What does Lukashenko’s strange pause on the border with Lithuania mean: naive to think it’s over?

According to the Department of Statistics, by early August, the flows of illegal immigrants had peaked: 287 people were arrested in one day, several more exploded and were detained later.

Despite concert work on the border with Belarus, which began on July 9, the picture looked bleak: by the end of the year, Lithuania could expect up to several thousand migrants, mostly Iraqis, who had been invited to Belarus. in your own transport. scheme.

And although Iraqi airlines flights to Belarus were eventually suspended, it is no secret that there will be no shortage of countries from which the EU would like to enter the EU due to wars, famines or other disasters and often just people looking for one. better situation. life.

Spokesmen for the Belarusian and Russian regimes enjoyed discussing new routes, from Libya, Syria and Afghanistan. There will be no shortage of refugees from there, and Belarusian airline Belavia, which has been banned from flying to the EU due to sanctions, will also find work transporting thousands of migrants.

However, this has not happened yet: for several weeks, almost no information about the border crossing with illegal immigrants has come from the Lithuanian border with Belarus. Not because the Ministry of the Interior, which does not allow the entry of Lithuanian journalists to the border, manages the information, not because several tens of kilometers of concerts have been built, not only because the Lithuanian Armed Forces, the shooters, the officials of Frontex and some of its flows have been diverted from Belarus to Latvia and Poland in recent weeks.

The Belarusian regime itself has the opportunity to release thousands of people transferred to their country through other areas, less used or not used in the 679 km border with Lithuania; it is physically impossible to store everything at least in the near future across the border. guards, troops and technical means. But Mr. Lukashenko is not doing that. Why?

New provocations can be expected

“It seems naive to hope that Lukashenko’s provocations have ended. Part of the migratory flows that meet other obstacles seek other directions, this is normal. I am convinced that neither the current measures nor (if there are any) the built wall is a panacea” warned Vytis Jurkonis, a professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Sciences (TSPMI) at Vilnius University, who has been studying the situation in Belarus for many years.

According to him, looking at the arsenal of tools used previously, from the blackmail in the security of the Astrava nuclear power plant or the military exercise “Zapad” to the provocative rhetoric and provocations against the leaders of various EU countries, Lithuania can expect even more.

“Neither disinformation, nor ultimately the wheels of specific European companies, nor even local attacks (vulnerable airspace / border, ‘involuntary’ entry of military cargo) seem to be more common than surprising phenomena,” said V. Jurkonis.

“Just look at Belarusian state television and it can be assumed that they are currently ‘writing’ the fruits of their activities. Their propaganda machine needs stories; after all, they cannot just show Lukashenko, who is digging potatoes, or talk to the same 5 characters.

The mill turns, especially when it can point to the neighbors who are supposedly to blame for 2020. summer in Belarus. I have no doubt that September 10th. The protest episodes will also be a delicious snack ”, commented the expert on possible new provocations.

Calculated, backed off, but struck again?

At the same time, the pause in migration flows itself can be as much a strategic ploy as a condition of circumstance. But Marius Laurinavičius has another version. According to an independent analyst, the reaction of Lithuania, which had been hesitant but finally reacted strongly and received the support of the EU, to stop the migrant regime forced the regime to stop for another reason as well.

According to M. Laurinavičius, the entire migrant transport operation is not led by A. Lukashenko, but by the Kremlin, which devised and planned such a scheme.

“In my opinion, that pause is indirect evidence or an indicator that it is not Belarus who came up with this attack, they basically have a problem with the migrants themselves, but they do nothing. Because the Russians don’t want to escalate, they don’t need that escalation.

They have calculated, they did not expect a slow but already ongoing review of the EU’s border protection policy. Yes, it has not happened yet, but it is starting, there is a possibility that the EU will even start funding the fence.

And Russia doesn’t need that because it used migrants as a weapon and if that normal review of immigration policy happened, the Kremlin would lose that weapon. This is their usual tactic: when they see that they are calculating, they fold ”, M. Laurinavičius is convinced.

According to M. Laurinavičius, Belarus by itself can no longer aggravate the situation, because even in the search for new directions, everything finally leads to a cost-benefit analysis, which is especially important for the Belarusian economy, depending on the Kremlin and the international organizations. .

“It just came to our attention then. Belarus cannot send 10,000 a day,” said M. Laurinavičius. The same situation, where migrants are returned at the border and travel back to Belarus, is unfavorable for the regime, since they must be captured, riot control, other special units must be transferred to the border, and it has become every It is increasingly difficult to push immigrants to the EU.

“The strategic objective of Belarus and Russia in Lithuania is to destabilize the situation, overthrow the government, but if the government reacts strongly to the attacks of migrants, the public reaction may ultimately be in support of that government, which is not good. for Minsk and Moscow, “said the expert.

At that time, according to V. Jurkonis, such a scenario that hundreds or perhaps even thousands of migrants from Belarus, who will be transferred in coordination with Lithuania, which has recently been reluctant to Lithuania – Russia or even China – cannot be turned away. .

Therefore, both border and migration policy need to be in place to function like an accurate clock in compliance with all international standards. Otherwise, you could become hostage to constant political waves. After all, it is possible to see with the naked eye how neighboring countries are trying to exploit this through the policy of divide and rule ”, said the expert.

“The Kremlin is watching, the Kremlin knows, this is also demonstrated by the coordination of information attacks that accompany the challenge of migrants. In many respects, it is also an attempt to divert attention from what is happening in the Belarus itself, an attempt to “occupy” Europe with its own (and indeed taxes) affairs: the theory of the Kremlin’s role in the migration crisis was supported by V. Jurkonis. But he also called not to lose sight of the fundamental problem of the Belarusian regime, and not just to be paralyzed by the challenge of migrants, which is only a consequence or consequence of the regime problem. “

The Kremlin’s influence will only grow

M. Laurinavičius also made no secret that immigrants are just a way of dividing the societies of Lithuania (and other neighboring countries of the EU). All the more so since there is no shortage of internal divisions in Lithuania without the help of the Kremlin or Minsk. But in the end, the migration crisis is not about Lithuania, it only showed Lithuania’s weaknesses.

Traditionally, everything for Russia is usually a traditional climbing game: two steps forward and one step back. If an unexpected and aggressive action is taken, one eventually retreats, but not to the starting position, but to a certain extent: Europe often tends to seek compromises and is upset by the Kremlin or its fugitive, often showing a willingness to accept. at least a part. of the Russian terms.

And if Belarus becomes completely dependent on Russia, and much less formally independent, then Lukashenko, who has climbed the ladder of climbing, after a while can play not only a hiatus, but also a withdrawal show. The migration crisis, for example, will end and this may already be a reason not to consider new sanctions against Belarus or even to lift existing ones.

In this way, one would completely forget where it all started: from Lukashenko’s inauguration, the rigged elections and the crackdown on protesters. But if, as M. Laurinavičius asserts, Lukashenko’s future is in the hands of the Kremlin, the game may be even more twisted: for some time now, the planned transfer of Lukashenko’s power by the Kremlin to someone else can be used as evidence. that Belarus is on the path of change.

Of course, there would be no place for the Belarusian opposition, but the formally democratic process of Mr Lukashenko’s withdrawal would give the impression that a change has taken place. And then there is no need for penalties. Even if Belarus remained in the pocket of Russia with the influence of the Kremlin and all the associated military security considerations.