Is the “Russian bear” changing sides?



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Two years and three months have passed since the breakdown of Athens-Moscow relations. When July 2018 when two Russian diplomats were deported, with the consequences now known. Three and a half years have passed since the last visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov in Athens, a long time ending with his arrival on October 26.

The move marks the beginning of a new page in bilateral relations with the Russian Foreign Minister. declare to the Athens News Agency on Monday morning that it is “the sovereign right of each state to determine the range of territorial waters up to 12 miles.”

After all, it is no coincidence that the rapprochement operation between the two countries coincides in time with the deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations. Your participation Turkey in Nagorno-Karabakh War It was the straw that broke the camel’s back, as the conflicting interests of Russia and Turkey in Syria and Libya had repeatedly driven them into conflict.

Both or Vladimir Putin as much as Recep Tayyip Erdoganhowever, they eventually reached a compromise, prioritizing the “big picture”. Moscow wanted Turkey to move away from the West, while Ankara used Russia to balance Western pressure.

However, the immediate military involvement of the Turks in the Caucasus, in Russia’s “backyard”, is something that Putin will not forgive. So one of the ways that Russian diplomacy uses to send messages and pressure Erdogan is to open up to Greece.

Additionally, Moscow is concerned about providing extensive military facilities to the Americans, especially in northern Greece, specifically in Alexandroupolis and Kavala. Moscow believes that the freezing of Greek-Russian relations caused by a ministry Nikos Kotzias it facilitated the strengthening of the US presence in Greece.

The two interventions

Lavrov’s next visit to Athens and his meetings at 12 noon with Nikos Dendias and at 5 in the afternoon with Kyriakos Mitsotakis, is a measure to warm up bilateral relations. That is why it was accompanied by two interesting Russian speeches that heated the atmosphere before the Chancellor’s visit.

THE The second was made through an anniversary message from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself. in order to commemorate the 193rd anniversary of the Battle of Navarino, which, with the sinking of the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet, led to the independence of Greece.

«The triumph of the allied fleet became one of the preconditions for the independence of Greece.“Says the post, which is accompanied by a video showing the naval battle and shows the Turkish ships on fire.

It should be remembered that in the Gulf of Navarino the naval forces of Russia, France and Great Britain achieved the key blow against the Ottomans. After the naval battle, in fact, a Russo-Turkish war broke out, as Sultan Mahmut II’s refusal to accept the achievements led to a general conflict with Russia. The sultan then proceeded to close the Dardanelles to Russian ships by repealing the Ackermann Convention (1826). In June 1828, the main Russian forces, led by Tsar Nicholas I, crossed the Danube and advanced on Dobroutsa.

The first Russian intervention was the announcement of the Russian embassy in Athens. which explicitly recognized the right of Greece to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. This is a position that not only coincides with the Greek and is opposed to the Turkish, but also greatly facilitates Greek diplomacy, since it was mainly Russia that was supposed to be opposed to expansion.

The two previous movements and a series of indications mark the opening of Moscow to the Greek side. This development is not sudden, but certainly the fact that it is happening now is of great importance to the broader balances of our region.

It is true that the Russo-Turkish approach, combined with the deterioration of Greek-Russian relations over the last two or three years, had changed Moscow’s traditional attitude towards Greek-Turkish. This was also evident recently by the submissive and unacceptable attitude of official Russia towards the conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, which Orthodox devotees and pilgrims to Mount Putin described as “an internal affair” of Turkey.

The crack and expulsion

We remind you that the breakdown in Athens-Moscow relations was caused by Prespa Agreement and especially after the deportation of two Russian diplomats and the prohibition of another two from entering Greece. It was preceded by accusations that the deported Russian diplomats were provoking popular reactions to the Prespa Agreement. Moscow protested, but the most important thing was that took it hard.

The Putin-Erdogan flirtation, however, had preceded it. Russian-Turkish relations had reached their lowest point when The Turkish F-16 had shot down a Russian bomber in northern Syria. Moscow had reacted calmly then, increasing its pressure on Turkey, so when Erdogan realized that NATO was not running alongside him, he turned around and effectively apologized to Putin by promising him.

THE TurkeyIn fact, it blocked the entry of Chechen separatists and began to open up. For its part, Moscow saw the unique opportunity to tow Turkey away from the West and, according to unconfirmed reports, it was the one who warned Erdogan about the July 2016 coup.

Somehow, despite the always opposing interests of the two countries on local fronts, the Russian-Turkish approach gained geopolitical weight. That is why, at least until recently, Moscow has limited itself to appeals for restraint, avoiding condemning the Turkish aggression in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Ankara-Moscow rapprochement further strengthened already important economic relations. The construction of the Turkish Stream pipeline, the decision of the two countries to trade in their national currencies, the unprecedented wave of Russian tourists in Turkey and the second contract for the S-400 missiles are just some of the steps taken.

Despite the indisputable fact that, in general, one needs the other, the conflicting interests on the individual fronts and, as mentioned above, especially the Turkish involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh have stretched the rope. A clear Azeri victory would automatically make Turkey a key player in the Caucasus, especially in the Muslim populations of southern Russia, and that is something that Moscow cannot allow.

Lavrov’s visit to Athens, therefore, must be viewed autonomously in terms of Greece-Russia relations, but also in the broader context of the Greece-Russia-Turkey triangle. The Kremlin is opening up to Athens to somehow balance its relations with the two countries, but also to warn Ankara that it may take other measures that will strengthen the Greek side in the open Greco-Turkish crisis.

Lavrov’s recent statement: “It is not accidental.Turkey has never been considered our strategic ally. He is a partner, a close partner. In many areas this cooperation is strategic». A vinegar, an oil.

Except for the Syria Y LibyaAnother front where Russia and Turkey have conflicting interests is the Albania-Kosovo duo. Moscow has officially condemned the idea of ​​a “Greater Albania” with the union of the two Albanian states. On the contrary, the Erdogan regime fosters Albanian nationalism and especially its Islamic dimension because it sees them as possible geopolitical underpinnings for Turkish foreign policy.

That is why Erdogan favors the idea of ​​a “Greater Albania”, while the Russian Foreign Ministry considers it a threat. Moscow estimates that a “Greater Albania” will turn against Serbia, which is what remains of Russian influence in the Balkans, and at the same time strengthen US influence in the region. The reason for the Russian reaction was the long-term joint meeting of the governments of Albania and Kosovo.

Sir. Nikos DendiasHowever, from the beginning of his mandate, he made the healing of the gap in Greek-Russian relations a priority and that is why he had rushed to visit Moscow. According to one source, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis had asked Putin to intervene with Erdogan to ease tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. According to the same information, the Kremlin had not even responded to the Greek request. Other sources make it clear that the Kremlin was willing to intervene, but Athens did not ask.

The Mitsotakis government was also responsible for the coldness that prevailed until recently in Greek-Russian relations because it delivered promises to Moscow that it did not keep. Among the promises was the non-extradition of the arrested hacker Alexander Vinik (or “Mr Bitcoin”) in France and the United States, as well as the non-participation of Mr. Mitsotakis in the celebrations in Moscow in May 2020, for 75 years. of victory in World War II. Finally, due to the coronavirus, the celebrations were canceled, but the Greek prime minister had canceled earlier.

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