An inevitable tragedy: how Lithuania found itself in the hands of the USSR

In the late afternoon of June 14, 1940, the Foreign Minister, Juozas Urbšis, received an ultimatum in Moscow.

The Soviets made three demands: arrest several high-ranking officials responsible for the alleged provocations against the Red Army in Lithuania; form a new government; urgent admission of Soviet troops.

On the night of June 15, members of the Cabinet of Ministers and army commanders gathered at the Kaunas Presidential Palace.

Most decided to adopt an ultimatum.

President Antanas Smetona, who called for resistance to Soviet aggression, left the country in a hurry.

The Red Army crossed the state border without our army firing a bullet.

Thus began the end of the First Republic.

Lots of painful friction

Algimantas Kasparavičius, principal investigator of the Lithuanian Institute of History (LII), said that Lithuania, like all of Europe, lived through a rather tense period from 1918 to 1939.

There was a feeling of a new war, he felt his fear.

Comments, essays, ideas from commentators and journalists on this appeared regularly, and politicians talked about it.

“The cruel and terrible images and losses of the First World War were still very clearly embedded in the memory of both Lithuania and other European countries. It can be said that the First World War between Tsarist Russia and Imperial Germany practically began on the territory of Lithuania. A large part of the Lithuanian cities, towns and villages were simply swept away. And that fear of a new war was really great. She was among intellectuals, politicians, farmers. Anyway, in the afternoons by the kerosene lamp, students and farmers, village children and teachers or priests often talked about it. The subject was universal and endless, “said the historian.

Anyway, in the afternoons by the kerosene lamp, students and farmers, village children and teachers or priests often talked about it. The theme was universal and endless.

According to A. Kasparavičius, there was no certainty about peace, because the Versailles Treaty of 1919 clearly showed that justice could not be achieved in practice.

The winners of World War I despised the losing states, first of all Germany, Austro-Hungary, and partly the Ottoman Empire, as the perpetrators of war, who tried to punish them in every possible way.

Starting with huge repairs, ending with significant cuts in the territories of those states.

All of this led to great painful friction between states, nations, and national minorities in Europe in the interwar years.

Perhaps the best proof of this is the ethnopolitical and territorial conflict in Lithuania and Poland, which has been raging for twenty years, which was at least three times one step away from actual hostilities in 1926, 1927, and 1938.

How did the war approach?

There has been no shortage of problems in Europe since the first day of the signing of the Versailles peace.

The Union of Nations, like a firefighter, extinguished conflicts almost every year in various parts of Europe: between Greeks and Turks, Poles and Czechoslovaks, Germans and Poles, Danish and Germans, Lithuanians and Poles, and so on.

However, when the Great Continent was hit by the Great Depression and the Nazis emerged in Germany, the situation on the continent became practically unmanageable in just a few years.

The authority of the League of Nations finally collapsed, the Versailles peace structure collapsed, and a career of multi-colored aggressors began for the conquest of Europe.

While the Russian Bolsheviks only planned such an occupation, Hitler’s Nazis did the real work.

“A very threatening and dangerous hotbed of war has formed in the middle of Europe. When the Nazis came to power in January 1933, they radically changed Germany’s internal and external policy, moving to active and aggressive revanchism in foreign policy, checking borders and claiming territories Inside – a drastic political regime Dealing with political opponents, passing racial laws and the like.

Finally, Hitler openly spit in front of the Western allies and in 1936-1938 restored the German armed forces: the navy, aviation, land armies, which were banned in Germany under the peace of Versailles. This has finally unbalanced the geopolitical situation across Europe, “said A. Kasparavičius.

According to the Doctor of Humanities, German revenge arrived in Lithuania very quickly.

Attempts were made to open Klaipėda as early as 1934-1935, but at that time the Lithuanian government suppressed the Nazi movement by legal means.

However, in March 1939, already after the annexation of Austria, the final destruction of Munich and Czechoslovakia, the Nazis captured the Klaipeda region.

“There was another threat to Europe, perhaps not to the entire continent, but to half of Europe it really is. It is a semi-Asian and semi-Asian Bolshevik civilization that took root in Russia after the collapse of the Tsarist empire,” he said. A. Kasparavičius.

There was another threat to Europe, perhaps not to the entire continent, but for half of Europe it really is. It is a semi-Asian, semi-Asian Bolshevik civilization that has taken root in Russia.

