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The US-Turkey relationship resembles a slow-moving train collision Foreign policy in an article titled “Time to let Turkey go.”
You can’t cooperate
In this article, signed by German Marshall Fund think tank researcher Nicholas Danforth, he opposes Erdogan’s appeasement policy and emphasizes that US President-elect Joe Biden has no place for a moral commitment to Erdogan’s Turkey. In fact, Erdogan clarifies, “you cannot cooperate with an authoritarian regime that is aimed at not cooperating with you.”
“Tax cut” with parental benefits and donations
In this context, the columnist calls on the United States to exert constant pressure on Ankara to show that competition from its former allies has consequences.
“Washington should be clear about Turkey’s role in US foreign policy, as well as its own role in Turkish domestic policy: it will be almost impossible to cooperate with Turkey when the Turkish government sees the US as a threat.” “And it will be difficult to support Turkish democracy when this is what much of the Turkish opposition is doing,” the columnist said.
The Biden challenge
The Foreign Policy article is as follows:
“If, as analysts point out, the relationship between the United States and Turkey looks like a collision of slow-moving trains, the good news is that the trains are moving slower than expected. The bad news is that they continue to direct each other by the Same rails Newly elected president Joe Biden now finds himself in the unenviable position of the braking driver … and he can’t expect much help from his counterpart on the other train.
For Biden, the challenge will be to minimize the damage Turkey can do to US interests without provoking further conflict or ruling out future cooperation.
His work must begin with the assumption that Washington cannot save the US-Turkish alliance alone, nor will Erdogan ever offer a real restoration of relations, no matter how many times he appears to do so. The United States and Turkey will continue to work on multiple levels and there will continue to be more crises. If everyone is lucky, there will also be breaks and some progress in areas of common interest.
For the best strategy in this win-win situation, Washington must be clear about Turkey’s role in US foreign policy, as well as its own role in Turkish domestic politics: it will be nearly impossible to work with Turkey. when the Turkish government sees the United States as a threat, and it will be difficult to support Turkish democracy when so does much of the Turkish opposition.
Conflict approach
There have been a number of explanations for why Turkey has taken a more confrontational approach with the United States and its other Western allies in recent years.
Some analysts have pointed to the domestic political benefits that Erdogan derives from his anti-Western stance, especially now that he is in an electoral alliance with Turkey’s supranationalist party. Others have highlighted the role of Erdogan’s Islamist ideology and his aspirations for hegemony in the Muslim world.
Others point to a number of specific Turkish complaints, such as Washington’s support for Kurdish fighters in Syria or its refusal to extradite Turkish preacher Fethullah Gulen to Turkey, arguing that they explain or justify Turkish hostility.
There is great truth in all these explanations. And that, in itself, is reason to suspect that the approach may be difficult. However, by themselves they do not highlight the full scope of the challenge.
The most troubling reality is that ideology, grievances, and domestic politics have together shaped a new Turkish security dogma that, consistently or not necessarily precisely, identifies the United States as a major threat that must be aggressively overcome. countermeasures.
Pro-government Turkish analysts were eager to highlight the idea of Turkey’s new foreign policy. They believe that the Western powers are concerned about Turkey’s newly won independence and are therefore working on several fronts to control the country’s rise.
Russia rewrites the rules of the game
And yet, as Western power shrinks and the world becomes more multipolar, they also believe that Turkey can use “hard power” and selective cooperation with Russia to rewrite the rules of the game in its favor.
This approach to the world is popular with Erdogan’s voters, fits well with the president’s ideological assumptions, and has received enough external validation to be difficult to discredit.
For Washington, taking Turkey’s new foreign policy seriously means accepting that no combination of threats or incentives will restore a partnership anytime soon. Instead, American politicians face a longer-term challenge to disprove the assumptions that guide Turkish politics.
This will require constant pressure to show Ankara that competition from its former allies has consequences. But it also demands that the door be left open to reduce escalation if Ankara decides to do so.
In other words, policy makers should not resort to any reconciliation agreement from Erdogan or view his offers to restart (relations) as a reason to bow to Ankara. At the same time, they must recognize that negotiations and working groups can play a valuable role in putting problems on ice, even when neither side expects them to be resolved soon.
Cooperation only if Erdogan leaves power
Indeed, given Washington’s growing frustration with Erdogan, some have already concluded that real cooperation with Turkey will only be possible when Erdogan leaves power.
Certainly there are reasons to expect that a government led by Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s Party will be less competitive with the United States and the EU.
Such a government may also be more willing to reconcile with neighbors like Egypt, while showing less enthusiasm for other regional players like Hamas. However, there is also reason to believe that the Turkish opposition shares many of the government’s suspicions about Washington and supports many of Erdogan’s efforts to do so. Furthermore, if they come to power, they will almost certainly face new political pressure, demanding that they prove their nationalist credentials.
Of course, one of the main reasons that both Erdogan and his opponents suspect Washington is their common belief that US support for democracy in Turkey always depends on what it might mean for the Turkish internal system. U.S.
Washington’s history of the Cold War certainly shows that its approach to Turkish democracy often revolved around parties that they believed supported American interests.
Lightning fast
The result is that, today, explicit support for the Turkish opposition is not necessarily the best way to support the Turkish opposition. Last summer, a video was posted showing Biden in an earlier interview with the editorial staff of the New York Times, who asked the United States to encourage the Turks to work to overthrow Erdogan through the electoral process.
Almost immediately, both Erdogan and Turkish opposition leaders were quick to condemn Biden’s comments. They denounced the interference of the United States in the internal affairs of Turkey and insisted that they would not participate in the imperialist game in Washington.
This reaction speaks to a deeper division among Turkey’s nationalist opposition over how they believe Washington can best help their country. Insisting that “Turkey is bigger than Erdogan”, many of Erdogan’s opponents argued that Western countries should not punish all of Turkey because of their anger at the leader.
They argue that to avoid losing the 50% of Turkey that hates Erdogan, the United States and the EU should offer Turkey better trade opportunities rather than sanctions, while working to address widely common Turkish concerns about the Gulen movement. , the YPG and the Eastern Mediterranean.
The problem, of course, is that other, more sincere members of the opposition insist that this approach would only strengthen Erdogan to his detriment. Giving Erdogan high-profile foreign policy victories, they insist, only gives him more courage. And avoiding sanctions on Turkey, let alone providing measures like a revised customs union with the EU, gives Erdogan vital financial support to maintain his authoritarian role.
Contradictory expectations
In light of these conflicting expectations, Biden simply needs to be consistent in criticizing Erdogan’s undemocratic behavior. It must condemn the arrest of Erdogan’s democratic opponents and push for the release of political prisoners. That in itself would be a welcome change, both from Erdogan’s desperate moral embrace with the outgoing US president and former President Barack Obama’s occasional willingness not to be critical in hopes of securing Ankara’s cooperation. .
The president does not need to openly support the opposition, but neither should he hesitate to respond to Erdogan’s foreign policy challenges in hopes of gaining their sympathy. Ultimately, separating America’s support for democracy from its specific geopolitical ambitions may be the best way to show that Americans truly support Turkish democracy for its own sake.
The United States has long been criticized for cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Trump reinforced this by facilitating Erdogan’s authoritarianism and did not even accept his cooperation in return. Biden may have inherited an ongoing accident, but at least he has no room for moral compromise. “You cannot cooperate with an authoritarian regime that aims not to cooperate with you.”
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