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By Maria Vassiliou
Without a doubt, Ankara’s dangerously growing aggression in the eastern Mediterranean is causing great concern throughout the European Union. However, on the chessboard of the balances that are being formed towards Turkey and the way of managing the Greek-Turkish crisis, the “27” do not show the same coherence. At the September 24-25 summit, European leaders will launch a strategic debate on Turkey and, if there is no de-escalation, they will focus on imposing sanctions with a higher probability of choosing the softer ones. Differences in approach, especially between Berlin and Paris, weaken the validity of European interventions beforehand, while making a more coordinated stance towards Turkey difficult.
“It would be difficult to find a European state in line with Turkey’s position, but there are different positions on the situation in the eastern Mediterranean and the general EU-Turkey relationship,” said Ian Lesser, director of Brussels and vice president of Germany of the United States. Marshall Fund. “At one end of the spectrum in terms of strategy and actions against Turkey is France and at the other Germany, which, although it disagrees with Turkey’s position in the eastern Mediterranean, is more sensitive to the course of the long-term relationship between the EU and Turkey. “As he explains,” this is a difficult balance situation in which the rest of the Member States, which have different interests and views towards Turkey, and the European institutions, which know that many issues, such as immigration, they must be linked to Turkey. “Italy, for example, has traditionally supported Turkey’s European course and is in a difficult position today, but in light of strictly maritime security, it is on the same line as Greece and Cyprus. Spain would be reluctant to participate in a military confrontation, but would like to see a more coordinated EU policy, Lesser explains.
The difficult balance is also overloading Brussels’ efforts to calm Turkey’s delinquencies. As European sources explain to “NEA”, the role of High Representative Josep Borel comes to power when a critical mass of Member States supports a certain position, which allows him to promote it, something that does not exist in relation to Turkey, thus Mr. Borrell negotiates with “severed legs”, while Turkey will seriously consider European interventions when it considers that there is significant support from EU member states.
Z. Borel
Mediation
“Germany sees that Greece is a member of the EU and solidarity with the country must be documented, without any conflict with Turkey. It is trying to mediate and seek a reduction in the eastern Mediterranean in a way that France does not. “Berlin and Paris have different views on de-escalation,” said Natalie Tocchi, special adviser to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, and director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. According to Tochi, France, Greece, Cyprus are on one side, but Germany, Spain and Italy move differently. “There is a lot of work to be done with the Member States on how Berlin can persuade Paris to change its attitude.” In this context, she believes that unless there are subversive developments until the Summit, the leaders will possibly agree to impose the softer sanctions (list of names), which Borrell presented at the recent Foreign Ministers meeting, and the impact will be small. “If the situation remains as it is, I do not see any intention to impose substantial sanctions on Turkey.” It is difficult to recover the sanctions and there are important issues in which Turkey plays a role. “Lesser agrees:” There will be a compromise, although some they ask for tougher sanctions, because there is an intention in Germany and elsewhere to keep the communication channel open with Turkey. If the measures are very strict, the door will close ”.
Toci believes that “the current status quo is not sustainable.” If it worsens, the EU will impose tough sanctions, if there is a de-escalation, it can generate momentum for a common European policy towards Turkey. However, he believes that “Greece should not see external intervention as the magic solution. The key to eliminating the impasse is not in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, Moscow or Washington, it is in Athens and Ankara.”
Dialogue
Lesser believes that there is room for tension reduction until the Summit, the first step being a coordinated effort to mitigate risk at the operational level. “The game is more difficult on a political level,” he said. Especially from the perspective of constructive dialogue, he considers that the current situation is more difficult than in the past. “On the one hand we have a more European and transatlantic Greece and on the other a more nationalistic, independent and aggressive Turkey. “Greece feels more politically confident about its positions and enjoys greater sympathy. On the contrary, Turkey is isolated and there is a risk of an alienation strategy.” However, he believes that “a more coordinated EU-Turkey policy is proof of European cohesion in foreign policy.”
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