Although the Bolsheviks had been oppressed in their eastern space since the late 1920s and did not pose a direct threat to Europe and Lithuania, the geopolitical instrument they created, the International, had a destructive effect: destroying Europe from the political inside and cultural.

“Around 1935-1937, Europe, especially the center and east, found itself at the pinch of two totalitarian regimes. On the one hand, Europe is under pressure from the Nazis. Well, and from the East, perhaps to a lesser degree, due to low military capabilities, internal terror, collectivization and the like, but there is still a threat from Bolshevism, “said the historian.

This brought Europe closer to World War II.

He felt a greater threat from the Nazis.

A. Kasparavičius says that in the interwar period, Lithuania did not feel the threat from the USSR and could not feel it because it did not have a common state border.

Since the fall of 1920, when the Polish army led by General Lucian Zheligowski occupied Vilnius and the Vilnius region, Lithuania has been cut off from Bolshevik Russia by a Polish corridor about 100-150 km wide.

Which, objectively speaking, also served as a Polish shield for Bolshevism Lithuania.

Although there were clandestine communists in the country, according to the historian, in the summer of 1939 there were only about a thousand.

Lithuanian Catholic Society The Bolsheviks of Bolshevism were quite resistant, and the Lithuanian Communist Party itself was more reminiscent of a political sect ruled not by a serious political force, but only by the Kremlin.

Lithuanian Catholic Society The Bolsheviks of Bolshevism were quite resistant, and the Lithuanian Communist Party itself was more reminiscent of a political sect ruled not by a serious political force, but only by the Kremlin.

At that time, the threat of the Third Reich and its attempts to destabilize the situation in Lithuania in one way or another had been felt since the summer of 1933 and especially since the spring of 1934.

Starting with the active separatism of the Nazi organizations and even terrorist activities in the Klaipeda region, ending with the Suwalki events in 1935-1936.

The Suwalki farmers’ strike in 1935, according to A. Kasparavičius, was partially financed and politically supported by certain structures of the Third Reich.

Withdrawals of strikers were also printed in Germany.

As the LII academic explained, our true political elite felt the real Soviet threat only on September 17, 1939, when the Red Army invaded Poland from the east into Poland during World War II, when the Nazis occupied Warsaw.

“Then Lithuanian politicians realized that Russia had been quite a distance for many years, now it has suddenly found itself near the borders of Lithuania. That the old claim by Polish politicians that the Poles were not afraid of Russia could easily overcome it and repeat the August 1920 victory that Poland was a nation of a superior army and a generally higher civilization was little supported by the bluff. The collapse of Poland was tragic for the Poles, but no less tragic for the Baltic nations, especially for Lithuania.

After the collapse of Poland, a Polish shield and a Polish corridor covering Lithuania from the Bolsheviks collapsed. It was an unpleasant experience and great political stress for Kaunas. “It would be about what Vilnius would experience today if the Martians suddenly attacked and destroyed NATO,” said the historian.

It was an unpleasant experience and great political stress for Kaunas.

We had no back

A. Kasparavičius mentioned that practically on the same day that the Soviets crossed the Polish border, a secret partial mobilization was carried out in Lithuania (the first stage was carried out in the early days of World War II).

During the two reserve calls mentioned, the Lithuanian Armed Forces increased from 23-24 to 60-64 thousand soldiers.

The objective of the mobilizations is to guarantee the neutrality of the Lithuanian state.

But the political elite, having stepped forward, also retreated here.

After a triple increase in military forces, public finances began to stagnate.

During the war in Europe, the country’s foreign trade decreased, the budget sharpened, and social tensions increased.

By not lifting such a burden, according to the LII historian, the government again reduced the army.

The historian pointed out that this was a fatal mistake.

Especially when the Red Army is already standing on state borders and before the next talks in Moscow.

In late September and early October 1939, the Bolsheviks succeeded in having Estonia and Latvia sign mutual assistance agreements with the USSR and admit Red Army crews into their territories.

“Only then, by forcing Lithuania from the east, south and north (Nazi Germany remains in the west), they dictated the following dilemma to Kaunas: or will you be good, follow the example of your northern neighbors and conclude a Covenant Mutual Assistance with Moscow, and Vilnius will be returned to you territory, which was assigned to Lithuania by the Bolsheviks in July 1920, or the Bolsheviks decide that Vilnius remains for Belarus and will start a different language with Lithuania.

