He named three scenarios for the future of Belarus: Lithuanian experts are not optimistic

“I am not sure that (the experts) have lost trust in Belarusian society. There are quite a number of people I know personally who strongly believe in it, doing everything possible to strengthen the faith and, as far as possible , contribute to the faith of that society for themselves.

On the other hand, this is probably also related to some dissatisfaction of emotional expectations. Sure, it’s easy for us to talk here when we’re outside those borders and we feel pretty safe, but there’s that lingering emotional expectation – we’re a little inspired and waiting for some breakthrough to happen in Belarus, and it doesn’t happen in the first week, the second. , third.

The protests take an almost routine form, but show no signs of steady growth, and then the question arises, how long can it last? If such a routine protest could lead to a final collapse. According to the experts, probably – no, some additional measures are required, forms of protest, and if they don’t exist, it will probably not be possible to sustain the emotional enthusiasm of society, ”said T. Janeliūnas.

However, the professor himself hopes to personally believe in a scenario aimed at forms of protracted protest that are not based on large rallies, but on a deeper belief that the regime can still be overthrown.

“Such forms would require even more effort, even more dedication and the belief that not everything will happen overnight, but it requires stamina, but I wouldn’t write such a scenario either,” said T. Janeliūnas.

The first scenario: the survival of the regime and intensified repression

The first scenario affirms that the regime is maintained and the repression intensifies. A review of this scenario indicates that the scale of the protests is gradually decreasing, with physical and psychological fatigue, and protesters are finding it increasingly difficult to stay motivated to attend events.

This motivation is further hampered by the intense detention of the most active protesters, their prosecution, their dismissal and the use of direct or psychological pressure and violence. The leaders note that the relationship between the potential benefits of regime change and the potential harm from the Lukashenko government is deteriorating, meaning that the potential harm or risk is increasing and the likelihood of change is lower, according to the review.

It points out that the mass of strikes does not change or decrease, and that protests in companies are usually short-lived and do not cause major disturbances in the economic system. The analysis points out that the financial system may face some liquidity problems, but this does not risk the collapse of the economy as a whole, but only increases the long-term debt of the country with external creditors (especially Russia, China).

In this scenario, it is written that the Coordinating Council has not yet managed to obtain sufficient resources and become a legitimate and universally recognized political institution that represents society. Information sources remain decentralized.

The analysis notes that Lukashenko manages to maintain loyalty to power and security structures. It does not recognize the legitimacy of the Coordinating Council, it rejects the possibility of reforming the Constitution, calling new presidential elections.

According to experts, Moscow is likely to provide hybrid support for Lukashenko, but in return asks for greater humility from Lukashenko and the Kremlin’s wishes: faster integration of the state of union, common financial system (and potentially common currency), ultimate integration. of the military forces or even Russia. deployment of military forces in Belarus.

The document says that Russia can publicly support a rather moderate tone towards Lukashenko and even partially recognize the right to exist of the Belarusian opposition, thus maintaining Lukashenko’s influence if he decides to deceive and disobey Moscow’s demands. It is also observed that the Belarusian economy and financial system are increasingly dependent on Russian “injections” (loans, preferences, trade between them).

According to analysts, the reaction of Western countries to Belarus, which is sinking even further into authoritarianism, is inert. There are individual sanctions, Lukashenko is politically isolated, but this only reflects the only chance that the Belarusian dictator has to have the support of the Kremlin, according to the document.

At the same time, this scenario indicates that the civil society born in Belarus does not forget the abuses, the organizations “in the shadows”, the groups of silent resistance are formed in hiding and periodically campaigns of disobedience are carried out in various cities. The opposition is looking for ways to better coordinate, Lukashenko is losing the trust of the general public, and a new opportunity is awaited for new leaders to surface pent-up outrage, according to the document.

The second scenario: long-term resistance and regressive regime

The second scenario notes that protests in the streets and squares of Minsk and other major cities in Belarus peaked between August 16 and 23. The analysis points out that the same rallies cannot force a regime change without radical escalation, that is, a massive and bloody repression is not used against the protester, and the protesters do not use aggression against OMON or other force structures.

However, the forms of protest can take a strategic form in order to mobilize the public for a more prolonged resistance and a regression of the regime, says the analysis.

