[ad_1]
As we move towards the 61st round of talks between Greece and Turkey, which will also be the first since March 2016, Turkey appears to be making little symbolic folds that are part of the new dialogue treaty.
You do not withdraw from “fixed” positions or claims, nor do you relinquish earnings you believe you had in the prior period, such as. Eg the internationally recognized agreement with the Libyan government for the mutual tracing of EEZs based on Turkish positions that annihilate the independent continental shelf and, consequently, the EEZ of the Greek islands. However, it is clear that at this stage you want to avoid a full-blown conflict with the European Union.
The key point is the possibility of European sanctions. What alarmed the Turkish government was not so much the possibility of another verbal criticism, nor the relatively small direct cost of the sanctions, but the symbolism they would have that Turkey is officially considered by the European Union as an international moving force. offender. For Turkey, this would have a higher total cost, which Erdogan now wants to avoid.
That is why Turkey has chosen to take a provocative stance on its way to the EU Summit on 24-25 September. Oruc Reis withdrew from the waters that Greece considers to be beyond the Greek continental shelf and NATO dialogue processes were resumed to defuse tensions at the military level. A key aspect of this effort by Turkey and the intention to show that it has no problem to proceed to a broader dialogue with Greece. 
The importance of developments on other fronts
All of this has to do with developments on other fronts. The situation in Libya is particularly important in this regard. There, Turkey had invested heavily in shifting the balance of power with its support for the Tripoli government, including the transfer of mercenaries from Syria, rejection of Haftar’s attacks, and the transfer of the “red line” to the east.
But at the same time it seemed that he was not the only force intervening. Russia made sure the balance of power got things where they are now, and Egypt intervened decisively to pave the way for political negotiations, all of which apparently had the support of other powers. The infighting within the Tripoli government itself, as well as large-scale popular protests, also showed Turkey that it was not enough to offer military aid alone.
With the prospect of a political solution that changes the data, Turkey must ensure that in the end it will maintain its influence on developments in the North African country but also that the political decisions of the Tripoli government, and especially the agreement on the EEZ, do not will be canceled. But to do that, it is not necessary to be in complete break with the entire international factor.
Put another way: for Turkey to be able to claim that it is in fact a “regional power” that cannot be omitted in any broader agreement in the region, it must shed the image of a country that generally conflicts with all the inhabitants of the region.
This has to do with the fact that at this time Turkey has opened fronts with several countries. The confrontation with France is a typical example. In fact, Turkey itself has accused France of targeting Ankara policy because it seeks non-colonial relations with African countries rather than France. But at the same time, it appears that Turkey is investing in the softer stance of other European countries like Germany, which do not want a complete breakout. This, in turn, explains why Turkey wants to show a less aggressive face and thus ensure that sanctions are avoided at the Summit and thus improve its overall image and presence on the other fronts. 
The thorn of Cyprus
However, in all this there is one more parameter. The question of sanctions against Turkey concerns not only Greek-Turkish relations, but also Cyprus. There, Turkey directly challenges the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus. In other words, in relation to the Greek continental shelf it can be described as a threat or as a challenge, as there is no official demarcation and Turkey has not attempted anything other than seismic studies, within the limits of the Cyprus EEZ. , which is normally declared and To some extent, there is a normal practical violation of a sovereign right, as Turkey has conducted periodic investigations, taking advantage of the fact that Cyprus cannot prevent such investigations by military means, but also the fact that Greece , in the context of the permanent Greek positions, it cannot participate directly.
This also explains the attitude of the Republic of Cyprus, which sees Turkey directly challenging its sovereign rights and that the EU does not react and that is why it has chosen to veto the decision on Belarus if there is no true European solidarity. This was already done in the debate in the EU Foreign Affairs Council on September 21, with the result that the issue was referred to the Summit.
Although Turkey has tried to separate the two tiers, it is clear that it would not want sanctions, if only on Cyprus issues, as this would ultimately have the same symbolism that Turkey is sanctioned precisely in Anchors are obvious aspects to ensure a role of regional power. And that explains why Turkey will persistently insist that once it has entered a dialogue process, then there can be no question of sanctions.
Of course, this will all depend on whether, and to what extent, there will eventually be some kind of resumption of the talks on the Cyprus issue, where this time it is clear that the crucial side will be the debate on how to share the benefits of the extraction of hydrocarbons. 
The uncertain next steps
Regardless of the balances or even the tricks that are sought at the Summit, it is clear that the next steps have a high degree of uncertainty.
The Greek side has made it clear that it wants dialogue, negotiation and a consensual appeal to The Hague on maritime issues, but insists that this presupposes the end of all other ways of questioning aspects of Greek national sovereignty (“gray areas”), the militarization of islands, etc.).
Until now, Turkey has insisted on the logic of dialogue on all things without preconditions combined with a tendency to raise all issues together, including those related to Greek national sovereignty.
What complicates matters is the fact that Turkey currently manages a set of “power projections” at the same time in a wider region and in different fields, an internal economic crisis that threatens the “development model” it defines. the political leadership position of the AKP. and Erdogan, the role of nationalism as a cohesive element both in relation to the Kurds and in foreign policy and, of course, a set of not always compatible geopolitical tactical approaches that have been established in recent years.
All this de facto makes a negotiation – which Athens clearly favors rather than the constant danger of a “hot episode” – much more complex but also uncertain, insofar as the Turkish attitude and mood are not always present. This, in turn, shows the limits of any mediation effort (United States, Germany) or intervention (France) insofar as they aim at cyclical management and avoid new tensions, while the horizon of such movements remains unfinished. Clear.
[ad_2]
