Are several states developing a new type of weapon of mass destruction?

He imagined that these planes could destroy various activists, political leaders of hostile states (or even his own state but in opposition). A spokesman for the manufacturers said the number of planes that could be produced for $ 25 million can wipe out half the city.

True, it was all science fiction. But, seriously?

There is much more than one country in the world developing autonomously controlled drone and weapon technologies. And a swarm of unmanned aerial vehicles in the United States is being created by all branches of the military (perhaps only with the exception of the newly established Space Force). Admittedly, the Navy creates swarms of jet skis rather than aircraft that can surround enemies and perform a variety of combat missions. The US Air Force USA He would use his swarm to collect intelligence and trap enemy air defense systems. Russia, China, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and many other countries are also developing their swarms.

At the same time, there are a number of states that are developing or have already established autonomous weapons systems (although, for the moment, they are mostly stationary). These include South Korea, which has an SGR-A1 machine gun turret, and the Americans, who developed the Phalanx weapon system.

By combining the two types of military systems, a Slaughterbot-type weapon can be obtained: a fully autonomous swarm of unmanned aerial vehicles armed with lethal weaponry. They were abbreviated as AFADS (fully autonomous armed drone swarm) by Zachary Kallenborn of the Modern Military Institute at Westpoint Military Academy (USA). Autonomy in this case is understood as computer controlled target selection and computer controlled movement, on land, air, water or even in space, when large numbers of drones cooperate with each other to achieve a common goal.

Due to these properties, AFADS could be classified as weapons of mass destruction. Callenborn points out in his latest study that AFADS can exceed the threshold to define the mass of victims chosen by any criteria and could not distinguish between military and civilian targets by nature.

Who needs such a classification?

Classifying drone swarms as weapons of mass destruction would have important conceptual, legal and national security implications. Conceptually, the perception that AFADS are (or are not) weapons of mass destruction requires a deep and exhaustive discussion of what this term means in general and what its alternatives are. While these drones have great similarities to “traditional” weapons of mass destruction in their capabilities, they also have important differences.

Legally, the classification of AFADS as weapons of mass destruction would mean that they are subject to the requirements of both the Seabed Arms Control Agreement and the Outer Space Arms Control Agreement. These treaties restrict the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in “common spaces” (at the bottom of the ocean and in outer space). The problem is that these treaties do not use a precise definition of “weapons of mass destruction”. Conventional biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of this type are also restricted by a number of other political agreements, programs, governmental and international organizations and agreements aimed at limiting the proliferation and use of these weapons and providing measures to respond to their use.

From a national security perspective, the classification of AFADS as a weapon of mass destruction is also important, since the use of any weapon of mass destruction, chemical, biological or nuclear, can drastically change public attitudes towards military action. If AFADS are classified as weapons of mass destruction, all laws, treaties, and regulations that restrict the proliferation of such weapons must also be considered.

However, assigning a particular weapon to a class of weapons of mass destruction is not an easy task. In fact, it is even very complex, since the variety of definitions of a weapon of mass destruction is enormous. Two dozen such definitions are used only in US government organizations. USA Partly because of this, some researchers even oppose the use of the term “weapons of mass destruction” because of its vagueness and potential for political abuse, as well as the blurred perception of this definition that all weapons of mass destruction – atomic Chemical and biological – they are equally threatening.

The disputes over the accuracy of terminology are very wide, so Z. Callenborn did not look for a solution for them in his article. But whatever the definition of weapons of mass destruction (or, conversely, not weapons of mass use) is chosen, the separation of this class of weapons from conventional weapons shows that weapons of mass destruction are different in nature and require special attention.

Swarms of drones as weapons of mass destruction

According to a representative of the Westpoint Academy, fully autonomous drone swarms should be classified as weapons of mass destruction because their potential damage and their inherent inability to separate military objectives from civilian ones are essential characteristics of “traditional” weapons of mass destruction.

Because swarms of armed drones could be of vastly different sizes established by mission leaders, they could exceed any imaginary threshold of “mass destruction” that is supposed to distinguish traditional weapons from mass destruction, be it one thousand, two thousand or tens of thousands.

