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It is true that Costas Hatzidakis had other plans when he went to the Ministry of Environment and Energy and found other situations. He knew he had to face the bad situation of the PPC, but as a good neoliberal he believed that he had the solution or at least wanted to show it: privatization.
But when he saw the reality of a PPC on the verge of collapse, largely as a result of political decisions by previous governments, including some in which he was involved, he realized that privatization could not take place now because it simply could not find a buyer. So PPC had to be saved.
This meant that PPC would receive a direct financial injection to cover basic needs. Therefore, the seemingly simpler solution was chosen: increasing DEH fees. This also meant that no other solution was considered that would help PPC recover.
However, the increase in PPC fees would also mean significant increases in consumer accounts. However, this would provoke reactions and dissatisfaction and that is what the government wanted to avoid.
Transfer of costs to ETMEAR
Another solution was thus preferred: the price of the electricity itself would be increased, but the Special Emission Reduction Rate (ETMEAR) would be reduced, so that with the settlement the bills would remain the same.
ETMEAR itself is a painful story …
In Greece, the decision to switch to renewable energy sources coincided with all variants of direct and indirect privatization and treatment of energy as a field of “investment”. The problem is that energy production from renewable energy sources costs more than production from fossil fuels. This in itself is a manageable subject if we are talking about a producer who combines both.
However, renewable energy sources were mainly delivered to private initiative and if electricity from renewable sources were purchased at the average price, the investments would not be profitable. Therefore, a subsidy was needed for those who produced electricity from renewable energy sources. The cost of this subsidy was chosen to be passed on to final consumers (excluding industrial consumption) and thus we arrive at ETMEAR, which occupies a significant part of the amount we pay.
How the “black hole” was formed
When Hatzidakis decided to cut ETMEAR – and indeed to cover increases in PPC electricity prices – he knew that in the end it would simply form a “black hole” in the line needed for renewables. However, he decided that he could proceed normally.
But then came the pandemic, restrictive measures, and economic recession. All this meant a significant reduction in electricity consumption and therefore in income for ETMEAR. Because as electricity consumption decreased, so did ETMEAR’s income and therefore ELAPE’s income, the special account where ETMEAR’s income ends. 
In July 2020, the accumulated deficit of ELAPE was 194 million euros. The estimate of DAPEEP (RES & Guarantee Manager SA), which manages ELAPE, is that at the end of the year the deficit will reach 217.6 million euros (287.6 after deducting the Special Emergency Reserve 70 million €) . In March, the Photovoltaic Energy Producers Association (SPEF) issued a statement in which it took into account the reduction in ELAPE’s income, due to a reduction in the System Limit Price (OTS), the deviation from the objective to the rights of emission and a reduction in consumption. the deficit could reach 423 million euros.
Who will pay for the marble?
The question is who will pay the cost of Hatzidaki… brilliant ideas?
The ministry itself and Hatzidakis are trying to get an emergency grant from the Recovery Fund, mainly because there is talk of other European countries. However, this is not a fact, since Brussels is always quite cautious with these practices, that is, it covers the deficit resources with other conveniences.
The other solution is to transfer the cost to the providers (hence to PPC) and to the competitive part of the rates. Aside from the fact that this exactly negates PPC’s supposed support, it will of course result in a burden for consumers. 
There is the possibility that consumers will commit to paying it by increasing the regulated tariffs. But this again conflicts with the government’s supposed commitment that consumers will not feel burdened.
Finally, there is the solution simply to reduce the quantities delivered by ELAPE to RES producers. This solution could be promoted, to the extent that several of the older investments have depreciated, but again it is obvious that it will provoke reactions.
Is there a plan in this ministry?
The question that arises is not only whether the ministry will be able to cover the “black hole” in ELAPE or which solution it will prefer.
The question is whether Costas Hatzidakis will really be able to come up with a plan, rather than just handling problems on the fly, which ends in a vicious cycle where solving one problem ends only one creates another …
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