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The Navalny case raises uncomfortable questions for the German government. Because if Moscow does not contribute to the clarification, a readjustment of Russian German policy will be inevitable.
An analysis by Kai Küstner, ARD capital studio
“We have to keep talking to Moscow” – this phrase has almost become a mantra in dealing with Russia in recent years. And so it was precisely the federal government that insistently defended the “double strategy of the two Ds” – the interaction of pressure and dialogue – in the face of any resistance. In both NATO and the EU, there have always been those who, on the one hand, would have liked to tackle President Putin more harshly. And on the other hand, those who would have liked to have thrown overboard all the painful economic sanctions imposed in 2014 as a result of the annexation of Crimea. Has the federal government missed the whole line with its middle ground?
At least there are clear signs that Germany is ready to abandon the path it has taken. Since the latest findings in the Navalny case, there can no longer be any question of noble diplomatic restraint. And thus there is much to suggest that the neurotoxin attack on Putin’s most stubborn adversary is drawing a similar deep furrow in relations between Germany and Russia and Europe as only the annexation of Crimea and the influence of Moscow in the east. from Ukraine before.
“There is almost no going back”
The Navalny case had at the latest become a political issue for the federal government when it advocated for a speedy transfer of this “political patient” to the Berlin Charité. That is even more true, since he considers that it is proven beyond any doubt that the Kremlin critic should be silenced with a neurotoxin.
There is almost no going back now. Verbally, Berlin has become too clear to remain inactive if Russia does not contribute to the investigation. It is obvious that in this case the federal government will seek sanctions in coordination with the other states of the EU. How difficult could they be? Are the European partners ready to accept this?
Nord Stream 2 demolition?
The record to date is mixed. Punitive measures imposed in 2014 for the annexation of Crimea hurt the Kremlin. In other cases, however, Europe held back, for example when Russia allegedly bombed hospitals and civilians during the Syrian war. When former double agent Sergej Skripal and his daughter were found poisoned on a park bench in southern England in March 2018, apparently war agent Novichok was used here, as with Navalny, the EU countries initially expelled to Russian diplomats. A rather symbolic measure that only hardened months later with account freezes and entry bans for the top military intelligence service.
In the Navalny case, however, the demands are now unmistakable to cancel the construction of the German-Russian Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which has yet to be fully completed.
Even during the Cold War, even after Russia “changed borders” in Europe with the annexation of Crimea, as Foreign Minister Steinmeier put it, neither Brussels nor Berlin dared to broach the “energy boycott” issue. Limiting gas supply to Europe, burying the Nord Stream 2 project at the bottom of the Baltic Sea would mean hitting the midrib of Moscow.
But will the federal government go that far now? The truth is that it will now be even more difficult to defend the pipeline, which is already highly controversial in the EU. With the United States anyway. Rewarding the Kremlin with a gas pipeline and at the same time thinking about punishments seems outdated to many.
Moscow is behaving in the Navalny case as it did in the case of the downing of the MH17 passenger plane over eastern Ukraine, in the Skripal case, in the so-called “Tiergarten Assassination”, forcing Berlin to readjust its relationship with Russia. Even if Moscow, of course, is still necessary: to resolve the conflicts in Syria, Libya and Ukraine. The much-invoked “staying in conversation with Russia” should remain a goal, even if this conversation now will certainly become even more difficult.
