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In April 2009, an agreement was signed between Greece and Albania on the demarcation of existing maritime zones (coastal zone, continental shelf), as well as maritime zones that could be established in the future (e.g. EEZ or border zone). The agreed maritime “multipurpose boundary” faithfully followed the median line and all islands in the area were fully taken into account during demarcation. The agreement followed the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) in an exemplary manner and was a model of maritime demarcation with a completely equal result for the two countries.
Following an appeal from the then Albanian opposition (and now the Edi Rama government), Albania’s Constitutional Court ruled in 2010 that the agreement was unconstitutional. Two of the four reasons invoked by the court fully coincided with the logic of the Turkish argument in favor of the Aegean. More specifically, it was stated that the adoption of the median line to establish the border between the two countries was contrary to the principle of equity. The court also found that full influence was wrongly attributed to the Greek islands in the region (Corfu and the Diapontian Islands) which were equated with the mainland Albanian coast. In Albania, islands should be considered “special circumstances” and have a reduced impact. Suspicions of Turkish interference in the process were soon confirmed. In November 2016, former Albanian President Sali Berisha directly accused Eddy Rama that the agreement “was canceled by the interests of a third party and not by the national interests of the Albanians.”
Since then, things have stalled. Despite pressure from Greece, Albania refused to ratify the agreement, citing a court ruling. Furthermore, the issue was involved in internal Albanian disputes. Albanian President Ilir Meta, from a different party than Prime Minister Edi Rama, had a different view of the government on how to solve the problem. In 2018, he had reached the point of refusing to give an order for new negotiations to Chancellor Busati.
At the same time, Albania asked Greece to respect the decision of the Albanian court (…!) And to renegotiate a new agreement. However, neither the geographic data of the area nor the legal data had changed. Therefore, the signing of a demarcation agreement with a content different from the one signed just in 2009 could not be justified. However, the previous Greek government had entered the logic of negotiating a new agreement. The draft of the new agreement that was drawn up is unknown, so no valid criticism can be made. However, the messages that Greece was sending at that time are strange. In Turkey we had to take an effective position because it is a large country. We had to sign the Prespa Agreement with Skopje for the sake of the Western alliance and its rapid accession to NATO. Given that Albania already has a signed agreement, why did Greece have to back down, at a time when the other party was not honoring its signature? Finally, due to the reactions of the Prespa Agreement, the agreement with Albania was never completed.
The announced decision of Greece and Albania appeal to the International Court of Justice in The Hague because the delimitation of the maritime zones between them was the only way out of the quagmire in which we had fallen. The appeal to the court will be preceded by the increase in territorial waters in the Ionian. This de facto reduces the area to be demarcated and makes the process relatively simpler.
The choice of litigation sends an excellent message to the Turkish side. The decision of the International Court of Justice may also be of strategic importance for Greek-Turkish relations. For the first time, this court will have to decide on the demarcation of a relatively small maritime zone where there are many islands.
It remains to be seen whether Albania will keep its word this time. We must not forget that the Turkish influence in Albania is generally high. It is no coincidence that the largest mosque in the Balkans (except Turkey, of course ζεται) is being built in Tirana with Turkish money. In particular, the Edi Rama government shows that it has even closer relations with Erdogan (than usual for Albanian data). Experience shows that after the first promise, the Albanian side looks for reasons and excuses to avoid respecting the agreement.
Also, the time to complete the joint action in court is limited. In April 2021, Albanians are led to parliamentary elections. The co-promise should have been completed by then.
* Mr. Angelos Syrigos is Professor of International Law and Foreign Policy, member of New Democracy in the Parliament of Athens.
