Estonia has proposed to lift the Kremlin: it will seek to acquire missiles and invites Lithuania to join

Russia has created A2 / AD (anti-access and area denial, A2 / AD) bubbles in the Baltic Sea region, areas that could be blocked by Russian anti-aircraft and anti-aircraft complexes in the event of conflict, jeopardizing the movement. of NATO and allied forces In the Baltic Sea region.

This threat has been highlighted for many years by current and former senior Alliance officials, the military, and independent experts. And while Russia’s real capacities and capabilities have been questioned and countermeasures have been proposed, the countries of the region appear to be opting for the usual deterrent measures, strengthening their capabilities.

Sweden has rebuilt its defense capabilities on the strategically important island of Gotland and will increase defense spending by up to 40% over the next 4 years. In addition to new acquisitions and the repair of holes, the army itself will increase: the personnel of the armed forces would increase by 60 thousand. up to 90 thousand. And even that, critics say, is not enough.

Finland has also strengthened its defense capabilities in recent years with the acquisition of cruise missiles, and is now seriously considering an American offer for fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets. Together with Finland, one of the smallest NATO countries, Estonia, it finally adopted its defense options in a strategically important location on the Baltic Sea.

This year, its defense budget is expected to reach 760 million. or almost 2.3%. GDP, and part will go to key acquisitions, one of which was presented this week by the commander of the country’s Armed Forces, General Martin Herem.

According to the general, Estonia would like the Baltic countries to jointly acquire anti-ship missiles with a range of up to 350 km. Who needs that ability and what would it mean?

From cannons to missiles

Gen. Mr. Herem’s statement is particularly timely and, at the same time, historic. Discussions have been going on in Estonia for some time on major investment projects in the defense field. And although Estonia, unlike Latvia and especially Lithuania, was slow to plan spending and acquire medium-range air defense systems (Lithuania and Latvia chose NASAMS), one of the priorities was coastal defense.

Last year, the EKRE party, which was part of the government at the time, did not hide its ambitious goals of borrowing money: up to 300 million. and part of them, about 60 million. specifically for the development of anti-fleet capacity. And although the populist statements were chilled by the defense minister and the government at the time, it appears that the actual plans to develop those capabilities are not mere illusions.

Unlike Lithuania, which protects a modest 90 km of coastline, Estonia has 1,242 km, which are washed by the waters of the Baltic Sea. In case of crisis to defend each of the more than 2,2 thousand. the Estonian islands simply don’t have the opportunities or the capacity. This is not news to Estonians.

As in the interwar period, Estonia seems determined to have a capability that primarily deters any potential opponent from a great distance. In the interwar period, Estonia expanded the network of coastal batteries that had been developing since Tsarist times and concentrated it around Tallinn, where the coastal protection batteries were converted into fortifications.

The batteries were equipped with the most powerful guns in the Baltic countries, ranging from 234mm to 305mm caliber guns, which could hit targets several tens of kilometers away. Together with the Finnish coastguard batteries, the Estonians could theoretically not only repel, but also, if necessary, deal a severe blow to the Soviet fleet, blocking it at the entrances to what was then Leningrad.

Of course, this did not happen, because Finland, which was attacked in 1939, resisted the Kremlin and maintained its independence, although it lost part of its territory, and Estonia, like the other Baltic states, was occupied by the Soviet Union almost without gunfire. All the coastal batteries and guns were occupied by the Soviets, later the Germans, and now many of the old batteries remain the ruins of concrete bunkers or rusty remnants of gun structures.

Today, stationary guns are no longer as effective, although Finland still maintains combat readiness in large-caliber gun batteries in several countries. Guided anti-ship missiles are considered to be a more effective means of stopping enemy navigation. Unlike cannon shells, they are more accurate and can be fired from a much greater distance.

The maximum range of 350 km, as declared by the Commander of the Estonian Armed Forces, is a target for the launch of Western anti-ship missiles, which are still under development. Many anti-ship missiles used in Western countries can hit targets 100-200 km away.

Deterrence is no longer just a theory

It is the latter number that is desirable for Estonians, because unlike cannons, anti-ship missiles can be deployed especially quickly and launched from various locations; To defend one of Estonia’s largest islands or deter enemy ships from them, Estonia can deploy its anti-ship capabilities on the mainland.

Furthermore, it is deterrence, not the desire to shoot or provoke, that Estonia is trying to teach Russia. The latter country since 2014. Attacks against Ukraine in the Baltic Sea also began to behave aggressively, with reports from Estonia, Finland and Latvia of airspace violations by Russian military aircraft. And the maneuvers of the Russian Baltic Fleet in the exclusive economic zones of the Baltic States are seen as a provocation.

Until now, Russia was well aware that none of the Baltic countries had the ability to pose the least threat to Russian warships more than a few kilometers away. But the anti-ship capabilities, the missiles, are changing everything.

Knowing that a small NATO country constantly despised and ridiculed by the Kremlin has suddenly seen the rise of a mobile, difficult-to-track anti-ship missile system that can destroy targets several hundred kilometers away, you may not want to be forced. to take extra precautions, including the captain of the warship.

Look at Poland

“I don’t know which manufacturer we will choose, but together with our Latvian colleagues we will visit Poland, which has such systems,” the country’s army commander told the Estonian daily Postimees.

His saying is more than eloquent, as is the attempt to consider acquiring anti-ship missiles together with Latvians and Lithuanians. Estonia, even in percentage terms, is no longer equal to the largest Lithuania and is only slightly ahead of Latvia in terms of defense funding, although a decade ago Estonia even spent more on defense than Lithuania.

The financial ceiling means that even 60 million. An amount of 1 million euros would allow anti-ship missiles to acquire a limited number of capabilities. However, Poland and the two Baltic countries were mentioned by chance. It was Polish soldiers who brought their latest NSM (naval attack missile) anti-aircraft missiles with mobile launchers to Estonia as early as 2019.

These Norwegian missiles are used by Norway itself, ordered by the Navy of the United States, Romania, Canada and Germany. It is one of the most advanced anti-missile missiles in the world. A launch truck has four of these missiles with a range of at least 185 km, which means that the movement of any ship through the Saaremaa anti-ship unit can control and block the movement of any ship in the narrow Gulf of Finland , the only sea route between the strategically important Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg.

12 mobile launchers with 50 of those missiles for 82 million. The Polish fleet, which bought the euro, was satisfied with these missiles, and Poland itself has traditionally sought additional benefits, such as the agreement to establish an NSM missile maintenance, production and certification center in Poland. Therefore, when considering additional acquisitions, the role of Poland with other Baltic countries, potential users of these systems, may not be less important than that of Norway.

Also, any larger purchase could theoretically lead to a better price and a larger order. True, these conversations about the potential for joint arms acquisitions have been circulating for several decades, especially in the Baltic states, but they rarely end in concrete agreements: country-specific requirements, specifications and ambitions often prevent a deal. .