Iran’s Nuclear Capabilities: A Hoax Instead Of A Bomb?



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Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz told the UN Security Council in early August that “Iran <...> only about ten weeks before the acquisition of the necessary materials for a nuclear weapon “.

“Now is the time to work, words are not enough. <...> “The Iranian regime threatens us and is causing a regional arms race,” he said.

Gantz is not the first to warn about the prospect of Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Antonis Blinken, in his first official interview as US Secretary of State in February 2021, said that Iran was missing for a couple of months before developing a nuclear weapon. He predicted that if all restrictions on the nuclear deal were lifted, Iran would receive enough fissile material “in a few weeks,” writes theconversation.com.

Paradoxically, the political goals that led to Blinken’s stern warning were completely opposite to those announced in the Israeli government’s statement. The current warnings from the Israeli government are aimed at ending negotiations on a nuclear program.

Iran’s access to nuclear weapons has been a key theme in the geopolitics of the Middle East under the new Joe Biden administration. Improving relations with Iran was a major foreign policy goal of Biden’s electoral platform. A major priority was to return to the “nuclear deal” (JCPOA) with Iran.

The only way the Biden administration can effectively prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb is to return to an improved nuclear deal with Iran. The Iranian government has tried to facilitate a return to negotiations, such as the lifting of sanctions. However, the Biden administration not only refused to ease Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, but also launched airstrikes against Iranian fighters in Syria.

Negotiations took place in Geneva with the signatories to the original nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or GSP), and significant progress was made in six rounds of negotiations, with four different texts covering a 1,520-page agreement. However, negotiations stalled after the election of Ebrahim Raisi in 2021. June Iran has reported further deviations from the agreement. Negotiations are currently stalling as Iran demands assurances that the United States will not abandon the deal in the future.

Of association

An evolving threat?

How justified are concerns about Iran’s progress in nuclear technology? There is no evidence that Iran has enriched the material to 90 percent. – the level required for nuclear explosives. Independent analysts believe that Iran is not included in the disaster program for the development of nuclear weapons and that until now enrichment has only been a means to pressure political and economic preferences.

However, this is potentially changing. According to the IAEA, Iran has from 62.8 kg to 20 percent. enriched uranium and 2.4 kg at 60 percent. enriched materials. But to develop a nuclear weapon, they will need to do more than store fissile material.

Iran has indicated that it can build a plant to produce uranium from metal. That would be necessary to create a weapon. Using nuclear fuel for weapons poses technical challenges that many Iran are believed to have failed to overcome. Detonating a weapon requires a fission reaction. The nuclear charge must be bound to the rocket and the payload must resist return through the Earth’s atmosphere.

The recent warnings are not new. In 2015, prior to the implementation of the CFSP, the report by Valerie Linci and Gario Milhollin of the Wisconsin Nuclear Arms Control Project used IAEA data, indicating that Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear cartridge in 1.7 months. Iran’s goal may be to maintain a “nuclear backward” state, which means having the ability to develop it to the point of mounting a nuclear charge. This was stated by the former head of the CIA, Leon Panetta.

Iran (photo by Scanpix)

Balance change

The full nuclear status would essentially give Iran a deterrent from attack, but it could have unintended consequences. The termination of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would also limit the existing nuclear cooperation with Russia on which Iran relies, since otherwise Russia would be violating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Iran is involved in a military conflict with at least two nuclear powers (Israel and the United States) in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and the sea. However, this limits escalation by relying on delegates and avoiding confrontation with enemies. Although the United States has been involved in regional conflicts in both Israel and Saudi Arabia, Iran, by acquiring a nuclear weapon, can ease the limitations of its opponents, particularly Israel and the United States.

Furthermore, it could have a ripple effect if regional players like Egypt and Saudi Arabia no longer believe they can trust the United States and decide to build their own nuclear arsenal.

A state of nuclear ambiguity based on latent opportunities gives Iran a strategic advantage in that it creates coercive power while limiting response. At the same time, it can be used for economic and political benefits, which Iran seeks in negotiations on its nuclear program.

The United States is only prepared to make so many concessions to Iran, but at the same time it believes that the agreement is the only effective means to restrict Iran’s nuclear program. That is why a modified return to GDP remains the most likely outcome in the near future.



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