The Lithuanian envoy to Moscow, Dr. Lad Natkevičius, was told that the Belarusians were all united: Vilnius longed for both the Nationalists and the Bolsheviks, because he considered it the ethnic territory of the Belarusians. It takes courage and will for Stalin to betray the Belarusian Slavs and deliver Vilnius to Lithuania. And Stalin also wants compensation for this: for Lithuania to become a satellite of essentially Bolshevik Russia and accept military crews on its territory, “said A. Kasparavičius.

The Lithuanian ambassador to Moscow, Dr. Lad Natkevičius, was told that the Belarusians were all united, both the nationalists and the Bolsheviks loved Vilnius because they considered him the ethnic territory of the Belarusians.

In his opinion, the choice of Lithuania was minimal.

It was no longer possible to seek help in Paris or London. These countries were at war with the Nazis and had millions of their own problems.

The United States was far away and still pursued a policy of neutrality.

It was also a bad thing that without consultation with Lithuania, the northern neighbors had already capitulated against Moscow.

So, although hesitant, after prolonging the negotiations for almost a week, the conditions dictated by the USSR were finally accepted.

“I will tell you a detail. Already after the negotiations, perhaps a couple of months later, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR stated in a review document that despite the fact that we had the Lithuanian capital Vilnius in our hands, negotiations with the Lithuanian delegation and the Lithuanian government were the most difficult and unpleasant. Lithuanians were most affected by the deployment of Soviet crews to Lithuania. He also claims that it was easier to reach an agreement with the Estonians. I had to negotiate a bit with the Latvians. Well, the Lithuanians were the most disgusting. That sounds like some kind of praise to us here.

But still, our government broke down that week. It was broken not because it was weak, but because I had no choice. After the collapse of Poland, the rise of Estonia, Latvia and the outbreak of war in Western Europe, Lithuania remained in September 1939 as a small island of ice constantly melting in water. Without Klaipėda and without Vilnius, on the political map, it was more like a province than a state. It was completely dependent on the will of the Third Reich and Stalin. As Hitler and Stalin had already crossed their arms, our destiny in the first days of October 1939 was largely determined, “emphasized the Doctor of Humanities.

During that week, our government broke down. It was broken not because it was weak, but because I had no choice.

He was also supported by Norbertas Černiauskas, Doctor of the Faculty of History of the Vilnius University (VU).

According to him, in the middle of June 1940, the Baltic states were left alone, without paths of retreat and retreat, official or secret allies, such as, for example, Finland, which fought the Winter War with the USSR.

He defeated fear of Stalin.

What happened in Lithuania in mid-June 1940, as noted by dr. A. Kasparavičius, in principle, was also part of the pan-European drama.

Therefore, it is very wrong and unhistorical to accuse Lithuania or its leaders without seeing the whole pan-European picture.

In the early morning of June 14, the Nazis marched to Paris. Fallen france

A British expeditionary corps of some 300,000 men, crushed by the Wehrmacht in a desperate fight in northern France near Dunkirk, awaited evacuation.

German aviation bombarded the cities of the British Empire. The first scene of the Battle of Britain took place.

The rapid and successful march of the Nazis through Europe overcame the fears of Hitler’s colleague, Stalin.

“He is beginning to mistrust Hitler even more and is taking what I think he had thought before: direct occupation and annexation of the Baltic states,” said the LII historian.

In early June 1940, the USSR accused Lithuania of alleged kidnapping of a Red Army soldier.

At the request of the Soviets, the Minister of the Interior, Kazimieras Skučas, and the Director of the Department of State Security, Augustinas Povilaitis, were dismissed and then arrested.

They were shot in Moscow.

A. Kasparavičius emphasized that the story of the alleged kidnapping of a Soviet soldier was only a formal pretext for Stalin to begin to pressure and occupy and annex Lithuania.

N.Černiauskas also emphasized that the reasons for the occupation of Lithuania should not be sought within the Republic.

“Why the occupation took place and how it took place, here we need to examine further the internal and external politics of the USSR, its ideology, the plan of aggression and the like.” (…) In considering the fact of occupation, it is not necessary to focus on the activities of the governments of Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia, as this immediately presupposes the view that our internal life of states and societies has contributed somehow to occupation.

It did not contribute in any way, because looking at Lithuania’s economic, social or cultural indicators in the early 1940s, we see a clear potential for growth, not some kind of decline or surrender. The occupation did not hit Lithuania as an internal evolution, but as an unprecedented external red flood, as Ignas Šeinius said, “said the historian.

The occupation hit Lithuania not as an internal evolution, but as an unprecedented external red flood, as Ignas Šeinius said.

