German foreign policy: “These are questions of our existence”

AOn Tuesday, Heiko Maas made his grand appearance at the United Nations General Assembly. Because the German Foreign Minister is currently in Corona quarantine, he addressed delegates from all 193 UN member states via video recording. Of course, that didn’t stop him from briskly presenting a variation on his favorite theme: a renewed call for multilateralism.

The SPD politician addressed almost all sources of fire in the world: the corona pandemic, the triangle of crisis Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, the Middle East, the Sahel area, Libya, Syria, the climate and the erosion of the gun control. Everywhere, “our generation faces a choice,” Maas said, or “to go on alone, without consideration” and thus ignore the UN’s multilateral legacy. “Or to renew this legacy, and to show that the correct response to the crises of our time is more solidarity.” In any case, Germany is ready for international cooperation.

However, the crucial question is: is Germany in a position to exert significant influence? This requires not only a commitment to cooperation, but above all adequate diplomatic, military and development resources, including the willingness to use these means of power in a systematic way. Six years ago, former Federal President Joachim Gauck appealed to the Federal Republic to assume responsibilities in the world “sooner, more decisively and substantially.” So has the government heeded this warning?

A new report from the Munich Security Conference investigates this question. Gauck had delivered his speech in Munich in 2014, which is why conference chair Wolfgang Ischinger and his team felt it was their duty to give “an overview of the strategic situation of German foreign policy” for the first time, as he puts it. the experienced diplomat.

“We are living a break in an era in which all the certainties on which German foreign policy has been based for decades are disappearing.” For example, Germany’s business model, which benefits from the rules-based world order guaranteed by the United States, is outdated, both economically and in terms of security policy. “Yet we behave as if we can continue to live with the status quo,” says Ischinger. “We can not do that. These are questions about our existence. “

Gauck was an early reader of the 118-page article. His conclusion: yes, progress has been made “in overcoming crises and emergencies, reorienting NATO or responding to the corona pandemic.” But then the restriction follows: “But it is also true that our commitment in some key areas remains behind the requirements of a changed world and the expectations of our partners. Foreign countries sometimes trust us more than we trust ourselves. “

The results of the report

The report also reaches this conclusion. “German foreign policy is changing, but the world around us is changing faster,” he says. The German commitment not only lives up to the expectations of the allies in NATO and the European Union: “It also does not meet the requirements derived from the strategic environment.” If almost all the pillars of foreign policy were eroded, gradual adjustments could no longer help.

Germany faces a “fateful decision: it can work resolutely to strengthen Europe in order to effectively defend German and European interests. Or Germany renounces shaping change, leaves it in the status quo and prepares for the fact that the EU-Europe becomes an appendage of Eurasia, which is dominated by other powers. “

All policy makers are aware of this “world political turning point”, but: “What has been lacking so far is a will, assumed by the political class, for a new German foreign policy that makes a sovereign Europe possible.” Nothing less than a turning point in German foreign policy. “

A German leadership role in the EU is targeted, which most partners want. For Europe to act, Germany must first define its strategic interests at the national level and modernize its foreign policy apparatus. That starts with further development of the “strategic culture.”

It seems necessary a document of national strategy that the government must present periodically, as it is usual in all the important allies. Currently, this document is published approximately every ten years. “This document and the annual interim reports could be the subject of debate in the Bundestag and help to create greater public awareness of the most important international issues. Furthermore, regardless of this, the Bundestag should generally debate foreign policy issues more frequently, ”the report says.

The government apparatus on foreign and security policy has hardly developed any further since the 1960s – on the contrary, uncoordinated polyphony prevails in international departments, the authors speak of the “Berlin disharmonics.” What is needed is “an improvement in our apparatus, either through the more systematic use and expansion of the Federal Security Council or the creation of new coordination structures.”

Where there is the greatest need to catch up

Diplomacy, development cooperation and defense must also be supported by sufficient resources: “In a long-term comparison, the share of international spending in the federal budget has decreased considerably and is no longer adequate for the current situation. “. The biggest need to catch up is defense spending, but also the number Diplomats are too low. The reduction of the US military presence in Europe, a trend that the report says will continue regardless of the outcome of the US elections, also increases the requirements: “Germany will not be able to avoid mobilizing more resources if Europe wants to act in terms of foreign policy and defense . “

The authors suspect that the effects of the corona pandemic will likely lead to a critical review of Germany’s spending in this area. However, they advise against making cuts: “In view of changes in global policy, we should not save here so as not to jeopardize the foundations of our security and prosperity.” Instead, an increase is proposed, that is, spending three percent of gross domestic product on international politics as a whole. In the current budget, it is around two percent.

In interviews with senior foreign policy personnel in the republic, the report’s authors also asked why Germany is having such difficulties with its international policy. The standard response was that a more active security policy could not be communicated to the public and that only a few citizens were interested in the issue. But is this really true?

For the report, the Munich Security Conference commissioned the opinion research institute Forsa to carry out a representative survey of the population’s attitudes towards foreign and security policy, which was carried out in August. Consequently, a clear majority, namely 64 per cent, are very or very interested in foreign and security policy.

75 percent of those surveyed assume that there will be more crises and conflicts in the coming years, a very realistic assessment. The population is “in parts even further away than parts of the general political elite,” according to the report’s authors.

In general, the Germans remained open and multilateral. And they are ready for a more active foreign policy, but only when it comes to civil instruments. Most military operations are rejected and the economic power of Germany also does not want most of it to be used for foreign policy purposes. So more influence is welcome, but without the use of means of power beyond diplomacy: resolving this paradox of public opinion, says Ischinger, is “a task of political leadership.”