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Since Greek-Turkish relations are in a fragile balance, with Tayyip Erdogan hesitating among lionesses and flirting with the European Union, with a meeting of Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias with Mevlüt Çavuşo παρέlu, former Prime Minister Costas Simitis on how Greece it shamelessly renounced the Helsinki advantage: the historic decision of the European Council of December 1999 – takes on special weight.
Mr. Simitis wrote an article in the “New Weekend” with the characteristic title “Helsinki and a” success that was not completed “”.
And in this, after describing the geopolitical framework that had been formed after the Imia crisis and the dense background of the European Council of December 10, 1999, he has no problem blaming his successor in Prime Minister, Costas Karamanlis, for the change in strategy that left Greece alone against Erdogan … the best man.
“The European Council met on December 10, 1999. It started with the question of the enlargement of the Union and the candidacy of Turkey. I said that I cannot agree with the candidacy of Turkey, unless the candidacy of Cyprus is treated positively. The Council, faced with the impasse created, was suspended. Successive tripartite consultations have been held with the Presidency and our colleagues to reach a generally accepted decision. I felt that the climate was gradually changing. The objections were based on the argument of that the Turks do not accept the solution of the Cyprus problem. The Presidency was in constant contact with the Turkish delegation and Ankara, while the Council was beginning to feel annoyed by their implacable stance. With great effort, in which the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr. Solana, made a decisive contribution, we have finally achieved our objectives. The two critical arrangements.
All 15 member states have agreed to recognize Turkey as a candidate country. It should, within a reasonable time, resolve any border or other conflict with member states on the basis of the principles of international law, including recourse to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.. if there was no agreement on the pending disputes. To further clarify, the Summit’s conclusions stated that “no later than 2004” the 15 leaders would review the situation to approve the start of Turkey’s accession process. If the pending controversies had not been resolved, they would have promoted their solution through the International Court of Justice. As regards Cyprus, we have convinced our partners that the precondition for a solution to the Cyprus problem, which they proposed as a starting point for the Cyprus accession process, made the president of “Northern Cyprus”, R Denktash, in the captain. of developments. From now on he could bargain extortively against the Union and Greece, since he would have in his hands the key to the accession process of Cyprus. Our 14 partners accepted our reasoning. In the conclusions of the Summit it was noted that “if a solution (on the Cyprus issue) has not been reached until the end of the Cyprus accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be taken without the foregoing being a condition “.
The first part forced Turkey to resolve in the future, but as a basic condition of its accession process, any of its problems with Greece and to put the EU as supervisor of the process.
The second, as is well known, turned out to be the key to Cyprus’s accession to the EU, sealed in a solemn event at Attalos Stoa in April 2003, when the Accession Treaty of ten new EU member states (including the Republic of Cyprus)) was signed.
The following is what Mr. Simitis writes about the turning point, when Mr. Karamanlis did not care about Helsinki:
“After the New Democracy victory, on Sunday March 7, 2004, I invited Mr. Karamanlis to Maximou to brief him on issues that I thought the new prime minister should be aware of. Mr. Karamanlis arrived at Maximou accompanied by his advisor, Mr. Molyviatis. Having referred to the current financial problems, I wanted to raise the question of relations with Turkey. Mr. Karamanlis immediately interrupted me saying that he has different views on these issues and that he does not need information.
He added that Mr. Molyviatis is primarily responsible for dealing with them. Mr. Molyviatis took the floor immediately after and said that the new government would implement its own policy, which is different from that of my government. Following this observation, the debate turned to other issues, regardless of foreign policy.
Greece was represented by the new Prime Minister K. Karamanlis in December 2004, when, in accordance with the Helsinki decision, the Brussels Summit was held to decide the start of accession negotiations with Turkey. Unfortunately, at the Brussels Summit it was decided to start Turkey’s accession process, despite the fact that it had not resolved its differences with Greece regarding the EEZ and the continental shelf. Karamanlis and the ND government, in contrast to the loudmouths of the opposition era, showed early on signs of widespread apathy towards events. His long-awaited mobilization for the December 2004 European Council did not take place. Nothing happened as those who had worked to bring Turkey to a one-way street that imposed decisions on it reasonably expected. The Greek Prime Minister, during the discussion, although he had the opportunity, did not object to the breach by Turkey of the condition established in Helsinki and was concerned about the existence of differences regarding the size of the Turkish continental shelf. On the contrary, he noted that “suffocating time constraints don’t help.” Thus, it accepted the start of accession negotiations with Turkey with unresolved Greek-Turkish differences regarding the borders of the continental shelf and its coastal areas. “Turkey came out of the alley without any reaction.”
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