Berlin-Brandenburg Airport: How the BER Degenerated into a Ruined Airport

The capital’s airport, BER, has damaged Germany’s image as a land of engineers, medium-sized functioning craft companies and a trustworthy administration in the public perception. How did this come about?

An honest consideration also includes looking at the history of the various change requests that planners had to deal with over and over again in the 14-year construction phase: in addition to the political tug of war, over the location and equipment of the airport, about their role in the competition. With the other large airports in the republic, even before construction began, the dispute over whether the capacities would be sufficient to cope with the growing demand from tourists and businessmen.

Planners were constantly faced with new ideas from politicians, who were dealing with additional check-in rooms, docks and docks. Obviously, the fact that each expansion involves a lot of additional changes to the plan was ignored.

The change requests were also not about aesthetic details, it was more than the very large in the literal sense: according to the original plans of the architect Meinhard von Gerkan from 1998, the terminal should have an area of ​​220,000 square meters. Fourteen years later, the usable space with a new dock in the south and one in the north, with additional mezzanines and commercial premises, totals more than 340,000 square meters.

“By making changes, adding additional buildings, like these piers, the TGA became of course [technische Gebäudeausstattung] – among other things – with extensions, and that always had to be adjusted, ”said Manfred Körtgen, responsible at the time, describing the situation in 2016. Last but not least, Körtgen was referring to the fume extraction system, which is crucial for fire safety, whose capacity was no longer sufficient for the expanded area.

The desire of the chairman of the supervisory board, Klaus Wowereit, to create boarding bridges for the A380 had a particularly serious effect. That meant a huge additional structural reprogramming, but it should also bring additional exclusive sales locations near these doors. Several months later, when the relevant rental contracts were concluded, the entrance to the A-380 was suddenly built elsewhere, and the architects were forced to completely redraw the plans for the shops, vents, the electricity and water lines.

In hindsight, the effort seems downright ridiculous, but even then there was great skepticism that an A380 door would make sense. “My statement at the time was very clear: you can build there, but it will not be used for the next 15 years because the A380 will not arrive in Berlin forever,” recalled Thomas Weyer, head of technology at the time, in front of the investigation committee. of the House of Representatives. .

As of January 2010, new requests for changes were strictly prohibited. However, according to many participants, the airport management continued to order new things: spaces, rooms, lounges or commercial premises. Many wishes were even justified, after all, the airport’s business model fundamentally changed over the course of BER’s development period. But there was no thought about how the new requirements would be technically implemented, and how much time and money it would cost.

The myriad of plan changes barely matched the frantic pace of the supposed final outbreak. This meant that multiple construction plans were in circulation at the same time and craftsmen often placed orders that were out of date. Horst Amann tried to control the consequences of this systematic chaos caused by the management, the politicians, but also the urban planners and the construction companies, and after the spectacular failure of the opening in May 2012, he assumed the technical direction. Its inventory lists 120,000 defects, of which 4,000 are “approval relevant.” Overall, the Brandenburg State Audit Office found in hindsight that BER 2012 was only 56 percent operational.

Eliminating defects turned out to be extremely difficult. The smoke extraction system, for example, went down in BER history as a “monster” and had to be divided into several individual systems. The cable ducts had to be resized to be able to put the building’s electrical system into operation and also to meet fire protection requirements. Great effort was also required for the expansion of the piping system for the sprinkler system. Because suddenly a much higher water pressure was necessary to be able to supply the most distant places. Initially, however, the larger distribution pipes could not withstand such pressure. Similarly, each serious deficiency triggers a chain of later problems.