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In the first two weeks of this undeclared war, the Armenian forces, despite being seriously surprised by the size and intensity of the Azeri air and ground attack, managed to absorb much of the offensive power of their opponents, without further allowing an attack. strategic. victories at a regular level. In a related article in Liberal, among other things, we raised the question of how much longer Armenians could make a successful defense. It was even emphasized that Azerbaijan, as an energy player with three times the population and four times the GDP, in the long term with a war of attrition could weaken the Armenians to defeat them as long as Russia remains neutral.
The defeat of the Armenians was significant, the losses unpaid, Moscow simply neutral and the significant superior military power of the Azeris, having Ankara at their side, brought the strategic result in the three days from October 5 to 8, six weeks after the start of the attack. The Azeris achieved two major recesses in the Southeast (MAP) that led them to occupy the second largest city of Susa (Sushi) and to control the Lachin corridor that connects Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian Prime Minister, Pasinian, and the leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, Karabakh Haroutiunian, realized that it would be futile to continue the fight with more bloodshed, as it was considered a matter of time before the occupation of the capital Stepanakert and the siege of Afghanistan by Kabul. Faced with the imminent great defeat and in order to save Nagorno-Karabakh itself, which they continue to occupy, they accepted on Monday the peace terms prepared by Moscow, which in essence constitutes a capitulation.
But let’s see what the terms “peace” say:
– All military action ceases and the forces of both states remain where they were when the Agreement entered into force. (10/11 01:00 local time).
– A 1960 Russian “Peacekeeping Force” is deployed with its own means, intervening between the Azerbaijani and Armenian Forces along the “Line of Contact” and along the Latsin corridor connecting Armenia with Nagorno- Karabakh, as mentioned above, for a period of five years. with a prospect of renewal for another five years.
– Armenia returns the Azeri territories that it still holds according to a specific schedule next month. Both parties guarantee the free and safe movement of the corridors towards Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan.
Displaced people and refugees are returning under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
It is clarified that the territories reconquered by Azerbaijan and those that will be returned by the Armenians are those that they controlled as the Nagorno-Karabakh Security Zone and constituted about 15% of the territory of Azerbaijan plus the nooks and crannies they made in Nagorno-Karabakh. Most of Nagorno-Karabakh remains in the hands of the Armenians, but the Agreement does not mention their legal status at all.
Putin is the big winner. His attitude to the war was not opportunistic but a matter of strategy. Now he comes as a referee and a pacifist and shows everywhere who is the master of the game in the Caucasus and especially in the Yerevan Government that came after the “velvet revolution” of 2018 and Prime Minister Nicole Panisian, whose openings to the West they were not welcomed in Moscow. Russian troops will no longer be only in Armenia, where it already has a large military base, but also in Azerbaijan!
Of course, the winner is Azerbaijan and personally President Ilham Aliyev. Overwhelmingly armed in means and personnel and after $ 13 billion in modern equipment over the past five years, bolstered by some 2,000 mercenaries transported by Ankara from Syria, with Turkish advisers, Azerbaijan tried to reclaim all of its territories. It may not have occupied Nagorno-Karabakh (only a small part of it) or, if you will, was content with a small part, but forced Yerevan to capitulate, reclaiming its territory and ensuring the return of tens of thousands of displaced Azeris. . They are celebrating in Baku after the triumphant announcement of the end of the war and victory.
Turkey is also a winner, who set foot in the Caucasus forever. Looking at the statements of the Turkish officials we would say that “Turkey wants to hide and joy does not leave it.” It may not join the peacekeeping force, Aliyev said, but the Turks will join the Control Center established to monitor the implementation of the agreement. His military advisers will remain in Azerbaijan.
Without a doubt, the big loser is Armenia. He was defeated, losing the Azeri territories that he controlled as the Nagorno-Karabakh security zone and a small part of it. With its Armed Forces weakened due to significant losses without resources and reserves and without substantial third party assistance, the Armenian political leadership was forced to accept this “incredibly painful Agreement”, as Panisyan himself claimed. Armenia enters a national and political situation after the crisis of this defeat.
In Greece we will have to learn a lot from this six-week conflict on a geopolitical, strategic, but also operational-tactical level. First of all, it should be noted that President Aliyev constantly used aggressive rhetoric against Armenia, thus preparing the international community and its people for military action (reminds anyone?). He never hid the fact that his strategic objective was to regain the lost territories of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Taking advantage of its energetic position in all previous years, it gained overwhelming power in relation to Armenia. With the West indifferent, assuring the “neutrality” of Moscow and seeing that the geopolitical situation allows it, he sought with the Turkish “brothers” a military solution that largely but not entirely succeeded.
Armenia rested for years … “on the laurels” of the victorious war of 1992-1994. He considered that his Alliance with Russia and the Russian Base on his territory were sufficient to protect him from an Azeri attack. He might realize that Moscow was playing its own game by promoting its own position in the Caucasus. He believed that the Armenian lobby in the United States would help. He eclipsed Azerbaijan’s over-equipping quite shamefully and failed to develop a deterrent which, as I often say, is different from defense. His prevention failed and it did not matter what they said in Yerevan and Stepanakert about it, but what perception they had in Baku. It was a big mistake to think that if something was done by Azerbaijanis it would be limited and not generalized and for a few days they would get it, as they did. In the long run, in intensity and extent they fell. Make a reduction to ours now and you will understand what I mean. We end by paraphrasing the well-known Clinton saying: “Inequality of power is nonsense.”
* Lieutenant General ea Konstantinos Loukopoulos is director of the “Liberal Observatory”
ΥΓ. Commercial and regular lessons (lessons learned), as well as those related to the use of new technologies, such as US drones, etc., we are sure that the Greek Armed Forces will evaluate them properly.
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