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Did you ever imagine that Naval Officers (PN) would take the advice of an Italian Mafia boss to fulfill one of the most critical missions of your career? Or that in their attempt to activate our most innovative naval weapons, PN executives could find solutions to serious technological problems at a cost less than 3% of the amount required by foreign suppliers?
On November 8, 2020, The author of “Kathimerini” Vassilis Nedos described critical aspects of the Odyssey of the 214 submarines and how they ended up being super-weapons in the fight against Turkey., whereas until recently they had been insulted as bowing (Y / B) subs. In his article, Nedos emphasized that a separate story could be written about the PN executives. who innovated to solve the enormous problems that kept these submarines unfinished for years.
This text, then, is the history of this historical group of the PN, which literally applied paradoxical and different management principles that the mafia itself would envy. He negotiated with trade unionists, put the goggles on American and German tech giants and took unprecedented initiatives for Greek and global data, so that he could finally activate the 214 submarines, saving the Greek state tens of millions of euros.
We are in 2013. The Scaramanga Shipyards are closed, the three submarines 214 and the improving submarine 209 are trapped, finished at rates much lower than the approximately 80% that was officially known. Percentage reached by the Greek hands of Skaramaga Shipyards under the direction of the German construction company HDW. The German and American companies involved in the construction of the four submarines are either missing or are asking for help from the tens of millions. Shipyard workers are unemployed and without pay for months and unionists are pushing for outrageous amounts, especially for some dialects, in the midst of a crisis.
In these desperate conditions, the PN leadership takes matters into their own hands, with the consent of the political leadership, and assumes control of the shipyards so that the construction of the substations can be completed. The burden of this historic mission falls on the then commander of Naval Squadron Scaramanga (NCS), an enlightened officer who proved himself the wizard of resource and personnel management.
From its founding in 1987 until that time, the function of the NCS was exclusively to monitor the development and implementation of the PN weapons programs, according to the contracts. Then, overnight, the NSC was found by a mere shipyard observer and inspector, manager of all his work and staff.
The first concern of the then commander of the NSC (D / NKS) was to select a dream team of officers and NCOs from the Submarine Command, who would be responsible for the entire organization and management of the shipbuilding program. The choice is right, since no one else knows and does not harm PCs more than those who would be its end users, and PC management is one of the most demanding and professionally trained in the PN After all, he himself is ” underwater “and he knows it very well.
Subsequently, the D / NKS and his team had to ensure the proper staffing of the shipyards and the rehire of more than 700 managers, employees and laid off workers. Here, however, we have a significant cultural conflict, as the PN officers have extensive experience in human resource management, but within the framework of the PN principles and regulations. So how could they handle the hundreds of trade unionists? and citizens of the shipyards?
The D / NKS realized that it had an unprecedented problem on its hands, which required an unprecedented solution. Ultimately, his solution included unusual management methods and practices, even following the advice of the mob. Specifically, the D / NKS turned to the classic business administration book entitled “The Mafia Manager” for help, business management principles from an Italian Mafia leader in the US, which was suggested to be studied. by all team officials. The stories of how the team applied the book’s principles are unique and would fit more into a movie script than an article.
However, where the PN team was in the management of the technological problems of the construction of the submarines. The team was divided into subgroups of around 10-20 people per submarine, who were tasked with guiding and coordinating the shipyard crews for the heaviest shipbuilding jobs. The team also included officers and NCOs considered electronics gurus, who took on the most sensitive electronic tasks themselves, to be personally responsible for managing complex business systems.
Very quickly, the PN team realized that there were huge problems of over-indebtedness but also delays in the supply of spare parts. For example, a German company was asking € 60,000 for a power supply, which would take months to deliver. Finally, PN technicians were able to build it themselves in just one hour with supplies that they bought on the national market at a cost of less than 1,500 euros. In other words, we are talking about only 2.5% of the price requested by the manufacturer.
