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Putin, a more Soviet than Russian patriot, assumed the presidency in the 2000s, and one of his top priorities was to take control of key political or economic levers that were lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union: key industries, the judiciary, media, politics.
During the third and fourth presidencies, he focused his ambitions on the geopolitical space: the invasion of Ukraine and Crimea, the alliance with Syria and various attacks on Western democracies, including the “active measures” of the KGB, which eventually culminated in cyberattacks, Politico writes Aronas.
Putin’s ratings are at record lows
An expert from the American Enterprise Institute notes that “many of the vectors that led to the invasion of Ukraine are now active again.” (…) Putin today has at least two reasons to think of similar challenging actions on a large scale. One is strategic and immutable: glory to him and to Russia as a whole, these two aspects are currently intertwined in his consciousness. Another tactical motive: Putin seeks the end-of-life rule for the sixth presidency in 2024, when he will be 72, and probably another 2030, in a country where the economy and profits have been stagnant for more than 10 years and still . The COVID-19 pandemic left deep scars. Furthermore, the arrest of pro-democracy leader Alexei Navaln sparked demonstrations in more than 100 Russian cities, for the first time since brutally dispersed anti-Putin demonstrations in 2011-2012.
As soon as he came to power, Putin, unknown to anyone at the time, was unable to enjoy the high audience ratings. The second war in Chechnya started in recent months under Boris Yeltsin, but on the last day of 1999, Vladimir Putin, the then prime minister (and acting president), officially assumed victory. Then Putin’s ratings went up – people like victories.
The same factors that are felt in Russia and now – coincided in 2012-2013. By deciding to annex Crimea, he allowed the Russians to temporarily forget about economic stagnation and corruption scandals. And it worked: the monthly number of people who positively evaluate Putin’s work increased by 65 percent. 2012-2013 at 81 percent. 2014-2018. Russian experts called it the “Crimean Consensus”, an “emotional stimulus” that meant “Russian consent to bear the loss in exchange for imperial greatness.”
Confidence in Vladimir Putin fell to 29 percent in late January and early February this year, according to a Levada Centr population survey. During the meeting, respondents were asked to name several politicians or public figures whom they trusted the most.
In August-October 2020, the level of confidence in Putin remained between 33% and 34%. the lowest confidence in the Russian leader (23%) was expressed by respondents in July. As early as November 2017, 59 percent indicated confidence in Putin. survey participants.
According to Aron, Putin can once again choose what has helped him very well in the past: the path of short victorious wars.
“If Putin plans to start another short victorious war, there will be no shortage of potential targets.” The obvious candidates are five neighboring countries. Three of them, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, are hotbeds of “frozen conflicts” that the Russian military or Russian-controlled forces can easily unfreeze within or near their borders.
Another country, Belarus, is half of the formal “state of the Union” with Russia. In the fifth country, Kazakhstan, ethnic Russians – 3.5 million. – more than any other post-Soviet state except Ukraine, and they are still “comfortably” settled in the six northern areas bordering Russia. If the Taliban seize power in Afghanistan and begin to expand into Central Asian countries, the annexation could be presented as “protection of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan,” the expert said.
Putin’s “big ideas” would be more in line with a victorious conflict with NATO
Yet these five potential wars would not fully match Putin’s ambitions for “big ideas” and his voluntary mission to rebuild power and revenge. A swift and victorious blow to the eastern NATO countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – would meet these criteria. According to one political analyst, a triumphant coup to NATO would be something that would allow Putin to feel different. After all, even the “powerful” Soviet Union did not.
According to the author, Russia could organize a Crimean-style “hybrid” military operation, using special. elite forces and paratroopers in western Russia: three regiments of special squadrons and airborne assault divisions stationed near the border with Estonia and Latvia. The most likely targets of such an attack are the Estonian county of Idu-Viru, where 74 percent live. ethnic Russians, and its largest city is Narva (83%), as well as the Latgale region (36% of Russians) and Daugavpils (48% of Russians). After one or both “rejoin their homeland,” their annexation would mean war with Russia.
According to Western experts and analysts, it would take NATO between 60 and 90 days to mobilize enough forces in the Baltic countries to outnumber the Russians. Aron recalls that only three weeks passed between the invasion of Crimea and the “referendum” and “admission” to the Russian Federation.
Warnig, 65, doesn’t like publicity. When asked how often he meets with Putin, the latter’s friend and former Stasi agent replied that the Russian president did not have a mobile phone, but added: “If I need to see it, we will arrange it.”
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