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meThere are moments in the Bundestag this Thursday when Hans-Georg Maassen seems to be losing his composure. When he chides Konstantin von Notz (Greens) into letting him finish. When he takes Martina Renner (left) to the show and makes it clear that he wants to “put an end to his thoughts.” Or if the lawyer repeatedly asks his interviewer to “clarify” his doubts.
The appearance of the former president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) made one thing clear from the beginning: he did not docilely admit mistakes. No, Maaßen deals.
The accusations against him and his former employer weigh heavily. When asked why Anis Amri was not detained in the run-up to the December 19, 2016 attack, the BfV takes focus. The authority describes itself as an “early warning system”. Constitutional protectors try to expose dangerous extremists at an early stage; People who are trusted to attack.
Why didn’t the BfV sound the alarm in Amri? A man who was the subject of discussion eleven times in 2016 at the Joint Center Against Terrorism (GTAZ), more often than any other Islamist threat.
Maaßen, dark blue suit, light red tie, has prepared for this appearance. His opening statement is 32 pages long, in which today’s lawyer essentially adheres to his famous statement about the “purely police case”: it was not the BfV but the police who were responsible for Amri. The role of constitution protection was “very limited.” The observations themselves would not have been possible to avoid jeopardizing police work.
One thing is certain: before the attack, the BfV had a fountain in Berlin’s Fussilet Mosque, where Amri also stopped. Maaßen, however, contradicts the representation that one had a source “in Amri”. The person was used for a different purpose in the house of prayer. According to Maaßen, Amri and the BfV contact had hardly any contact points.
The Christmas market on Breitscheidplatz after the killer crossed the square in a truck
Source: dpa-infocom GmbH
There are at least some doubts as to whether this is the case. Not hundreds of believers, but about 80 people are said to have stayed at the mosque during rush hour. Don’t they know each other a little better on that radio?
In addition to the mosque source, the BfV’s handling of Moroccan information is also explosive. In autumn 2016, the German security authorities received information that Amri was in contact with IS and could be planning attacks.
These warnings were discussed in a meeting at the GTAZ on November 2, 2016, around six weeks before the attack. Von Notz reminded Maassen in the commission of inquiry that his authority wanted to investigate this information. According to protocol, the BfV promised: “We clarify this.”
Police officers standing in front of the Fussilet mosque in Berlin.
Source: dpa
Source: WORLD infographic
In fact, the BfV asked a friendly foreign intelligence service (AND) what was wrong with the warnings. However, the threat videos that Amri recorded in the weeks leading up to the attack were sent to German authorities only after the attack. The question arises whether the BfV really did enough to investigate Morocco’s warnings.
Von Notz pointed out that the BfV’s involvement in the Moroccan reporting refutes Maassen’s presentation of the “purely police case.” The former senior official rejected that. It was just about supporting the main police. “Such requests to a DNA are generally handled by a national secret service.”
Anis Amri, here in her IS admission video, recorded in Berlin
Source: AFP
Benjamin Strasser (FDP) also expressed doubts about Maassen’s representation. Recognizing threats like Amri is precisely the job of the BfV. Will you stick to the fact that your authority “did not make any technical errors in the Amri case”? Maaßen: “I think that we, as an office, under the conditions at the time, did a good job.”
According to Maaßen, the German authorities, including the BfV, never saw Amri as a “mega threat”. For a long time, the Tunisian was classified at level seven on the danger scale, making an attack “possible, but not probable”. Later, the police even demoted Amri to level five. “Today we know that it was an error in judgment.”
Hans-Georg Maaßen in front of the committee members
Source: dpa
The name Amri was first made known to Maassen on January 26, 2016. At that time, one of his specialized departments asked him to sign the so-called official certificate for the criminal process of the State Criminal Police Office in Rhineland of the North-Westphalia. The North Rhine-Westphalia authority would not have wanted to issue the certificate itself, otherwise a source would have been in danger. That is why the BfV – in the person of Maaßen – appeared as a “giver of legends”.
He only heard from Amri shortly after the attack in Berlin, Maaßen said. Amri was not mentioned in operational rounds in which the then president was briefed by employees on specific cases.
As vehemently as Maassen rejects the accusations against the BfV, he also resolutely distributed them against other authorities. It was like a blanket agreement: in Italy, Amri should never have been released after 30 days. With a view to his entry into the Federal Republic, it is inexplicable why the Tunisian was not “immediately returned to Italy” under the Dublin regulation.
Otherwise, the authorities of this country would have had to take much harsher measures. Amri should have been taken into custody because of his crimes, his dangerousness and his unfounded asylum claim. Also, Amri should have been kept on a short leash with space restrictions and daily visits. Last but not least, it is inexplicable that no further pressure was exerted on the Tunisian authorities.
“Why doesn’t the secretary of state call there?” The refusal to deport Amri’s friend, Bilel Ben Ammar, after the attack is proof that something like this is possible.
Strasser responded to the former head of constitutional protection that in the Amri case there had been criticism of the BfV’s work even within the German authorities. It refers to a corresponding mail traffic between the BfV and the Federal Intelligence Service.
In it, the BND is said to complain that the German interior authorities did not inform it sufficiently. Maaßen says he may be a “return coach” for the BND, as his employees criticized the BND.
Investigative committee members were disappointed after Maassen’s appearance: “Today, Mr. Maassen gambled on the opportunity to openly deal with the mistakes made by his authority,” Strasser said. Maassen just continued with the “Blame Game.” “From the municipal immigration authorities to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, everyone is in some way responsible, only the BfV had a clean slate.”
Von Notz describes the legend of the “purely police case” as a “diversionary maneuver.” The claim that there was no source in the Amri area was “objections”. “In the case of a realistic interpretation, we must assume that the visitors to the mosque somehow knew each other.”
And measure? During the seven-hour session, he stated: “The attack was avoidable. It didn’t have to take place. “
Only the BfV is supposedly not responsible for this.
