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But it’s much easier for the president-elect to talk about restoring America’s leadership than actually doing it. America is no longer as strong as it used to be. Simple reintegration into international institutions – the World Health Organization or the Paris climate agreement – will not put the United States “on the table.” The cost of participating in international negotiations could consist of accepting compromise solutions that would not be appreciated in Washington. It is unclear whether US politicians and voters will be willing to accept that price.
In Washington, the terms “US-led world order,” “liberal world order,” and “rule-based order” often seem to be used synonymously. A confusion to understand. The postwar world order was essentially conceived by the United States. It is no coincidence that the IMF and the World Bank have their headquarters in Washington and the UN in New York. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 only strengthened American hegemony.
Donald Trump came to power in 2016, claiming that international bodies like the World Trade Organization are no longer relevant to the United States. America was shattered and the “globalists” impoverished ordinary Americans, he said. By removing the hyperbole of trumpets and paranoia, we will find a kernel of truth behind this rhetoric. In a world where power is more evenly distributed, a rule-based order and a world led by the United States are not the same.
This unresolved tension permeates Biden’s entire approach to international affairs. In his Foreign Affairs article, Biden says “the United States must lead the world” on climate matters and promises that the United States “will convene a meeting of the world’s top carbon emitters.” The largest transmitter is China. It seems highly unlikely that Beijing will voluntarily agree to appear at a conference convened by the United States, at which Biden promises to “cement applicable commitments that will reduce emissions.”
Realistically, China and many others will insist that the only appropriate forum for climate negotiations is the UN-sponsored meetings. Fortunately for the Biden administration, the next UN climate conference, COP26, will be hosted by a friendly country: the UK. Still, the president-elect’s promise of enforceable commitments to reduce emissions may not be fulfilled, particularly in the United States. America’s negotiating partners will know that Congress will likely have the last word on any American promise. With Republicans likely to continue to control the Senate, the Biden administration will have trouble keeping its promise.
Similar problems threaten to obstruct the president-elect’s commitment to American commerce. Biden vowed to resist “a dangerous global slide toward protectionism.” But he knows that Trump’s hostility to free trade is reaching a sore spot among many American voters. And the suspicion of new trade agreements goes beyond party borders. Hillary Clinton was forced in 2016 by hostility in her own Democratic Party to repudiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a broad trade agreement in which she herself participated in negotiations.
Biden’s solution is to promise that “union and environmental leaders” will be “at the table” from the start of any future US trade negotiations. But this could hamper progress towards new trade deals. Meanwhile, the world advances. This weekend, the leaders of 15 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, China and South Korea, signed one of the largest free trade agreements in history. Biden and his team continue to talk enthusiastically about uniting America’s friends to strike back at China. But new realities are already materializing on the ground.
Biden’s emphasis on collaborating with allies, in contrast to Trump’s confrontational and insulting position, is obviously a good idea. But a friendlier American attitude is no guarantee of success, not even in Europe.
The EU is moving forward with its plans to regulate and tax US tech giants like Google and Amazon. The Biden administration is likely to oppose many of these initiatives, as is the Trump administration. An early scandal over regulation or taxation of tech corporations could deflate hopes for an impending new era of mutual respect in transatlantic relations, or that “American leadership” will be an easy solution to difficult global governance problems.
John Ikenberry, a Princeton scholar who coined the term “liberal international order,” writes in a new book that the idea of liberal internationalism must be separated from American hegemony. He argues that, from the United States’ point of view, “in an era of declining American power, the value of cooperation with other liberal democracies should increase.” It is probably a fact. But it is an argument that is more likely to win in Princeton than in Washington, where sovereignty is still closely guarded.
Biden will find it difficult to convince Americans that the United States has something to gain from international involvement, but without automatically assuming the leadership role. However, on the bright side, the United States will no longer actively destroy global institutions. Reason enough for great relief.
