From an intelligence report: How the Belarusian KGB blackmailed and recruited Tom, who betrayed his wife

According to the services, the KGB starts collecting information about Lithuanian citizens traveling to Belarus as soon as they submit a visa application.

The KGB is of interest to officials, judges and politicians, employees of strategic companies, state institutions and municipalities, and journalists who regularly travel to Belarus.

The activities of the KGB are not limited by human rights and the rule of law in Western democracies.

“The activities of the KGB are not restricted by the principles of human rights and the rule of law in Western democracies, so Lithuanian citizens can be subjected to extremely harsh actions,” note the SSD and the AOTD in the assessment. of threats to the citizens of Lithuania. security.

When recruiting Lithuanian citizens traveling to Belarus, the KGB does not prevent blackmail, it can use compromising information, organize or take advantage of traffic accidents, violations of laws, visa regulations and border crossing procedures.

It is also a method known as a ‘honey trap’, in which an immigrant is introduced to a person who cooperates with the KGB to establish an intimate relationship.

The purpose of such actions is to intimidate Lithuanian citizens so that they can be prosecuted legally and thus force them to cooperate with the Belarusian intelligence service, state the SSD and the AOTD.

In the assessment of threats to national security presented on Thursday, the Lithuanian intelligence services provide an eloquent example that reveals all the behind-the-scenes recruiting.

Tom’s experience in Belarus

We offer to know him (the name of the Lithuanian citizen and other personal data that identify him have been changed).

Tomas, 34, has a family and works as a maintenance specialist for one of the databases of Lithuanian state institutions, which collects data on the Lithuanian population.

From time to time, alone or with his family, he would go to Belarus to rest or buy cheaper fuel and goods.

Tom booked a visa for Belarus at travel agencies and at the Belarusian consulate in Vilnius.

While crossing the Medininkai-Kamenij Log border checkpoint, Belarusian border officials repeatedly took X-rays of Tom’s car and asked if he was using drugs.

Tom did not value border controls.

At the end of the summer, Tom and several friends went to Belarus to celebrate the birthday of one of them.

At the Grodno bar, Tom met Jelena, an understanding Belarusian who paid special attention to him throughout the night.

At the Grodno bar, Tom met Jelena, an understanding Belarusian who paid special attention to him throughout the night.

Drunk with alcohol, Tom agreed to go home with the girl.

In the morning Tom, who was returning to the hotel, was detained by a Belarusian militia officer, asked for his identity documents and hinted that he was conducting an investigation into the robbery.

Soon a person in civilian clothes approached them and ordered them to sit in a nearby car with another person in it.

The men, who introduced themselves to Alexander and Grigory, began asking about Tom’s work and family, asking why he was visiting Belarus.

The men explained that a Belarusian citizen had been mugged at night and that Tom was suspected of having committed the crime.

When Tom asked to be allowed to call the Lithuanian diplomatic mission in Belarus, Alexander showed the compromising photos of Tom taken in Jelena’s apartment and threatened to pass them on to his wife.

Grigory offered to avoid inconvenience: tell him about his workplace, characterize his co-workers, as well as give him a copy of the population database.

It was explained to Tom that during his next visit to Belarus, the men would contact him with a mobile chat app.

Alexander assured that by helping them, Tomas would not harm Lithuania in any way and could earn extra money.

Alexander assured that by helping them, Tomas would not harm Lithuania in any way and could earn extra money.

Tom told a friend about these events and told him that he did not want to work for these people.

A friend who had heard of similar recruitment cases advised him to immediately contact the Lithuanian intelligence services.

After returning to Lithuania, Tomas contacted Lithuanian intelligence by email, reported the incident in Belarus, and received help.

In case of a similar situation, you can contact the SSD hotline at 8700 70007 or send an email. by mail [email protected].

Russia has influence over those who live on the border

Russian intelligence services are also involved in the recruitment of Lithuanian citizens, especially those who live in the border regions with the Kaliningrad region and regularly cross the border.

“Through border-crossing procedures, Russian intelligence services interview Lithuanian citizens, are interested in their biography, work experience, service in the structures of the USSR, information on family members, foreign relations, attitudes towards Russia, as well such as on NATO exercises or military operations observed in Lithuania. movement in the border region “, – the SSD and AOTD publish in the annual threat assessment.

According to the services, Russian officials check the mobile devices of Lithuanian citizens interested in border crossing procedures: they view contacts, correspondence content, photos, and in some cases install malicious software on them.

In this way, it is possible to remotely record the conversations and correspondence of the owner of the infected device, to intercept the information received through the phone’s camera and microphone.

Russia, according to the knowledge of the Lithuanian intelligence services, normally assigns recruits the following tasks: to provide publicly available and visually recorded information about ongoing military exercises, border guard, military and civil infrastructure in Lithuania;

Lithuanian citizens visiting the Kaliningrad region are considered more likely to be recruited by the Russian intelligence services.

In addition, individual residents of the border areas, especially politicians and smugglers, the prevailing political mood in the border region.

“Lithuanian citizens who frequently visit the Kaliningrad region are considered best suited for recruitment by Russian intelligence services, as their personal, business and other interests depend on the decision of Russian intelligence to allow them to visit Russia, that is, from its cooperation with Russian intelligence. services, “services.

More on other threats to Lithuania’s national security: here.