However, there were also cases where after many interventions on highly sensitive electronics, the PN team had to seek the help of a leading US defense equipment manufacturer. The problem was solved by our technicians, but given the complexity of this system it was important to obtain the opinion of the manufacturer. When the company technician examined the part, he did not believe the intervention made by the PN technicians and took photos to share with his colleagues. In fact, he characteristically said that “there is nothing you have done. This is the first time I have seen this part open, we usually do not reopen it after it leaves the factory.”
These successive small successes boosted the morale of the PN executives, who worked at a dizzying pace. But this effort was worth it, as they saw every day that a well-honed system had been created that identified problems, solved them immediately, and this experience carried over to the faster resolution of other future obstacles. Many described this experience as the best and most “full” of satisfaction of their many years of PN careers.
Finally, this team, with the active assistance of the shipyard technicians, was able to activate the first Greek Submarine 214 and the modernized Submarine 209 in about six months, and the rest followed a little later, saving the Greek State. cost tens of millions of euros.
This process, however, had multiple benefits, in addition to the substations.
At this time, the subcommand has perhaps the most technologically trained officers and NCOs in this highly specialized subject in the world. One of them, who is still the commander of a submarine, was the master of activation of the electronics of all 214 submarines. This officer and his team solved communication problems of all the electronic systems of the submarines that neither the companies could. construction companies. If it were in the private sector, both the young officer and his team would have received huge bonuses, as they were essentially the ones who took billions of sleeping sheets and turned them into the fear and terror of the Turkish PN.
It should be noted that the service recognized the value of all those involved. Some were rewarded by the PN leader, while most took key positions to continue offering using the knowledge, experience, but above all the flexibility and out-of-frame thinking acquired during the activation of the submarines. .
Furthermore, the knowledge of this unique process has already been transferred to the crews of all Greek submarines, but also to the School of Submarines, so that it becomes the property of all future generations who will man our ships.
Yet at the same time, this story has a sour side. There is a tendency now, capable executives from the PN, but also from the Air Force and Army, to decide to pursue different careers. People in the substation activation program, and not only, turn to both the domestic and global private labor market. Of course I don’t know what the solution to this problem could be. All I know is that these people are our nuclear weapon against an increasingly aggressive Turkey, so addressing this phenomenon should be an immediate priority.
Finally, do you wonder what the “mafioso” commander in chief of the Scaramanga naval squad, who organized this little miracle, the fruits of which we reap today, is doing today? After obtaining all the ranks allowed by the service, he successfully completed his term as Vice Admiral in September 2020. He is only 57 years old. Would we rather see you as the commander of a great state body, rather than being your home? Perhaps your next mission should be the establishment and organization of a special state body that would utilize suitable individuals in the future, such as those in the Y / B dream team, as these are our true super weapons.
Revolutionary technology
Submarines are subdivided into nuclear and conventional. Nuclear power plants have practically unlimited autonomy, since their energy comes from a nuclear reactor. In other words, they can stay diving for as long as operationally necessary, even months or, in theory, years.
In contrast, conventional substations, such as the six oldest Greek substations 209, use batteries, which must be charged every few days. To charge them, the submarine is required to be shallow so that it can raise its fan to the surface of the sea to get air and operate the machines that charge the batteries with the help of generators. At this stage, PCs are vulnerable.
The four newer 214s and the updated 209 have revolutionary technology that allows them to dive for more than a month, as we saw in the recent crisis with Turkey. This technology works as follows. As is well known, the electrolysis of water occurs when we apply current to two electrodes dividing the water into hydrogen and oxygen. Substations 214 use the reverse procedure. Combining hydrogen and oxygen they produce water and electricity, which charges their batteries. This process is quiet and anaerobic, that is, it does not require the submarine to ascend to periscope depth to gain access to air for the operation of the machines that charge the batteries, such as the old 209. Thus, in combination with the mastery of the crews. our submarines remain undetected.
* Mr. Nikolas Katsimbras is a professor in the conflict resolution program at Columbia University in New York, is an International Relations Advisor and a former Navy officer.