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You’re starting to get nervous in government offices around the world. November 3 is Election Day in what remains the most powerful country in the world, and by January 20 it will be clear who will occupy the White House for the next four years.
Of course, there is a nervousness about who will have the power. It is possible to draw markedly different scenarios not just for cross-Atlantic relations, the climate problem, health cooperation and much more, depending on whether it is Donald Trump or Joe Biden who takes an oath.
But a growing part of the nervousness has to do with what may happen between these dates. It is almost three months during which Donald Trump is, in any case, the one who has power, and he will surely use it too.
Of course, a clear and unequivocal electoral result should be desirable for everyone. But, unfortunately, there is a clear risk that an electoral result run by broad groups will be perceived as illegitimate. Already today, opinion polls show that important groups on both sides will simply not see an electoral result in which their candidate loses as legitimate. An electoral debate in which the alternatives are sometimes presented as a life-threatening socialism versus a threatening totalitarian government, unfortunately, often leads to reactions like these.
In such a situation, there is a great risk that an electoral result that many do not see as legitimate will lead to a brutal maneuver to change this in one direction or another with all the possibilities of the constitution, and perhaps more.
Concerned opinion leaders in the United States have worked out various scenarios for such developments, with some of them choosing not to proceed because the consequences seemed too difficult to handle.
If the power struggle in the United States turns into a protracted constitutional confrontation, the consequences for the country’s internal development are obvious, but in addition, American power worldwide risks being radically weakened. An America that is sinking into an internal confrontation will lose attention to most other things, and it cannot be ruled out that this creates temptations for other power players to suddenly make moves they would otherwise be more careful with.
It is not difficult to see the capitals where, in such a situation, one might begin to consider steps that would otherwise seem too risky.
Just one example: what if President Putin suddenly wants to “help” Armenia and then “must” allow his troops to secure the roads through Georgia where an election may have also led to a more volatile situation? Who would then mobilize the world against the abuse of another country?
It can get dangerous quickly. Vigilance will be required.
In a situation where Donald Trump knows or fears that it is not he who will take the oath for the next four years on January 20, additional dangers will also be added. Unfortunately, I think it is clearly likely that they will then try to burn bridges for the incoming Biden administration’s opportunities to implement their policy in important areas.
And in the field of foreign policy, the president’s strong position of power provides opportunities for this. Even if he lost power, Donald Trump would remain 100 percent president of the United States every minute until the soldier with the code wallet for the strategic nuclear forces quietly slips into the vicinity of Joe Biden immediately after being sworn in.
The Trump administration’s foreign policy has been contentious and controversial in important respects, often accompanied by rhetoric and sometimes also actions that are more reminiscent of crusades than more classical diplomacy.
And there are certainly important areas where it will not be difficult for an incoming administration to change course.
Relations with Iran and the so-called JCPOA agreement are one of them. Despite Trump’s then-Foreign and Defense Ministers and National Security Advisers viewing the deal as in the interest of the United States, opposition to it has become a central element in administration policy.
The last few days have seen a sharp escalation of sanctions against Iran. This is surely just the beginning. We should probably assume that attempts will be made to provoke those in power in Tehran with various stepwise measures that would seriously hamper a return to the JCPOA deal.
And we must not forget that there are growing forces in Iran that see an escalation of confrontation with the United States as something that would further strengthen their position of power.
Joe Biden has already said that he wants a quick and “clean” return to the JCPOA deal – both Iran and the United States must honor all of their commitments – and this is something he will probably do everything he can to try to complicate it. or prevent.
But escalating confrontation in the Middle East is always a risky policy. It doesn’t always go as planned. I think the nervousness, especially in Baghdad, is enormous: Iraq runs the risk of becoming an even more battlefield if the confrontation between the United States and Iran suddenly escalates.
Also in the case of China, it is not unlikely that the last fleeing power opportunities will be used to escalate the confrontation and burn the remaining bridges.
To take a perhaps extreme example: what happens if Chancellor Pompeo suddenly lands in Taipei with the legitimate purpose per se of marking support for democracy in Taiwan?
All red lines would be crossed. In all likelihood, it would be a provocation that Xi Jinping couldn’t pass up. If only for reasons of domestic politics, he would probably be forced into some form of more or less dramatic reaction.
To take another example: what if China quickly occupies one of the islands that Taiwan considers its own?
In any case, Joe Biden would be forced into an extremely acute confrontational situation with China and would immediately be forced to take a position on direct military options. And in the worst case, at the same time, the same could apply in the relationship with Iran. Perhaps also with Iran.
However, it seems less likely that there will be some more dramatic steps in the relationship with Europe. An outgoing Trump administration knows that an incoming Biden administration will have restored relationships with allies and friends, perhaps at the top of its list of foreign policy actions, but the chance of radically hurting the chances of this will be less.
Some stupid additional fees are always a possibility. The situation on these matters is certainly a bit tense, with the EU set to accept US anti-Boeing tariffs that the WTO has awarded after US tariffs on European aid to Airbus, and a Careless action may well lead to rapid escalation.
But while this with a continuing Trump administration with significant probability is just the beginning of a real trade war across the Atlantic, that bomb should be possible to disarm with mutual wise steps if a Biden administration takes over the administration.
The simple thing is, of course, to abolish both Airbus and Boeing sanctions. Both big industries are already struggling as they are these days.
So there are reasons for nervousness in government offices around the world and Europe these days.
The time after January 20 will certainly offer its challenges, somewhat different in different settings, and more or less welcome for different government offices, but the time until then can certainly also be dramatic.
Let’s hope this is all wrong and that none of this happens. The moment of the new chaos is already difficult.
