whatever they want, paying handsomely for it, and biting German hands and hands too. Dutch who feed them.
A recipe for a quick Ungexit or Polexit? Why would they be so stupid? Johnson can talk all he wants about being with greasy bacon and cabbage; Orbán really does. No, the immediate threat to the EU is not that Hungary and Poland will follow in Britain’s footsteps, but that they remain full members of the club while violating its most important rules.
It is difficult to say which is now the greatest danger to the future of the EU: a democratic Britain or an undemocratic Hungary that remains.
