Let’s hurry early transition to Korean opposition rights … US “Give me a defense enhancement plan”



[ad_1]

On the 14th (local time), Secretary of Defense Seo Wook (left), who is visiting the United States, visits the Korean War Veterans Memorial Park in Washington DC with the United States Minister of Defense United, Mark Esper, to deliver a wreath.  [사진 제공 = 국방부]

picture explanationOn the 14th (local time), Secretary of Defense Seo Wook (left), who is visiting the United States, visits the Korean War Veterans Memorial Park in Washington DC with the United States Minister of Defense United, Mark Esper, to deliver a wreath. [사진 제공 = 국방부]

On the 14th (local time), a controversy arises over the omission of the provisions to “ maintain current USFK level ” in a joint statement containing the results of the 52nd Security Council of the Republic of Korea and the United States (SCM). This is because, through discussions, the Moon Jae-in administration plan to transition to wartime “ initial ” operational control, the question of increasing defense cost sharing and The evaluation of the military agreement of September 19 revealed a difference of perspective on the problems of the bilateral alliance.

In fact, this statement differs from SCM’s 51st Joint Statement held in Seoul last year and several sentences. The biggest change is the USFK troop level. Last year’s joint statement (article 7) contains a phrase that says that “Minister Esper has reaffirmed his commitment to maintain the current level of the USFK and improve combat readiness reflecting the current security situation.” Even before that, the same content has been included repeatedly year after year.

However, this issue was omitted from the 52nd Joint Statement. According to a senior Defense Ministry official, the South Korean side suggested keeping the phrase as it was, but the US side did not accept it. Noting whether it means’ USFK troop reduction, ‘the official said, referring to a joint declaration clause (Article 6) stating that’ Minister Esper has reaffirmed the unwavering commitment of the United States to the combined defense of the Republic of Korea’. “The absence of the phrase ‘maintain the current level of the USFK’ does not mean the reduction of troops,” he explained. The United States agreed that the statement contained a promise of the presence of American forces in Korea, and that our side agreed. However, there are still interpretations that the US side eliminated the “maintenance of US forces in Korea” section with the possibility of reducing US forces in Korea in the future. This is because there have been observations that the US administration of Donald Trump will pressure South Korea to increase its share of defense costs with the USFK reduction card.

On this day, US Defense Minister Mark Esper insisted somewhat blatantly on increasing Korea’s share of defense costs. “The United States urges not only NATO and other allies, but also Korea to contribute more to our collective security,” Esper said in his remarks. “We hope that everyone agrees on the need to reach a Special Defense Contribution Agreement (SMA) as soon as possible to ensure a stable presence of US forces in Korea,” he added. If the SMA deal is delayed, it can be interpreted as pressure that cannot guarantee the current level of the USFK. In this regard, an official from the South Korean Defense Ministry explained: “There is a concern about preparedness, so we are trying to solve the problem of defense cost and there is no need to interpret it in a leap forward.” The official added: “The secretary did not comment at the meeting that he would reduce USFK troops if defense costs were not negotiated.”

The temperature difference between the Republic of Korea and the US is also detected in relation to the OPCON conversion plan, which the Moon Jae-in administration has stated several times will be completed on time. In a joint statement last year, “ The Minister and the Secretary decided to promote the Full Operating Capacity Assessment (FOC) for the future CFC in 2020, ” but this time the detailed schedule was omitted. “It will take time to fully meet all the conditions for OPCON’s transition,” Esper said in a speech throughout SCM on the same day. This is in contrast to the statement by Defense Minister Seo-wook in all comments: “We will work together to prepare the ROK military-led combined defense system preparing the conditions for OPCON transition early.” In this regard, a senior official from the Korean Ministry of Defense said: “The matter of the transition of OPCON based on conditions was agreed between the Republic of Korea and the United States in 2015.” “I will.” This official explained that “the conversion of operating rights is not a concept of time, but a concept of conditions”, and said: “We want to fulfill them as quickly as possible within the great transition framework based on conditions.” He added: “I understand that the transition within the period of the Moon Jae-in administration was in the compromise of the presidential election, but in the task of state affairs, it was transformed into an immediate transition.”

Rather, it is peculiar to reflect a new phrase that “Minister Esper paid attention to the need to understand Korea’s procurement plan in the first place” in connection with the conversion of OPCON. In the course of the recovery of OPCON by the ROK military, weapons and strategic assets need to be further strengthened to increase defense capabilities, and the US requested a plan for Korea to acquire it. This can be interpreted as a reflection of the US position to warn of OPCON’s early transition, as well as suggesting the purchase of US-made weapons to enhance defense capabilities.

On this day, in a comment by SCM, Minister Esper demanded that South Korea also actively participate in the US Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China. “We welcome South Korea’s involvement in the security of the Indo-Pacific region, including anti-piracy operations, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, regional security cooperation, humanitarian aid, and case assistance. disaster, “Esper said. However, this was not reflected in the joint statement subsequently released by both parties. It is analyzed as a result of strong opposition from the Korean side in the negotiation process, aware of relations with China.

The subject who positively values ​​the effects of the military agreement of September 19 was also marked as ‘the two ministers’ last year, but this year’s joint statement only reflected it as ‘the secretary Seo’, revealing the difference between the two parties to the military agreement.

[워싱턴 = 신헌철 특파원 / 연규욱 기자][ⓒ 매일경제 & mk.co.kr, 무단전재 및 재배포 금지]

[ad_2]