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According to him, Moscow should have become the clear winner of the August presidential elections in Belarus. Why?
Belarusian society has been increasingly active during the summer and Mr. Lukashenko has been increasingly repressed. This turned into a brutal crackdown on protests immediately after the vote, and the West immediately expressed outrage: Lukashenko is unlikely to be talked about.
Events should have put Minsk in the hands of the Kremlin and given Russia a chance to act as it pleases.
“It just came to our attention then. However, the political crisis in the country turned out to be more serious than anticipated: Lukashenko’s legitimacy was too crushed,” says A. Shraibman, who believes that civil society activity has changed. fundamentally the situation.
Support that cannot be given up
After burning all the bridges to the West and interrupting the already feigned performance of the supposed balancing act between the West and Russia, Lukashenko was preparing for a few weeks for what he considered a very important meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi.
Before the meeting, the West had already become the main enemy of Belarus in official rhetoric, and the opposition was Russophobic and working in the United States. A. Šraibman recalls here that at the beginning of August, the opposition, in the words of A. Lukashenko, was ruled by the hosts in Russia.
Scanpix / AP Photo / Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin
“Lukashenko wanted to come to Sochi as the leader who controlled the uprising at home. Hundreds of people were arrested again over the weekend, the women were beaten. But it did not work.
In the regions of the protests it may be less than a month ago, but in Minsk on Sundays 100-150 thousand regularly gather. people, ”says A. Šraibmanas.
The two presidents spoke for more than four hours, but on a single specific point, $ 1.5 billion. loans to Belarus were agreed before the negotiations. And since Belarus owes the Russians about the same, Minsk is unlikely to get any funds.
Lukashenko wanted to come to Sochi as the leader controlling the uprising at home. Hundreds of people were detained again over the weekend, the women were beaten. But it does not work.
Putin began the meeting by saying that he supported Lukashenko’s constitutional reform plan and, according to Shraibman, “everyone understands that this is an introduction to the transfer of power.”
After all, Lukashenko himself told Russian journalists that if the amendments to the Constitution were approved, early presidential elections could be held in a couple of years.
How to gain influence?
“But just because Lukashenko’s door to the West has already been slammed shut, he won’t necessarily do what Moscow tells him to do,” Shraibman said.
Also, there is little point in demanding that Lukashenko immediately do what is asked of him. In this way, Putin would only create more problems: if Lukashenko succeeds in consolidating power, he will soon forget that he has signed anything.
But if his position is further weakened, he will certainly not stay in power long enough to be able to implement the ambitious integration plans of the state of the Union ”, adds the analyst.
„Reuters“ / „Scanpix“ nuotr./Aliaksandras Lukašenka
It is said that if the protesters think that Lukashenko is renouncing the sovereignty of Belarus, the demonstrations demanding democracy will turn into a struggle for independence, and then the Kremlin can forget about a stable pro-Russian Belarusian majority. The image of Russia itself is off.
It would be ideal for Moscow if Lukashenko himself could stabilize the situation without shedding blood and then roll back smoothly, a process, of course, in coordination with the Kremlin, to a horizontal model.
Then there is the issue of legitimacy in the international arena. “Any agreement limiting the sovereignty of Belarus will not be adopted in the West, and as a result, the Russian protectorate of Belarus could become a great Crimea, isolated by economic sanctions,” said A. Shraibman.
For Russia, that change would cost significantly more than all those years of subsidizing the Minsk regime.
Therefore, according to the expert, Moscow could demand this more beneficial support for the Lukashenko regime: privatization of important industrial sectors or a military base, although the latter option is less realistic.
VIDEO: Weekend in Belarus: 150 thousand marched in Minsk. protesters, more than 400 people were arrested
According to A. Shraibman, it would be ideal for Moscow if Lukashenko himself could stabilize the situation without shedding blood and then withdraw smoothly, a process, of course, in coordination with the Kremlin, to a horizontal model.
“In this way, Moscow could not depend solely on Lukashenko or his successor. Russia could then constantly influence politics in Belarus, through loyal parties, individual officials and control of important economic sectors. And there would be no powerful president with right of veto ”, says A. Šraibmanas.
Will you be able to act with caution and consideration?
But again, the devil is in the details, because no one knows what Lukashenko thinks of such a plan. Do you want to leave quickly but with honor? Or is all this talk about a new Constitution and early elections just an attempt to buy time and divide the opposition?
“Will their plans change if the protests are exhausted? Are you willing to consult with Moscow on the transfer of power, although you obviously still do not trust the Kremlin? ”Asks A. Shraibman.
Reuters / Photo by Scanpix / Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin
It seems to him that both parties will discover a lot in the already familiar space: the economy. The new Western sanctions will affect the economic potential of Belarus, and the economy cannot grow without large and regular injections from abroad.
“As before, Belarus needs an additional 3-5 billion dollars a year. But since Lukashenko’s global credit sector is closed, his only hope is Russia,” the analyst said.
According to him, Lukashenko, although trapped in a corner, will continue to try to remove the benefits of his regime from Russia.
He will not make promises to the Kremlin, but he will try to show that he suppresses the anti-Russian uprising and continues the possibility of NATO tanks appearing on the Russian border; get it, that alone should be rewarded.
The Kremlin’s actions in the post-Soviet space are rarely characterized by meticulous turns. Creating conflicts and freezing them is one. It is quite another to oversee an orderly change of government in a neighboring country.
“Moscow will develop the dialogue cautiously. If the Belarusian nomenklatura or the public feel that Russia no longer supports Lukashenko, the regime will soon come to an end. But the Kremlin does not want a sudden collapse, at least as long as it has no other reliable partners in Belarus, “Shraibman said.
As a result, Lukashenko is well aware of the importance of maintaining a monopoly on relations with Moscow, which is why he is blocking any separate negotiations between nomenclaturists and Russia, disrupting structures that threaten him and imprisoning potential opposition leaders.
“If Lukashenko persists for the time being, Moscow will have to choose carefully when to remove the gingerbread and when to remove the cake, forcing the Belarusian leader to get to where Russia needs him. It will require constant attention and understanding of the situation.
However, the Kremlin’s actions in the post-Soviet space are rarely characterized by meticulous turns. Creating conflicts and freezing them is one. It is very different to supervise an orderly change of government in a neighboring country, ”says A. Šraibmanas.
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