The Soviets cut back from the escape of Smetona

Late on the night of June 14, after receiving the ultimatum from Moscow, according to A. Kasparavičius, our political elite is divided.

At that time, 2-3 ministers and President A.Smetona were thinking about the state.

“Most of the ministers, both warlords, Generals Stasys Raštikis and Vincas Vitkauskas, and, what is more important and painful, from a historical point of view, it seems to me that all the opposition is thinking opportunistically. They practically tend to accept the ultimatum and essentially capitulate. Both most ministers and the left opposition, the Socialist People’s Party and the right opposition, the Christian Democrats, see the Soviet ultimatum caused by President Smetona’s bad policies and not for Stalin’s imperialist intentions and efforts to enslave Lithuania.

That pressure from them to accept the ultimatum and vote for the ultimatum, would say, explain and reveal a lot. In the end, it explains one fact: why President Smetona withdrew from the state. His will is different. He disagrees with the position of the majority of the cabinet members, with the opposition’s willingness to bow to and accept the ultimatum. This is the basis of their withdrawal, as a protest against internal capitulation and the beginning of external occupation (at the last meeting A.Smetona said: Don’t you understand that we are already occupied here?), “Said the LII scientist.

At the last meeting, A. Smetona said: Don’t you understand that we are already busy here?

According to N.Černiauskas, no matter how we evaluate A.Smetona’s departure for Germany, this is probably the clearest first sign of disagreement with the occupation.

Although it was not done entirely, chaotically. Suppose the president does not leave an appeal to the nation explaining the reasons for his withdrawal from the country.

“But basically his resignation speaks to A. Smetona’s understanding that he understood the situation. He may have lacked more concrete steps, but he really wasn’t naive,” the VU historian explained.

For example, the presidents of Latvia and Estonia, Karl Ulmanis and Konstantin Pats, remained: they were forced to resign and then arrested.

The public learned of the departure of the President of the Soviet mouthpieces.

The first newspaper headlines in occupied Lithuania announced that A. Smetona had fled, across the stream, over the “escape from the scandalous dictator” and the like.

“Until March 11, the public basically only knew the messages with this wording. Basically there were no alternatives. The Soviets were able to immediately present this version of the event in a favorable direction. Information communications have already been controlled , the public receives specific information. Basically, the Soviets presented that first version, with which we sometimes fight to this day. In general, the actions of the president do not adorn it, but this does not change anything in the history of 15 June, “said the VU investigator.

The Soviets were able to immediately shape the presentation of this version of the event in a favorable direction.

Lithuania came to be liquidated

According to documents June 16-18 and later, the opposition tried naively to negotiate with the USSR envoy in Kaunas Nikolaus Pozdniakov and with Vladimir Dekanozov, who was sent to lead the Sovietization of Lithuania, about the formation of a new government, a new political course in the country.

As A. Kasparavičius said, only from June 23 to 25, it became clear to the anti-methonic opposition that Stalin’s contingent did not come to rescue Lithuania from A. Smetona, but to liquidate independent Lithuania.

“But when the opposition and the capitulated ministers realize this, it is too late. Little by little, they begin to be dismissed, isolated and similar. Although, on the other hand, there are other facts that the Commander of the Armed Forces, general V. Vitkauskas, it serves them.In the so-called Provisional Government we have two leaders of the Lithuanian war: the multiple prime minister, the foreign minister, the liberal Ernestas Galvanauskas, writer, patriot, former president of the Board of the Union of Vincas Krėve-Mickevičius riflemen.

At least initially, Stalin acted somewhat, I would say, more diplomatically than Hitler, covering his occupation and annexation with certain political figures, such as those of E. Galvanauskas and V. Krėvė-Mickevičius. Then when those figs are no longer needed, they are very easily removed from the government, and there is practically no government, no Lithuania, no constitution. Waking up very quickly in the Soviet republic, and de facto “In the busy state,” explained the historian.

Waking up very quickly in the Soviet republic, and de facto – In the busy state.

The fear spread

How did society respond to what happened in the 1940s. June 15? N.Černiauskas said there is no unequivocal answer.

“Maybe every day in a remote village and we don’t notice that something is fundamentally changing here, but in a few days many have already realized that Lithuania as it was will definitely not exist.” The third immediately understood very clearly what the Red Army’s mobile tanks meant. As far as some documents and diaries can be found, some people have seen very seriously from day one that this is an obvious communist aggression that will not lead to good.

