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The meeting of the Seimas Defense and National Security Committee (NSGC) raised the question of what lessons we have learned from the migration crisis.
Kasčiūnas: the line between threats is blurring
“The crisis may have stabilized, of course, it has gone nowhere, but we must think about the lessons learned. Apparently both global and complex are needed [galvoti]. For me and for some experts, it is clear that the word hybrid, which we use very often, <...> He testifies that in this 21st century, conflict and aggression will not be purely traditional. It often has very civilian elements, ”Laurynas Kasčiūnas, chairman of the committee and conservative, said at the NSGK meeting.
According to him, at first glance, the crisis may appear civil, but in the long run it may also acquire armed elements.
“It just came to our attention then. The nature of the crisis and the pressure can change. Here the state must react flexibly, “said the parliamentarian.
According to L. Kasčiūnas, what can be seen in the migration crisis was first absorbed into the internal affairs system. According to the chairman of the committee, the work of the internal affairs system and of all officials should be viewed not only from the point of view of law enforcement, but also from the point of view of national security and defense.
“It just came to our knowledge then [NATO] Limits of article 5. In the case of military aggression, we know that there is a Law of Military Statute, in which case the institutions of the Ministry of the Interior system become part of the Armed Forces. Here we have algorithms, we work and so on.
However, before Article 5, in that so-called gray area, the MIA system had a first blow, they were the first link in the response and that link obviously needs to be strengthened ”, said the president of NSGK.
A hybrid threat: everything between peace and war?
Linas Kojala, a political scientist and director of the Center for Eastern European Studies (RESC), said it was very difficult to define what hybrid threats are, where they start and where they end.
“Probably the most accurate definition is that a hybrid threat is almost everything between peace and conventional warfare. But in that case, that gap is very wide, “said L. Kojala.
According to him, NATO experts, who recently prepared a study on the subject, pointed to electoral interference as examples of hybrid threats.
“What Lithuania and many of our other allies have experienced, with the aim of influencing electoral campaigns,” said the political scientist.
According to L. Kojala, the experts identified the promotion of social differences as one of the hybrid threats.
“We probably feel that also in Lithuania, when we try to exploit the vulnerability of society to achieve geopolitical goals from the perspective of third countries through the polarization of political debates, through the emphasis on cultural, ethnic and social differences”, explained. .
The political scientist also highlighted the weakening of confidence in the state and the direct attempt to influence public opinion.
„[Menkinimas] It also concerns the institutions, their reaction, the way in which they are presented, the information that is provided on the functioning of state institutions, the possibilities of that functioning which, as we know, are often inflated and discredited by the entire state apparatus. .
<...> Lithuania is one of the experts on the issue of disinformation, understanding how public opinion is manipulated and what impact it can have, ”said L. Kojala.
Many elements of the hybrid threat have been used in the migration crisis.
NATO experts have added diplomatic and economic pressure, cyber operations, terrorism and espionage to the hybrid threats, but, as Kojala said, the list is certainly not exhaustive and can be expanded.
“That coverage is also broad in terms of specific immigration problems. <...> we would see that at least some elements have been, are or could be used directly ”, said the director of RESC.
“Hybrid threats are complex, it is very difficult to have an algorithm that is universally applicable, but at the same time that flexibility suggests that there are possible directions that, if considered in a single case, could be used in a broader context.
<...> A systematic response requires a broad network of first responders and those who make the most of their strengths, possibly hiding [kitų] defects. This should be done not in times of crisis, but in advance.
Consistency is important from a communication perspective. We probably feel it in the context of migration too. Perhaps that consistency was not always, perhaps it is not always possible in a democratic society, but the more it is, the more effectively the strategic objectives established from the perspective of communication will be achieved, ”said L. Kojala.
The darkest stage is possible
“We have had to participate and analyze various hybrid attacks several times in all kinds of crisis management simulations. Who can see very clearly that it is very convenient to be on the side of the red team there. In this case, if we call things by our own names, on the Russian side. Why? Because there are very few restrictions: ethical, legal and others, ”said Liudas Zdanavičius, a policy analyst at the Defense Analysis Center of the Lithuanian Military Academy General Jonas Zemaitis.