According to the document, a prerequisite for this is the strengthening of the Coordinating Council or another center of opposition forces and strategic planning, which would have at least some of the following characteristics: the establishment of a clear political center and its institutions or executive functions ( which means “shadow government”); the pooling and consistent and efficient allocation of resources for resistance actors and activities; Opportunities are created to financially support active protesters, participants in strikes; provide physical protection to the most active resistance leaders; the possibility of supporting the continuous dissemination of alternative information; a clear political and action program that is not too radical in the public eye; the ability of the regime to accept program requirements that would cost less than the cost of long-term endurance.

Under this scenario, the forms of resistance would translate into an economic and social disruption of the regime: a growing scale of strikes, growing problems in tax collection, payment of pensions, salaries to public officials, representatives of the power structures. The analysis assumes that it would not be possible to neutralize such resistance by force, but the exhaustion of the regimen system can take months.

Prof. T. Janeliūnas assumes that with the increasing risk of economic collapse, Lukashenko may try to enter into negotiations on some of the opposition’s proposals. The study author notes that balancing Russia (in exchange for financial assistance) and the opposition’s demands is a great challenge for Lukashenko, and the process itself takes quite a while.

Scenario 3: sudden escalation and substantial fracture

The third scenario would mean a sudden the status quo a change in what would result from various provocations or violence against protesters. This scenario recalls the most famous precedent: Ukraine in 2013-2014. protests, when the most important outbreaks of violence were in 2014. February 18-23. – took place after more than two months of peaceful protests.

It is assumed that the force structures (or mid-level partial individual commanders) in such a situation could change their position and respond to support Lukashenko. The author of the study concludes that by losing control of consolidated power, Lukashenko can offer negotiations, seek safe ways to withdraw or rely on forces completely loyal to him and prepare for a “deadly battle.”

It is not ruled out that Russia’s participation in the sudden escalation phase may be delayed and inappropriate. T. Janeliūnas states that depending on the scale of the escalation, alternative ways can be taken to preserve the influence of Belarus, even without A. Lukashenko.

It is not excluded that Moscow may change its mind

Based on the additional scenario threads identified in the study, it is assumed that Moscow may choose to replace Lukashenko in the future if its support costs become excessive. Based on the analysis, this can be done in a number of ways, from persuading yourself to retreat to a military coup.

In this case, however, Moscow should have a clear plan for what would replace Lukashenko in the current period, and how the new Belarusian leader would become a pro-Russian leader, according to the study.

The study also considers that as the economic situation of the country deteriorates, Lukashenko could propose several solutions to alleged negotiations or compromises: initiate a process of reform of the Constitution, initiate a reduction of the powers of the president, propose ideas for a referendum or even prepare new elections. It is not ruled out that, in such a case, it may even agree to partially comply with some of the opposition’s demands, such as the gradual release of the detained protesters.

According to the study, the aim of such proposals would be to “vent” into Protestant society, but it is most likely that such proposals aim to mimic change. It is not ruled out that some formal amendments (such as the Constitution) are adopted under pressure from Russia, which would like clear proof that Mr Lukashenko is fulfilling his commitments.

Among the various variants, an internal blow variant is envisaged, which, according to study author T. Janeliūnas, is however unlikely. The study notes that, so far, Mr. Lukashenko has managed to neutralize potential competitors or stronger leaders in a timely manner, and the heads of political or security structures have reported directly to and been loyal to Mr. Lukashenko.

Experts – not very optimistic

An expert survey was conducted during study preparation. According to her, 55 percent. Lithuanian experts consider that the variant that “protests will gradually decrease and / or be suppressed, and Lukashenko will retain political power” is the most likely scenario.

There was much less expert support for the options that “resistance to the regime will take continuous forms, eventually bringing the Belarusian regime to the brink of collapse”, and that “the Kremlin will join the crisis in Belarus, rescuing Lukashenko already. him personally. ” This was answered by 18 percent. surveyed.

One expert chose the option that “the protests will intensify and Mr. Lukashenko will be forced to negotiate with the opposition on possible changes or solutions” as the most likely scenario.

No expert has chosen options that “the protests will take a radical form and Lukashenko will be forced to withdraw” or that “the Kremlin will join the crisis in Belarus to replace Lukashenko as a more pro-Russian leader.”