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Arrived with the baggage of a military tradition behind him, his military rise was due to his well-defined strategies, as well as the insight with which he was gifted by the young man.
Observed by Ceausescu, he is chosen by the missions of the highest importance. He followed a sudden evolution that propelled him in a very short time to the position of head of the Army Endowment Directorate. The task of selling arms through foreign trade, originating from Nicolae Ceausescu, helped him to build his bridge both with possible external collaborations and with the heart of the Ceausescus. During the Nicolae Ceausescu dictatorship, Victor Stanculescu contributed more than $ 500 million from arms sales to the state budget.
The close connections he established with Elena Ceaușescu through gifts from abroad, money, but also discussions about the evolution of Romtehnica, demonstrate the general’s ability to secure his beneficial place in both the army and the party.
At the XIV Congress in November 1989, Victor Stănculescu was on the list of candidates for the Central Committee, being nominated for the county of Mehedinți, but he lost this quality due to the meeting he had at Lake Balaton in Hungary. where the deputy director of the GRU for Eastern countries was also present. Security, upon learning of this information, passed it on to the head of state, who decided to remove it from the list of candidates for the Central Committee.
However, in a moment of despair that Nicolae Ceaușescu felt, regarding the evolution of the events of December 1989, he decided on the night of December 21 to bring Stănculescu from Timișoara, feeling that Minister Milea had begun to oscillate over the repression plans. of the protesters. In a moment of desperation, Ceausescu completely ignores the information about the treacherous actions carried out by General Stanculescu and waits for him in Bucharest to help him regarding his stay in power.
On December 22, 1989, in that state of anxiety and panic of the dictator, he only managed to pronounce one name, and this was Stanculescu, whom he anxiously awaited, placing all his hopes on him. “Where is Stanculescu?” Why don’t you come? Bring it faster! “Constantin Manea shows that, informed about the” accident “of Stănculescu, Nicolae Ceaușescu shouted at him:” With broken legs to come, and to come in 5 minutes, do not play that I arrest him! “.
Victor Stănculescu: “I politely went to the headquarters of the Central Committee after 10 o’clock, when I received a phone call from Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Cabinet, for which they called me urgently, even in the conditions in which I was (with my leg in a cast) . “Come as you are,” said Manea, who had called me on the phone, “the comrade president is looking for you.” (1)
“I review the detail with my plaster foot. The truth is that it was a reason for my coverage, to have a justification for my non-appearance in a mission that I expected, and my presence in the CC, when, after the suicide of General Milea , I met the team who, so to speak, politely invited me, not to mention picking me up at home. ” (2)
The decision to put the foot in plaster was explained in a 1993 Senate Committee: “On December 21, 1989, I went to the military plane that was there (Timișoara) and I believe that at 1:45 p.m., on the 22, I landed in Otopeni … I got home around two.
My wife was scared… I started looking for solutions. No one was looking for me that night, around 4:00 I called the operational officer of the ministry and told him that I had arrived … I was looking for a solution not to participate in what was clearly a repressive action. . I asked at the Military Hospital who was on duty. They told me that there were many doctors, that many were injured and that the bosses were present in all departments. I was looking for gen.doc. Niculescu, the head of the Department of Traumatology … I went and told him that I don’t want to go to the CC. He said, “I put your foot in a cast … You say your meniscus was stretched.” (3)
Since December 22, General Stanculescu has been a visible person in the events of late December 1989. Therefore, it is possible that his desire was not related to not appearing in the field of actions, but to having a large participation more involved reduced in terms of their presence. Probably the most reliable of them would have been the establishment in an office within the Central Committee or the Ministry of Defense from which it could observe and direct the actions that would be undertaken in the capital of the country.
Matenciuc Trifan, aide to General Stănculescu: “Nicolae Ceaușescu addressed the genre. Stanculescu says to him: «Comrade. Stanculescu, I called you to work with me. The army does not lay down its arms. The army uses all these facilities (aiming around CC – where there was a strong defense device composed of ground troops with armored equipment plus those of the aVa Directorate, with scouts and the rest of the intervention troops). Go there (indicating the checkpoint inside the CC) and give the necessary orders ».” (4)
Victor Stănculescu: “I didn’t go to send him the order, I went into the room where the stations were located and asked if they had connections. They said yes. Then “tell the units to stop, try to go back to the barracks and say they are with the people at work.” Meanwhile I got to the operating room … I spoke to the operating group, in general, about the activities, without telling them at that time of that order, because I did not know what the reaction would be, for fear of not canceling it. . This was, so to speak, the number one moment of the decision I made … ”(5)
Lieutenant Colonel Alex Rafailescu: “At 10:40, Lieutenant General Victor Stănculescu entered, accompanied by an aide-de-camp, Captain Matenciuc, who immediately went to the buffet for mineral water. When we were left alone (there were other officers present), Lieutenant General Stanculescu told us to close the door and ordered us to send orders to the units to withdraw to the barracks. After we broadcast, we contacted him and he ordered us to go to the sixth floor. “(6)
Interesting look. While General Stanculescu tried to remove the army from the posts, Nicolae Ceausescu decreed a state of emergency throughout the country, with the army units in a state of alarm. This is the 0th moment of the disinformation initiated within the Army, as well as the key to the bloody events of the following days. In General Voinea’s personal agenda it was recorded that at 10:07, Colonel Negrea transmitted the fact that no one fires any warning fire, and at 10:35, Rear Admiral Petre George, Head of the Organizing Department of the Superior Political Council of the Army. and General Ilie Ceausescu’s first deputy, “to speak to the protesters who are said to be retreating to the barracks.” At 10:40 am, all the units informed the protesters that they were going to withdraw to the barracks. Therefore, either General Stanculescu was already aware of this fact and sent this order to receive praise, or he tried by all means in his power to remove the Army from the battlefield.
Note:
1. The word, no.8-9, March 28, 1990, p. 9
2. Viorel Domenico, The Gypsum Revolution, p.22
3. Indictment 05.04.2019, Senate Commission, file No. 172 / JI4 and 88 / JI4, Transcripts No. 12 / 01.11.1993 and
130 / 06.09.1994
4. Witness statement from SPM headquarters, 05/23/2017, indictment 04/05/2019
5. Indictment 05.04.2019, Senate Commission, file no 172 / JI4 and 88 / JI4, Transcripts no. 12 / 01.11.1993 and
130 / 06.09.1994
6. Viorel Domenico, The Gypsum Revolution, p. 60
