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Recently, Libya has been experiencing a large wave of spontaneous popular demonstrations triggered by shortages of basic goods, mainly electricity and medicines. Both governments in western Libya (Saraj) and eastern Libya (Saleh-Haftar) are desperately trying to stop the protesters.
They don’t seem to be doing so well. The first scapegoat was the Benghazi government, close to Haftar and who resigned the day before yesterday. However, the country’s legitimate prime minister, Fayez al-Saraj, head of the Western Libyan government, is also ready to resign. Its aim is to send a goodwill message to the international community that it wants to go ahead with the peace talks under the auspices of Morocco (an “honest broker” or honest broker), with the ultimate goal of holding elections in March 2021. .
I would not be particularly optimistic about such an outcome. Since the day the ceasefire agreement was announced, neither of the two warring factions has stopped stockpiling military equipment. Aside from Turkey, which continues the flyover to Al Wattiya airbase in northwestern Libya, eastern Libya continues to be supplied by Russia and Egypt, strengthening the Sirte-Yufra line, the gateway to the Crescent of the Petroleum.
In recent weeks we have seen a game of thrones unfold in the Libyan government. Haftar’s military defeat, and thus the absence of the adhesive between the factions, of the West Libyan government, once again brought intra-parliamentary disputes to the surface.
In light of the above, the reasonable question one would ask is whether the North African country will sink into even deeper chaos.
The answer is that anarchy will surely strengthen. In any case, this is a very familiar situation in Libya. Because after the fall of Gaddafi, the country was governed more by a mosaic of alliances with tribes, such as the Tuareg and Tubu in the south or the Gaddafi and Al Zouya tribes in Sirte, than by governments in the sense that we define them in the West. .
There are many questions. At a time when much of the south of the country is living in anarchy, no one knows what position the Guardians will take, with whom the alliance has made possible Haftar’s advance west in recent years. These guardians show loyalty only to Haftar personally, not to the East Libyan government. They had bet on him that he would prove to be the “winning horse” in the race for power. It did not happen.
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In Saraj’s case, the racial factor is absent to the same degree. Two great centers of power, Tripoli and Misrata, play a central role. The latter is the center of the Turkish-born Islamists, who, however, do not support the Saraj government per se, rather than the deputy warlords that are its members, such as Defense Minister Basaga.
In other words, anarchy already existed in the country and will surely intensify in various areas of Libya, due to the unknown attitude that the guards will take in the face of Haftar’s overthrow. Therefore, there is no answer to the question of whether the two sides will go to the elections next March. After all, the peace talks were due to a military stalemate. In what is called in the literature of international relations “the mutual tie that hurts.” When neither opponent is able to completely defeat the other on the battlefield. Therefore, it is mandatory to negotiate with him to find a beneficial compromise solution and at the same time try to increase your own bargaining power. The elections will only take place on the condition that there is an ad hoc agreement between East and West Libya on such a roadmap. A map that will include not only national elections, but also a referendum.
The question now is who has the power and legitimacy to carry out, under imaginary conditions, in a country plagued by crisis and war, both national elections and referendums. Neither side, of course
The image at this time is as follows. On the one hand, both sides are trying to increase their bargaining power through military aid, along with a series of measures as a show of goodwill, such as the lifting of the Libyan oil embargo and the alleged resignation of Saraj for a new government. . shape.
However, the problems persist and there are three:
– The impossibility of an agreement on the distribution of power. Each side excels at something and lags behind at something else. Eastern Libya excels in wealth resources, Western Libya in population. Eastern Libya is supported by Russians, Egyptians and diplomatically by the French, while western Libya is supported by Turkey and Qatar.
– Third party guarantees. If some third party will guarantee this famous roadmap. There is no available player who is recognized by both parties as an “honest mediator”. Or France, Egypt or Russia.
– The involvement of so many external actors, some of whom do not want peace but rather the consolidation of their dominant position and, therefore, the creation of areas of influence.
These are the reasons why I am not particularly optimistic about the positive outcome of the talks. The real fear is that just as the Circassian Agreement was not implemented in 2015, such a solution will not work now. Because the above three problems must be solved first. And the risk of provocation by Haftar’s forces may not be as great as in the past, but it is questionable what Syria’s mercenaries will do and how other actors will react to the (semi) permanent Turkish military bridgehead in the West. Libya and the differences between the political ranks of the two camps. It is very likely that all of them, or all together, will lead to a new stalemate in the peace negotiations.
* Dr. Spyros Plakoudas is Professor of International Relations and works as Assistant Professor of Homeland Security at Rabdan Academy.
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