How many were somehow naive thinking? Maybe he was thinking until his first arrests in July. In fact, there was little geopolitical knowledge here, many were catching up on an international situation, listening to the radio, and still remembering the First World War. Another common farmer quickly realized with his fur that difficult times were approaching, ”said the VU researcher.

Along with the Soviet occupation, marked restrictions on various freedoms begin, such as religion, the media, or public life.

According to N.Černiauskas, demonstrative propaganda campaigns begin, from which it is obvious that a fictional town in Lithuania was created with fictional problems and fictional “enemies of the people”.

In addition to terror, the nationalization of property and the subsequent collectivization, as the historian pointed out, were essential elements of Sovietization.

It affected practically everyone personally, breaking into the last unoccupied space: a personal patio, apartment or cabin.

Looking further, when society in general collapsed due to Sovietization, we can go back to the times of collectivization, the creation of collective farms in 1948-1949. We see that some Lithuanian farmers maintained some personal freedom or connection to the state previous that gave him the land until the Soviet government directly touched his farms. They remained at least somewhat independent on their farms. But collectivization cleared society of any individuality and independence, here was the last step to break society, “he said N. Černiauskas.

Looking further, when society in general collapsed due to Sovietization, we can go back to the times of collectivization, the creation of collective farms in 1948-1949.

Furthermore, as the historian pointed out, fear and uncertainty spread.

Since the beginning of the occupation, there have been layoffs, the release of officers and the increasing number of arrests.

“It sowed a certain distrust, fear, destroyed the community’s natural ties. As the summer progressed, there were more attempts to escape from Soviet Lithuania, because many people realized that the good would not end here, “said the VU historian.

Later, the anti-Soviet subsoil begins to form.

We lag far behind the Finns

In interwar Lithuania, the army was proud and the spirit of patriotism was promoted.

Al comentar sobre las declaraciones audibles de que nuestro ejército en ese momento estaba mejor preparado que los finlandeses que resistieron la invasión soviética, A. Kasparavičius dijo que quienes lo decían tenían poco conocimiento de la guerra y su historia.

Según él, el ejército finlandés siempre ha estado en un nivel mucho más alto que el nuestro en términos de armamento, número de armas, calidad, número de soldados y otras cosas.

Se afirma que esto se ha registrado en todas las inspecciones anteriores, informes europeos.

“Nuestro ejército se basó básicamente en el ejemplo francés, no en el alemán. Estaba armada principalmente con armas checas o francesas. En total, había alrededor de medio centenar de tanques en el ejército, de los cuales tal vez solo la mitad estaban en tránsito.

No olvidemos que del 28 al 29 de octubre de 1939, en la marcha del ejército, una marcha pacífica, desde Kaunas a Vilna, cuando fuimos a Vilna a recoger no un arma, sino que simplemente vinimos para demostrar que muchos tanques fueron quemados y los soldados resultaron heridos. Para que el nivel y la capacidad del ejército sean muy condicionales en este caso “, dijo A. Kasparavičius.

De modo que ese nivel y capacidad del ejército en este caso es muy condicional.

¿Por qué no disparaste?

¿Por qué nadie disparó de todos modos?

Según A. Kasparavičius, los soldados, desde lo ordinario hasta lo general, llevan a cabo órdenes.

“Cuando la orden del Comandante de las Fuerzas Armadas, el General V.Vitkauskas, y la línea inferior – todos los demás comandantes fueron dados para aceptar pacíficamente a los soviéticos, aceptar, mostrar lugares, acomodarlos, introducir el territorio, mostrar mapas y cosas similares, entiendo muy bien a las Fuerzas Armadas”. Después de todo, debemos darnos cuenta de que los militares son parte de la sociedad. Esta no es un área separada donde viven otras personas. Las mismas ilusiones del período de entreguerras que atormentaron a la élite social, política y cultural de la época eran características de la élite militar.

Tas prabudimas Lietuvos kariuomenės elito įvyksta tuo metu, kai kariuomenė pradedama nuginkluoti, iš tarnybos pradedami atleisti pasižymėję kariai, pirmiausia – karininkai, kai kurie jau pradedami patyliukais represuoti. O tai jau yra praktiškai 1940 metų liepos vidurys. Tiesa, buvo toks 9-as pulkas, kuris stovėjo arčiau Rytprūsių. Jis lyg ir padarė tam tikrą refleksiją, judesį. Tačiau, tiesą pasakius, ir pasirinkimas buvo vienintelis: pabėgti nuo bolševikų pas nacius“, – pažymėjo istorikas.

