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As is now known, on November 9, Armenia agreed to sign the treaty to end the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. This includes very harsh terms for the Armenian side as the Armenians were defeated. The only positive condition for Armenia is the provision of a “corridor” from Armenia to the capital of Artsakh through the Lachin (Pezhor) region, which will make a decisive contribution to the viability of the Armenian enclave.
But what are the reasons why Armenia capitulated? The answer is not obvious. What matters is not only the defeat of the Armenian forces, but also the reasons that led to it and, of course, the internal political situation in Armenia, which also contributed to the collapse of the front.
Let’s look at the military part first: when the Azeris attacked, the Armenian forces in Artsakh were not sufficiently prepared. The forces of the de facto independent Republic, the eighteen, mainly soldiers sent from Armenia and all the volunteers who had arrived from the Armenian diaspora, were essentially beheaded. On November 11, the President of Artsakh spoke clearly about the flight of many Armenian citizens to Armenia at the beginning of hostilities. He stressed that the main reason for the defeat was the lack, not only of ammunition, but mainly of combat manpower.
Armenian artillery appeared to be effective in the early days of the war. However, the widespread use of Turkish and Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) appears to have given Azerbaijan the upper hand. But the reality is this: Azerbaijan (with the help of Syrian mercenaries) has essentially fought against an army that did not have the characteristics of a regular army. It’s like fighting the guerrillas. This happened because the Armed Forces of Armenia did not participate decisively in the fighting. Tanks, ballistic and anti-ballistic missiles, artillery, radar and MEA were sent to the front. However, the thousands of soldiers that could be dispatched were not dispatched, except for the soldiers and a small number of soldiers who were mostly between 18 and 25 years old. There were no regular mobilizations in Armenia. This is because the Republic of Armenia itself must be protected in the event of an attack by Azerbaijan.
Another reason was Turkey’s security guarantees in Azerbaijan. If Armenia participated in the war properly and by all means, there was a danger of a more immediate and decisive participation by Turkey. There are also reports from Armenian sources that many soldiers left the area at a time when the Azeris were advancing, resulting in the loss of much of the territory in the southern part of Artsakh and Sushi, the second largest city and cultural capital of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Armenia fought alone. The only help he received was from Russia, but that help was not enough. Moscow saw from the beginning of the conflict that the Armenians faced serious problems due to the MEAs used by Azerbaijan. However, it equipped Armenian forces with special MEA demolition vehicles only two weeks ago. Azerbaijan, for its part, received the full support of Turkey, as well as other states (Israel, Pakistan). It received Turkish military advisers, a large quantity of Turkish (and NATO) weaponry, Turkish and Israeli MEAs, Turkish special forces units, Syrian mercenaries, and paramilitary groups (mainly gray wolves).
The most important thing is the reconciliation between Turkey and Russia, something that was also reflected in the ceasefire agreement, even though Turkey was not part of it.
But why didn’t Russia support its strategic partner Armenia? The first reason is the pro-Western stance of the Pasinian government, which overthrew the semi-authoritarian pro-Russian regime in Armenia with the 2018 velvet revolution. Many speak of a “lesson” that Russia taught Armenia similar to the one that It hit Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. There was no reason for Moscow to jeopardize its influence in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, with its stance, Russia “displaced” Europe (France) and the United States from what was happening in Nagorno-Karabakh. The two countries face their own internal problems (terrorism in France and elections in the US) and they did not get involved as they should have been as members of the OSCE Minsk Group, responsible for solving this problem.
Furthermore, with the outcome of the war, the Russians are gaining even more ground: they are further strengthening their military presence in Transcaucasia and returning militarily to Nagorno-Karabakh for the first time since the collapse of the USSR. They are also closing in on Azerbaijan, from which they will benefit for three main reasons: First, Russian arms sales to Baku will increase. Second, energy cooperation between the two countries will be improved, and third, Azerbaijan will move away from the West because it will no longer need it. Finally, Russia achieves Armenia’s greatest commitment to him. Despite Moscow “emptied” Yerevan (some speak of treason), Armenia now needs Russia even more for defense reasons (Armenia needs to be rearmed) but also for the protection of the Armenian population in Artsakh, who remain isolated from Armenia until the construction of a new highway that connects Yerevan with Stepanakert and bypasses the city of Sushi, which will reach Azerbaijan.
But the last but essential reason for the Russian position is the Moscow-Ankara crossing. Relations between the two states are not strategic or even truly allied. But there is a special and direct communication between Putin and Erdogan. We have seen it happen in Syria and Libya. Now it happened in Archah’s case. This rapprochement between Russia and Turkey serves both leaders: Putin is creating a rift in the western camp and managing to maintain Russian influence in the post-Soviet space and increase it in the broader Middle East.
Erdogan, on the other hand, manages to implement his neo-Ottoman policies. The Nagorno-Karabakh agreement not only wins its strategic partner in the Caucasus, it not only strengthens the rhetoric of pan-Turkishism, but applies as, with the new highway connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, Turkey (which borders Nakhichevan) will open a new “pan-Turkish” corridor that will connect you directly with Azerbaijan and the Turkic-speaking countries of Central Asia.
Finally, it is convenient to refer to the internal situation in Armenia before the agreement is signed. The whole world recognizes the unity of the Armenian nation. Armenians everywhere did what they could to help their homeland. But the same is not the case with Armenian politicians. In a war, all political forces must side with the government to confront the enemy. In Armenia, the majority of the opposition (17 parties, including representatives of the old regime) demanded the resignation of the prime minister. It is also said that the military friends of the former regime left the Artsakh areas as a result of the defeat of the Armenian forces. This information has not been confirmed, but it has been spoken by many Armenian fighters.
The old regime has a strong presence in the bureaucracy and in the army. Its representatives are described by many as oligarchs who serve the interests of Russia. Former Armenian leaders Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharian are close personal friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin. When the Pasinian government won the elections, it sought to clean up the political system, which was riddled with widespread corruption. The former Kotsarian president was also imprisoned in this context. This purge attempt upset Russia because it damaged its own interests in the country and in the region in general. I will not be surprised if in the future it is revealed that the representatives of the old regime contributed to the defeat of Azerbaijan. But for now we can only make assumptions.
In conclusion, the agreement was a national defeat for Armenia. But it was necessary. Otherwise, Stepanakert would fall and we would have many more deaths. It is not ruled out that the Azeris occupied all of Artsakh, a fact that would mark the definitive end of the Armenian presence in the region. The agreement is humiliating and, as history has shown, humiliating conditions lead to revisionism. That is why I hope that further negotiations will take place in the future with the aim of a just and, above all, peaceful solution to the issue. It is obvious that Armenians have their own responsibilities for not solving the problem for 30 years, but that is the subject of another article. In short: the best organization of the Azeri army, the non-deployment of a significant number of troops from Armenia to Artsakh, the assistance received by Baku from Turkey, the Russian neutrality, the Russia-Turkey alliance, as well as the internal political situation in Armenia. . in the defeat and acceptance of this agreement.
