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At the last EU summit, such an initiative was strongly rejected by the Eastern bloc countries and received much criticism and condemnation. Does this mean an increasingly strict stance on Russia in the West?
The French and German discourse on European strategic autonomy has intensified, in particular, since US President Donald Trump pursued a highly independent foreign policy without consulting with European partners and ignoring their interests.
Withdrawal from the Iran deal, unilateral protectionism, criticism of Europeans for their insufficient contribution to NATO, and many other episodes were the reasons why Germany, and Macron in particular, were so strongly attached to the idea of a Europe. independent less dependent on the economy. USA.
The position of the French and the Germans did not and did not please the Baltic States and Poland, for whom Russia is a threat, an enemy and an aggressor.
Of course, that was not the only reason. French national identity has always been based on the self-perception of an important center of power in Europe and the world, and Germany’s attitude towards Russia is a constant attempt to help secure German pragmatic interests, not too strictly against Russia so as not to damage German economic interests too much.
This position has never been to the liking of the Baltic countries and Poland, for whom Russia is a threat, an enemy and an aggressor. In representing and defending the position of value, these countries have always called for relations with Russia to be considered through a policy of deterrence and detention rather than dialogue. For some time now, Russia’s own behavior has only fostered a more aggressive and austere stance.
The change of administration in Washington has raised expectations in Eastern Europe that the United States will return to a more transatlantic and pro-democratic relationship with its European partners. Biden’s rhetoric only strengthened those expectations. Hopes have also grown in France and Germany for a more constructive relationship with Washington. Biden’s visit and meetings with EU, G7 and NATO leaders in Europe were strategically important in rebuilding transatlantic relations and building trust. The agreement to end many years of disagreement between the US and the EU over Boeing and Airbus was a practical illustration of this.
However, Biden’s next step was a meeting with Vladimir Putin. And this was no longer a step that met the expectations of the Eastern European countries. It is clear that Lithuania, Poland and others expected Washington to take a much tougher stance on human rights, democratic principles and Russia’s deterrence. Rather than drawing strict “red lines” for Russia, this meeting (in Eastern Europe at least) was more reminiscent of a modified version of “relational reloading.”
Reuters / Photo by Scanpix / Meeting of Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin in Geneva
From the point of view of Germany and France, the meeting between Biden and Putin, among other things, turned out to be a pretext for further attempts to find ways to strengthen independence. This is logical, because it is at the beginning of the term of the new president of the United States, before he has established his office, that there is the greatest opportunity to form a favorable attitude. If we want to be independent and autonomous, Mr Biden must see that Europe can do it. Therefore, it was necessary to show his power by meeting with Putin on his own.
The arguments of E. Macron and A. Merkel indicated precisely this logic in their rather unexpected joint proposal to hold an EU-Russia summit. If Biden can talk to Putin, why can’t we? If Russia and the United States are not going to talk about Europe or address them, but Europe itself, it must be a direct actor in the process.
However, Merkel-Macron’s proposal was rejected at the forefront of other EU partners, with the Baltic states and Poland. The European Union has reached a consensus. It was closer to the ideal of the eastern partners, but more distant from the original goals of France and Germany.
It is clear that the consensus also delayed plans for a separate EU dialogue with Russia controlled by Germany and France. At the same time, it is a scant, and perhaps a blow, to French and German ambitions for European leadership, especially in creating the latter’s “strategic autonomy.” Such a consensus is unlikely to force the Biden administration to take the power of Paris and Berlin more seriously to have an independent agenda.
On the other hand, that consensus is likely to send a signal to Moscow that the “divide and rule” strategy towards Europe can remain effective. Autumn elections in Germany will determine who will replace Merkel in office, but Armin Laschet, the leading candidate for the main polling station union at the polls, does not seem very inclined to change Russia’s “dialogue-based” approach. The same is true in France, where Macron, the current leader, is likely to run again for the presidency with Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Movement, in the upcoming April elections. None of them, to put it mildly, are in favor of a tough stance on Russia.
Russia’s Western approach remains difficult to call a coordinated and coherent approach.
Thus, by rejecting the idea of an EU-Russia summit, advocates of a hard line against Russia won the battle within the EU. But it is not yet a victory. Internal tensions in Europe seem likely to persist. Paradoxically, the biggest asset of the “strict” so far is the Kremlin itself, which with its behavior simply deprives the soft-line supporters of any argument.
However, it remains difficult to qualify a new Western approach to Russia as coherent and coherent. The balance in the priorities of the Biden administration (China – strategic weaponry – democratic values), political cohesion in Germany and France after the next elections, the Duma elections in Russia in September are just some of the factors that will shape Russia and Western Agenda in the near future. Their mutual enigma can still change this agenda in any direction.
Laurynas Jonavičius is a professor at VU TSPMI.
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