According to him, during a hybrid attack, the state “target” is severely limited by various regulations. According to L. Zdanavičius, if hybrid attacks are used against Western countries, they generally aim to “strike concessions” or to gain an advantage in some negotiations.
“But if we talk about countries like Lithuania, Georgia, Ukraine, the darkest scenario is possible, it is an introduction and a preparatory stage for a conventional attack. This is something very, very dangerous, “said the analyst.
According to L. Zdanavičius, a very important component in hybrid attacks is testing, attacking and seeing how the country will react.
“If you consider that the defense is strong and effective, there is scope for withdrawal. We also see that in Ukraine,” he said.
In order for the hybrid attack to work even more effectively, according to L. Zdanavičius, the aim is to hide the fact that different measures are related, for example, the provoked migration crisis goes hand in hand with information and cyberattacks.
“It just came to our attention then. <...> The interfaces are hidden in every way. The attacking character tries by all means to hide his connection with what is happening, “said L. Zdanavičius.
Belarus learned from other countries
Speaking about the migration crisis, L. Zdanavičius said that it could not be ruled out that the “red team” included not only Belarus, but also Russia, which gave permission for such actions or was informed about the planned attack.
According to the analyst, the organizers of the hybrid attack pointed out that in the face of the migration crisis of 2015, the migration policy of the European Union did not work at all. L. Zdanavičius assured that Belarus has been inspired by other countries on how illegal migration can act as a weapon.
“Morocco has been very successful in putting pressure on Spain simply by removing border controls and sending migratory flows. <...> Turks against Greece. In 2020, they simply collected 38,000 in Istanbul. people, brought them to the border and pushed them towards the Greeks, ”said L. Zdaavičius.
According to him, migrants have also used migrants as weapons.
“It just came to our notice then. We all fondly remember the famous Syrian cyclists who crossed the border posts into Finland and Norway. What did he end up with? The leaders of both Finland and Norway got in touch with Russia and, in terms In return, they asked for something to stop him. The Turks, in turn, received funding from the European Union, as did Morocco, “the analyst explained.
Said how not to instruct the enemy
L. Zdanavičius also presented a recipe on what to do with hybrid attacks.
“The most effective against hybrid attacks is an effective all-encompassing defense system,” said the analyst.
According to him, a strong interaction both between state institutions and with the public is important.
“Because it is necessary to effectively identify that an attack is taking place and make quick decisions, the information must be gathered in one place. “
The analyst noted that in almost all cases, officials know where the main gaps and vulnerabilities are, but in Lithuania this did not translate into decision-making and provision of the necessary resources.
“If we don’t solve those problems, we are basically helping the attacking side because we are giving instructions on what to do. If problems are identified, it is very important that they become solutions as soon as possible, ”said L. Zdanavičius.
Suggest giving more powers to the police.
Mindaugas Akelaitis, head of the Public Police Board, suggested reviewing the logic of decision-making in the face of hybrid attacks.
“It is very important that on such soft issues, politicians and decision makers are probably not needed, perhaps politicians do not need to intervene in decision making”, reasoned M. Akelaitis.
He recalled the events of 2018, when Protestant teachers occupied the Ministry of Education and Science.
“A leadership decision was made to remove those teachers. But we are asking as a practitioner what will happen if some protesters settle in 2-3 ministries. How will trust in the state and institutions change? Because again, it takes some kind of decision maker at the political level to get them out of there.
We think it should be through simulations. <...> identify those places where it would be appropriate to delegate non-political decision making to institutional or tactical decision makers. In this way, there would be an opportunity for less erosion of confidence in the state, ”said M. Akelaitis.
He said that he understood that there was a risk that the institutions would make disproportionate use of those powers.
“If we talk about a hybrid, <...> when it becomes a volume perceived by all, then it is too late and difficult to react. If we can react in the first steps, make a more decisive decision and prevent it, then we may not know if there really was a hybrid, but we will really learn that we do not reduce the confidence of the State ”, affirmed M. Akelaitis. .
During the meeting, the members of the NSGK decided to propose to the Government to increase the funds for the activities of the statutory bodies of the MoI system. The document also calls for an assessment of the lessons learned from the illegal migrant crisis and the presentation of systematic information on how the MoI system is prepared to counter hybrid threats.
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