Following the money: how the Kremlin stories appear on the lips of local misinformers

Donatas Puslys, director of the Media and Democracy Program at the Vilnius Institute for Political Analysis, commented that local actors are not misunderstood. “They do it in a very conscious way, they take advantage of a certain audience, certain attitudes that are common in them to attract attention, to generate impact,” he said.

At the time, Mantas Martišius, a professor at the Vilnius University Faculty of Communication, noted that the Kremlin media can be attractive to some people because they offer what is not available elsewhere.

“On the one hand, it is false information about things that cannot be verified or denied, a kind of conspiracy theory. “Another thing stems from the fact that there is a certain political correctness in the Western media and some issues are simply muted, they are ignored,” he said.

Delfi continues the cycle of articles on who and how finances disinformation in Lithuania. In the first part we write about the Russian state media, in the second part, about the characters on the margins of the Lithuanian public space. Read on for ways to combat misinformation.

Common narratives

This year, the Vilnius Institute for Political Analysis presented an analysis of narratives attributed to disinformation that are widespread in Lithuanian society. The research was carried out in two stages: initially during interviews in four Lithuanian cities (Klaipėda, Kėdainiai, Šalčininkai and Visaginas) the common narratives there were identified, and then Baltic Research conducted a representative survey throughout Lithuania.

Common narratives include that COVID-19 destroyed the Lithuanian healthcare system, COVID-19 was manipulated to impose control on the public, Lithuania does not have an independent foreign policy, the Lithuanian educational system promotes inappropriate values, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not. nothing, NATO deprives Member States of Member States’ money, which would be better spent on social security, etc.

At the time, the poll showed up to 28 percent. 50% of those surveyed fully agree. agrees in part with the claim that the country’s health system is not working and that the COVID-19 pandemic has completely destroyed it. Up to 29 percent. respondents fully agree with the statement that in Lithuania an honest person cannot win, and another 44 percent. Rather, he agrees with that statement.

Respondents tend to blame a specific political force – the National Christian Democratic Union of Lithuania – for economic failures: overall, up to 59 percent. He agreed with the statement that “the Conservative government stole from the people, the pensions and people’s money went down.”

As said by D. Puslys, who worked with this investigation, the goal was to find out how much potential Russian disinformation has in Lithuania.

“Three aspects are important when analyzing disinformation. The first is who disseminates it, the second is the environment in which it is disseminated, what media are used and the third is the objective. Often times, disinformation exploits certain dispositions that already exist in society, certain existing conflicts, polarization, etc. ”, He explained.

The interlocutor pointed out that the misinformation seeks to exacerbate and incite conflict, causing less conversation.

“It can be compared to the frozen conflicts in Transnistria or Abkhazia. If the role of the media is to inform the public and help them grasp the complex reality so they can find a solution and leave the issue behind, then misinformation, by the On the contrary, it is interested in constantly supporting incitement, incitement, frozen opposition, exploiting every loophole, “said Puslys.

Some believe, others explode

At such a juncture, outsiders, that is, actors who are not directly related to the Kremlin, emerge and begin to spread the same ideas. According to D. Puslis, it is possible that some of them simply believed what they said.

“A person does not reach any social or daily space like a ‘tabula rasa’ (a blank sheet of paper). It comes with certain attitudes, with a certain worldview, that act as certain filters by which you select. Often a person looks for someone to confirm their provisions. If I think that living in Lithuania is “š” because I am unlucky, I will hardly look for information that shows me that living in Lithuania is wonderful.

You better find someone who agrees with that and still tells you who is to blame. It is always easier to live when you know someone is to blame: Landsbergis, Conservatives, Communists, Brazauskas, etc. ”He commented.

Another reason for spreading disinformation, according to D. Puslis, may be the desire to satisfy the ego.

“You can feel important, influential. Of course, perhaps at the same time it is possible to sell something to one’s audience or to associate with a certain political force, to form its electorate ”, he commented.

For his part, M. Martišius said that the science of communication has two explanations for how the stories of the Kremlin appear on the lips of local misinformers.

“One answer is that the type of information we use, then we use it and make decisions. If I use the knowledge of the Kremlin channels, eventually I will start repeating what they say.

On the other hand, can I see why I use that information? What determines this? This is a deeper question. If we look at the channels that are intended for foreign audiences, that is, Sputnik, RT, etc., we would see two strategic trends.

First of all, it is obvious that there will be nothing wrong with those channels about Russia, its domestic policy, foreign policy errors, etc. Another thing is that they, like any other media channel, are thinking about how to attract an audience. You need to offer something for it to come. What is generally offered is what is not available in the local media.

In The New York Times, for example, I have little idea what the subject of Black Lives Matter is, be it a racist or semi-racist movement. These topics will generally not be written. At that time, the Kremlin’s editors-in-chief are beginning to raise a variety of such issues. These are the themes of the culture wars, they attract the audience, ”he said.

Martišius said that the Kremlin was trying to create an alternative media agenda.

“Lithuania is often about simple and worn-out themes: what is a failed state, everyone is starving, everyone is gone, and who will be last: turn off the electricity. At that time, the West is told to power it up. democracy is just a facade, that there is no freedom of expression. It is said that they have an alternative approach and many people accept it, “he said.

In short, according to M. Martišius, the means used by a person shape his vision of the world, but the choice of the means he uses is determined by the vision of the world he already has.

The interlocutor also warned that not all people who spread disinformation in Lithuania can be grouped together.

“All complex phenomena require investigation and here there is no single answer. For example, before the 2016 US presidential elections in North Macedonia, teenagers started creating fake news on social media.

They realized that by taking the speeches of Democratic Party candidates, a little modeling, some deletion, some additions can generate advertising revenue. Their motivation was not that they were in favor of Donald Trump. They were thinking about how to get money when there was no work. For some, it can be a business.

But others are believers. Many people do things not for money, not for fame. They believe that. For example, the Christians said at the beginning that the Son of God had come to earth. They had to believe in that story (at least in part), they did it with great conviction, ”said M. Martišius.