Foreign policy: this crisis will be ruthless for the Kremlin, prospects are bleak

The coronavirus pandemic has caused problems worldwide, but it looks like it could hit Russia extremely hard and is likely to present new and difficult challenges for President Vladimir Putin. The results of a new study by the independent research organization Levada Center show that the conditions created by the pandemic have seriously undermined the Kremlin’s ability to generate economic growth and public welfare, two key pillars of Putin’s stability.

Combining these facts with other long-term trends, such as the growing importance of civil rights and urbanization, creates a surprisingly bleak picture surrounding the man who has ruled Russia for the past 20 years, Foreign Policy writes.

From the beginning of this century, Putin sought the support of two main sources. First, by promising rapid economic growth, the Kremlin has earned the favor of middle-class professionals. Second, the Kremlin has managed to attract the support of low-income social groups, including public sector workers and retirees. Representatives of these groups depend mainly on state support and are nostalgic for the Soviet period. Their support was secured through a combination of populist promises and the rhetoric of great power. Historically, Russians have tended to prioritize the state’s ability to grant social rather than civil rights. This is a reflection of the paternalistic orientation inherent in societies in conflict with the communist legacy, which has found its place in Putin’s broader strategy.

In the last 20 years, the system has been the most affected by these support groups since 2008. financial crisis. The economic recession that started after the crisis led to a significant drop in support for the government, culminating in a series of nationwide protests that started in 2011. It was all topped by the dramatic failure of the proprietary United Russia party in the elections. Duma of that year. Although Putin’s ratings continue to drop in 2013, the 2014 Kremlin After the occupation of Crimea and the disintegration of Ukraine, this trend was temporarily reversed. The annexation of Crimea has led to a patriotic and nationalist concentration. This effect lasted for approximately two and a half years. However, around 2017. and the slow dissolution of support for Putin has returned.

The current violent pandemic is likely to hit Russia even harder than the 2008 financial crisis. In particular, a sharp drop in oil prices, combined with an almost complete disruption of economic activity, will cause long-term structural damage to the economy. Comparing 2020 May and 2019 According to data from October, twice the Russians reported a delay in the payment of wages, reductions or layoffs. This led to the largest decrease in the evaluation of the economic situation of the Russian country since 2008. crisis. In March, even before most Russian regions introduced social distance measures, the Levada Center had registered a 20-point drop in the consumer confidence index.

However, this year the situation looks even worse than in 2008. For example, President Putin’s confidence rating, measured by asking Russians to name trusted leaders, has dropped from 35 percent. in January at 25 percent. In May. In the 20 years of observation, this figure has never fallen so sharply, and has reached a minimum of 30%. – It had reached it in 2013. Another indicator, the rating of support for Putin’s activities, has now also reached historical lows: 59 percent.

So far, the current economic situation in Russia can be compared with 2008. position. However, past crises have hit when support for Putin has peaked. In 2008, even before the financial crisis, Putin’s ratings skyrocketed after several years of economic growth. The next economic crisis in 2014 In the late 19th century, the news about Putin’s annexed Crimea was balanced. Since then, public support for the president has reached record levels. The year 2020 is unique because even before the start of the pandemic, population support for Putin had already declined for several years in a row after an unpopular decision to raise the retirement age and a five-year decrease in real disposable income . These processes yielded results: in 2018, the army surpassed the presidency to identify the most reliable institution in the country.

The pandemic also damaged the Kremlin’s ability to provide public services. A study by the European Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA) and the Levada Center showed that even before the pandemic, respondents were particularly concerned about limited access to medical care, as well as the right to social security, a decent standard of living, the right to work, good conditions and a decent wage. Foreign Policy journalists noted that about 40 percent of respondents with such concerns The selected sample tended to fundamentally change their approach to the Russian political system and expressed significantly less confidence in the direction the country was heading and less support for Putin’s leadership. The current pandemic is likely to exacerbate deficiencies in the Russian health system.

Local social media has already been inundated with ultrafast videos showing the plight of Russian hospitals and the accidents and deaths caused by unsafe medical equipment. With the continued spread of the coronavirus in Russia, more and more people will gain first-hand experience of the shortcomings of the country’s medical system. The provision of medical services is a particularly sensitive issue for older people who are more dependent on medical services than the country’s average population. Putin currently maintains greater confidence in those over 55. in the age group of the respondents: 37 percent. Representatives of this age group said in May that they trusted Putin. Among respondents ages 18-24, this confidence was only 10 percent. However, according to the survey, respondents familiar with the shortcomings of the Russian medical system are fundamentally reconsidering their views on the political system and Putin. In other words, the coronavirus crisis is likely to respond to the support expressed by its main supporters.

Short-term trends do not promise anything good for the Putin regime, but long-term trends are not good for him either. Russian society continues to become more modern. The results of urbanization are evident: now a quarter of Russia’s population lives in major cities. More than 40 percent. Russians now rely on information they find on the Internet and on social media, thereby avoiding Putin’s influence in traditional media. Since 2010 in Russia, the bottom-up concentration of society has intensified, which has contributed to the strengthening of social ties, especially at the community level. Such dynamics has led to a significant increase in the importance of civil rights in Russia in recent years. For example, after asking the question “What rights and freedoms do you think are most important”, the proportion of respondents who chose the answer “freedom of expression” from 2017 to 2019. The proportion of respondents who chose the answer “freedom of peaceful assembly “increased from 13% to 28%. The proportion of respondents who chose the answer “access to information” increased from 25% to 39%. The three most important rights, according to the respondents, are “life, liberty, personal integrity” (this proportion has increased from 72% to 78% since December 2017), “medical care” (the number has remained stable at 70% ) and “fair litigation” (it jumped from 50% to 64%). The tendency to value freedom more was more pronounced among younger people and more educated respondents. This suggests that such sentiment will only intensify in the future.

What can these observations mean for the sustainability of the Putin regime? Although previous crises, such as 2008, The Recession, viewed as challenges the state could overcome, the current pandemic reveals the Kremlin’s failure to provide both long-term economic growth and everyday social services. The impending crisis in the health care system will accelerate the trend of public opposition to the Kremlin. Putin is aging and Russian society is modernizing, becoming more urbanized and less dependent on state-controlled media. Russia is no longer the society that can be governed in a completely autocratic style. Although Moscow still has a large financial reserve, Putin himself can become hostage to the system he has created. And by 2024, the year of the next presidential elections, these changes could be significant enough to bring fundamentally new challenges to Putin’s ability to maintain power.