N.Černiauskas aiškino, kad net žinodami, kuo baigėsi birželio 15 dienos įvykiai, neturėtume „patarinėti“ tiems, kas tąsyk priėmė sprendimus.

Jis svarstė, kad tam, jog Lietuva veiksmingai pasipriešintų sovietų agresijai, tikriausiai reikėjo apie tai nuspėti prieš 20 metų ir vien tik tam ruoštis.

„Bet mes patys suprantame, kad valstybė turėjo gyventi ir kitose srityse, o ne mūsų patarinėjama 20 metų ruoštis hipotetiniam ateities karui, kurį kažkada ateityje sukels du totalitariniai režimai. Čia jau fantastiniai reikalavimai tuometinei valstybei. Be to, pernelyg susikoncentruojame į simbolinius šūvius.

Simbolinis šūvis apskritai nelabai ką keičia istorijoje. Vertinkime ir analizuokime sovietų ir nacių vidaus bei užsienio politiką, jų įsigalėjimo žingsnius, raskime priešnuodžius prieš antidemokratines idėjas šiandien, o ne analizuokime, ar reikėjo, ar nereikėjo iššauti šūvį anuomet“, – mano VU mokslininkas.

Simbolinis šūvis apskritai nelabai ką keičia istorijoje.

Kaip galėjo būti?

A.Kasparavičiaus teigimu, 1938–1940 metais situacija Europoje ir aplink Lietuvą taip susiklostė, kad tuo metu Lietuva neturėjo galimybių išsaugoti nepriklausomybę.

Anot jo, ginklu pasipriešinti ir, kaip lenkams, paplūsti krauju, išsiųsti Vyriausybę į politinę emigraciją, galimybė buvo, bet apginti nepriklausomybės – ne.

Esą kitaip galėjo būti 1944-1945 metais, kai pasaulio ir Europos reikalus jau tvarkė kiti herojai ir vyko taikos konferencijos Teherane, Jaltoje, Potsdame.

„Pagrindiniai, mums lemtingi sprendimai buvo priimti Jaltoje 1945 metų vasarį. Būtent tai nulėmė mūsų 50 metų okupacijos laikotarpį, o ne 1939 ar 1940 metai. Nes 1938–1940 metų vienokioje ar kitokioje okupacijoje buvo atsidūrę 2/3 Europos valstybių. Praktiškai visos jos 1944-1945 metais okupacijos jungą nusimetė, nes tokia buvo didžiųjų politinių lyderių valia.

Deja, Baltijos regiono atžvilgiu Jaltoje sėdinčių žmonių valia buvo kitokia ir Baltijos valstybės, sakykime taip tiesiai, liko antrą kartą parduotos bolševikinei Rusijai. Kaip Hitleris pasielgė 1939 metais, kiti lyderiai pasielgė panašiai 1944 metais. Tik pasielgė ne formaliai, be jokių parašų. Tiesiog kalbantis, šypsantis, linksint galvomis ir geriant kavą buvo priimti nebylūs sprendimai toms tautoms už akių, neatsiklausus jų valios“, – pabrėžė LII istorikas.

Kaip Hitleris pasielgė 1939 metais, kiti lyderiai pasielgė panašiai 1944 metais.

N.Černiauskas irgi įsitikinęs, kad prasidėjus Antrajam pasauliniam karui Lietuva sunkiai galėjo išvengti to, kas nutiko.

Anot jo, tarpukariu Lietuva užsienio ir vidaus politikoje padarė galbūt ne vieną klaidą.

Tačiau net jas stebuklingai pavertus „sėkmės istorijomis“, istorikas nemano, kad 1940 metų birželio 15 dieną kažkas būtų atsitikę kardinaliai kitaip.

„Ne Lietuvoje buvo sprendžiamas šitas klausimas. Ne Rygoje ir ne Taline. Kad ir ką 1940 metais bebūtų dariusios Baltijos šalys, bandymas jas okupuoti arba kitokia agresija prieš jas vis tiek būtų buvusi. Tarptautinė situacija, slaptieji protokolai, sutelkta šimtatūkstantinė armija ir karo frontų išsidėstymas Vakaruose sovietinei agresijai buvo itin palankūs. Birželį įmantrūs valstybių naikinimo reikalai sprendėsi Maskvoje, o ne Kaune“, – sakė N.Černiauskas.

Kad ir ką 1940 metais bebūtų dariusios Baltijos šalys, bandymas jas okupuoti arba kitokia agresija prieš jas vis tiek būtų buvusi.