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For several decades, the Greek “red line” with respect to Turkish disputes regarding sovereign rights issues in relation to the continental shelf and potentially the EEZ was the conduct of seismic studies by a Turkish research vessel in waters that we consider to belong to Greece. continental shelf, as defined by the “letter” of international law (200 nm or independent insular continental shelf and median line).
This position fueled the Greek reaction for a long period, from the launch of “Hora” in 1976 and the Greco-Turkish crisis of 1987 to the summer of 2020 and the reaction to the previous investigation of Oruc Reis.
However, this time it is clear that the Greek government has chosen another line and in practice has moved the “red line” in terms of Turkish investigations to carry out investigations within the territorial waters of the country, that is, within the area of pure sovereignty. This is reflected in the fact that there is constant surveillance of the Turkish vessels, but not an attempt at further obstruction, even when the route reaches a distance of up to 6.1 nautical miles from the Kastelorizo coast.
And yesterday’s loss in Parliament regarding a report on the nationalism of the Michalis Chrysochoidis 12-mile debate is no accident.
What are the reasons for the change in the “red line” of the Turkish investigations?
Several reasons seem to contribute to this change.
First of all, the specific part of the Greek continental shelf has special characteristics. For years, the view has been expressed that if one looks at the jurisprudence of international tribunals such as the Hague Tribunal, one will find that the “letter” of the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, that is, the full influence of the Kastelorizo complex, it could hardly be applied here. and that a significant part of the area that we generally include in the potential area of the Greek continental shelf would be recognized in Turkey. This means that the Greek side finds it difficult to more aggressively address Turkish investigations in areas that could be considered “contested”. 
The second crucial element is the effort by the Greek side to avoid the image of a dispute that seeks a referee. In this context, it is important to constantly give the impression that a country that moves unilaterally, that in practice denies clear international positions in favor of a “moratorium” on research for dialogue, and that in practice does not respect the law international, it is Turkey.
The fear of an “institutional episode” with unpredictable extensions
The third crucial element is, of course, the fear of a “hot episode”, especially within an area that for the international community is not a field for the exercise of Greek sovereign law, but simply a “disputed area”. It is clear that any more severe obstruction or harassment of Turkish investigations, given the escort of the Turkish research vessel by Turkish navy ships, could lead to an armed conflict, the dynamics of which are not given. 
There are two main fears here: one is that there is a big difference between how Greek society and Turkish society would handle an armed conflict. Turkey is a country that currently has its armed forces abroad, with a large volume of forces in Syria, while conducting armed operations against the PKK inside and outside the borders. Turkish society is more influenced by a nationalistic climate and is more familiar with the possible losses of military personnel. On the contrary, it is not at all a fact what the reaction of Greek society would be to such a possibility. The other fear is that any “hot episode”, regardless of who is responsible for the challenge, will create international pressure for a swift compromise that could mean far greater concessions than would actually be the case in a negotiation.
Estimation of the real power correlation
To all this are added other estimates. This Turkey is on a trajectory of constant “power projections” and with a strategy that includes as an organic part Turkey’s constant participation in successive crises as fields where it will be constantly confirmed that it has achieved the level of a strong regional power. Consequently, it is considered that it is not easy for Greece to follow Turkey at such a level of competition, but it is preferable that Greece invest much more in the formation of a diplomatic front to support the Greek positions, speaking with the strong “players” in the at international level. chess board, but also building local alliances in the area. This is reflected in the effort to secure European and American support, in the attempt to rekindle Greek-Russian relations with Lavrov’s visit, but also in the improvement of relations with Israel and Egypt. This move is also undermined by the fact that sooner or later the way Turkey moves and the way it intervenes in open conflicts, this most recent example in Nagorno-Karabakh, will eventually lead to conflict with part of the international community or even and isolation. 
And, of course, in all this there are estimates about the actual military relationship between the two countries, given the increased investment made by Turkey, at a time when Greece is now starting a program of reinforcement of the armed forces, after a long weather. period of budget restrictions. This also has a more general dimension. Greece is currently facing an open health emergency, like the rest of the world, but also with an economic crisis that followed a decade of very high economic and social costs, it will have to weigh whether it will face the cost of a “warm” engagement with Turkey to short term.
The attempt at strategy and the shame
On the other hand, we can only emphasize the relative shame reflected in this unspoken change of the “red line.” This refers, first of all, to concerns about whether the current standoff on the Greek side will fuel Turkish aggression and we will see disputes on a larger scale over possible Greek sovereignty, given that Turkey has sent agricultural vessels to the Republic’s proclaimed EEZ. from Cyprus. for natural gas.
The second source of shame concerns the borders of the Greek alliances. So far, Turkey seems to think it can try to change the “rules of the game”. He may have resigned regularly in the run-up to the EU summit to avoid referring to sanctions in the decision, but shortly after returning Oruc Reis, he dealt effectively with the German effort, in particular, to reduce tensions and dialogue. However, this did not lead to an escalation of European (and especially German) reactions, despite specific proposals made by the Greek side both for the suspension of the customs connection and for an embargo on the sale of arms to Turkey. Even in the midst of a climactic election campaign, the United States is not likely to intervene with greater intensity. 
And the third shame is whether Turkey is simply making “power projections”, based on its own perception of how a pre-negotiation correlation is formed, or whether the logic of “achieved” corresponds to the perception that Turkey will try to establish in practice what is supposed to be negotiated in the dialogue, a perception with which the Greek side can hardly agree.
All this means that Greek foreign policy has entered the difficult phase of seeking the delicate balance between realism and composure on the one hand and the expression of that determination that will put an end to any attempt at “achievements” to be consolidated. negative correlation.
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