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Saturday 12 September 2020
Von denis trubetskoy
On Monday, Belarusian ruler Lukashenko visited Russian President Putin. He expects Moscow’s support and has financial concessions to offer. With the help of Lukashenko, Moscow risks losing the sympathy of the Belarusians.
The meeting was announced weeks ago and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will travel to Russia on Monday. In the city of Sochi on the Black Sea, he will meet his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.
“It’s just a working visit,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, downplaying expectations. “The presidents will speak. There are no plans to sign any documents.” Rumors that the outcome of the meeting could be a step in the direction of the Russian-Belarusian state of union that has been officially aspired to since the 1990s, Peskov called “sheer nonsense.”
However, according to Peskov in Sochi, the interstate integration feared by most Belarusians, energy prices for Belarus and the refinancing of Minsk’s public debt will also be at stake. Lukashenko’s visit will definitely lead the way for the situation in Belarus. On paper, the Kremlin is behind the Belarusian autocrats. For example, Putin has announced the creation of a police reserve for the neighbor if the situation gets out of control. Moscow is also said to have promised to refinance a large loan. Russia accounts for about 70 percent of the Belarusian public debt.
However, so far there has been no concrete help from the Kremlin, and that is exactly what Lukashenko wants to negotiate in Russia. The decisive steps of Moscow would be of vital importance to him, because Belarus remains at a standstill. The protest is always very large, but it remains largely peaceful even a month after the controversial presidential elections, while the Belarusian security authorities and the state apparatus continue to support Lukashenko. There are no signs that this status quo is going to change anytime soon.
Putin is supposed to think Lukashenko has everything under control
This is precisely what makes Lukashenko’s visit a key event. Before that, the correct image must be transferred to Moscow. Because it is not a coincidence that the demonstrations in the city center of Minsk have recently been repressed. The objective is to convey to the neighboring country that there are fewer protests. Therefore, as at the beginning of the crisis, more and more people gather in smaller groups in the town hall. However, Moscow should have the impression that Lukashenko is in full control of the situation.
Concrete support for Lukashenko, for example in the police sector, could backfire for Putin. The fact that the Kremlin is fundamentally behind the eternal president is already jeopardizing the original sympathy for Russia among the protesters. Originally, the protest was predominantly geared towards domestic politics. However, now you can feel the disappointment with the Russian line. Anti-Russian slogans increase in Sunday’s demonstrations. The Kremlin’s policy is also causing a lack of understanding among protesters because the main characters in the protests, such as Maria Kolesnikova, are quite loyal to Russia.
An at least neutral position would have brought respect to the Kremlin in much of Belarusian society, according to Minsk. Russia could have improved its relations with the EU as a result. Also, working with Lukashenko, who is primarily interested in his personal gain and often does not stick to agreements, is anything but a pleasure for Moscow. If Putin still supports him, he runs the risk of losing another friendly neighbor after Ukraine.
The liquidation of Belarusian companies is likely
And what concessions could Lukashenko make in Sochi? Almost anything that could jeopardize the independence of Belarus, such as the much-discussed introduction of a common currency, is almost impossible. “Since we signed the Union Treaty, two generations have grown up. Today, such a deep integration is no longer possible,” Lukashenko himself said beforehand.
There has been a discussion between Russia and Belarus since 2019 because Moscow wanted to intensify the integration process again. According to a survey conducted by the Warsaw-based think tank “Belarusian Analytical Workshop” from early 2020, only about 13 percent of Belarusians want full union status with Russia. However, three quarters were in favor of good intergovernmental relations, including visa and customs exemption.
Financially, Lukashenko seems to want to go as far as possible to secure his power. A sale of the few large state-owned companies that are still profitable for Russian buyers is conceivable. Moscow has also long been interested in the transit of Belarusian goods that go not through the Baltic, but through Russian ports. The Lithuanian port city of Klaipeda, for example, lives mainly on Belarusian transit. It would also be in Moscow’s interest if Minsk aligns its economic ties even more closely with the Eurasian Economic Union, a merger of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, with Belarus doing half of its foreign trade with these countries anyway.
The key question is what political price Lukashenko would pay for Russia’s support. Moscow will hardly accept that everything in Belarus continues as before. Therefore, Lukashenko often speaks of a constitutional reform that would make the parliament more powerful, and he does not even rule out new elections. Moscow, on the other hand, was willing to share the experience of recent constitutional changes with Minsk. A perfect plan? Lukashenko would only be available for such a scenario if he was guaranteed to remain in power in one form or another. The opposition, which currently has a clear majority in Belarus, would certainly be against it. But that would not be optimal for Moscow in the medium term either.