The size and effect of conventional weapons are limited by many different factors, while many of these factors do not limit the increase in swarms of drones. Drones are weapon platforms that are easy to develop and relatively easy to configure. Bard College (United States) recently identified up to 95 states using military drones (a total of 171 different types of drones). And some of these drones are so simple that the hardware itself can be purchased from a regular hardware store or even printed on a 3D printer. For individual drones to be part of a swarm of drones, it is only necessary to give them the software and technical capacity to share information, as well as to make the political and financial decisions necessary for the acquisition of such equipment and the development of technology.

Let’s say a private company, Intel, demonstrates a rapidly growing ability to manage an increasing number of drones simultaneously. And this shows that the size of the drone cloud is almost unlimited. 2016 the company demonstrated a coordinated flight of 100 drones, the number increased to 300 in 2017 and to 1218 in 2018, and to 2018 in the same year. If each of these drones were armed with even a small explosive, the large number of casualties it would be undeniable.

Of course, the exact amount of damage is highly context dependent. Defenders can be armed with strong drone defense forces or traditional anti-aircraft defense forces. If such deadly armed drones became a “standard” part of armaments, the easiest way to combat them would be to hook up nets. On the other hand, drone swarms are, by definition, very flexible and can be easily adjusted to apply different effects, such as extending a chemical weapon or firing long-range missiles. Drone swarms can operate on various types of battlefields, can be armed with anti-tank, electronic combat, or other weapons, and can also be equipped with vitality-enhancing protection systems.

Fortunately, there are so far very few real-world examples to realistically estimate the extent of damage they could cause. The closest example is 2018. The case of January, when the Syrian rebels, armed with 10 homemade drones, simultaneously released them against a Russian military base in Syria. While the Russian army has officially announced that it has successfully defended itself against the attack, the Free Alavite movement has announced that it has destroyed a $ 400 million S-400 anti-aircraft defense system. AMERICAN DOLLAR. It is true that the evidence that the damage was actually done is minimal, and both parties have a very clear motivation to lie to strengthen their positions, making it very difficult for those who do not participate directly in events to know which one. it’s true.

An innate inability to separate a military objective from a civilian one

The nature of drone swarms fosters a high level of autonomous control. The greater the number of drones in a swarm, the more difficult it will be to control what each of these robots specifically does. The movement of each particular drone must be coordinated with the rest of the group, both due to the need to complete the task and to avoid collisions between them. As the number of drones increases, human control of individual robots may simply become impossible. The drone management program of the US Air Force. USA It is no longer adequately staffed and these soldiers are “running out” faster than in any other military career.

Autonomous determination of whether a target is “real” is an extremely difficult task. Well, think of a uniformed enemy soldier. At first glance, this is a perfectly legitimate “legitimate” objective. What if you are so injured that you can no longer fight? But if a soldier can aim a weapon, even if he is wounded, it is a “real” target.

Not only that, the autonomous armed system must be able to effectively distinguish a gunman from an unarmed and hostile force from a friendly, military, or other civilian uniform. Even if an artificial intelligence system is able to distinguish a shovel from a firearm in a laboratory, in actual use it will have to do the same when conditions are really difficult, for example, when part of the object is not visible or is intentionally masked. Reliable identification of threatening and non-threatening objects may require artificial intelligence close to the human level. And the development of such technologies is not expected, at least in the near future, they may never be developed.

The level of complexity will also depend largely on the environment in which the operation takes place. Suppose that swarms of water drones (either floating or flying over water) will face much less environmental disturbance than swarms on land. In the open ocean, tree branches will not interfere with a good view of a potentially hostile ship. Furthermore, the separation of a warship from a civilian ship is usually very simple due to design differences, due to the fairly massive weapon systems. But that relative simplicity is just ‘relative’: Despite the fewest obstacles, identifying the real target is not easy, even at sea.

Some states are very likely to deliberately choose not to develop and use such weapons systems, either for practical development reasons or for ethical reasons. But it is necessary to assume that some states will actually do so.

History has shown that the authorities of some countries tend to shake hands with victims of unworthy people, be it the landing in Dresden, the use of chemical weapons against their own citizens in Syria or the destruction of certain ethical groups in Africa, by governments that militarily and politically elevate objectives above the lives of unarmed people, it always happens. In Iraq, such measures have even been used for strategic purposes: a intimidated society represents a minor threat to the ruling regime. And if almost everyone in the world’s unstable countries has or can easily buy an AK-47, why wouldn’t they have a chance to buy a self-contained armed drone?

So what should be done?

Representatives of the world’s responsible governments should limit the use of fully autonomous armed drone swarms as much as possible, establish rules that restrict their use, seriously consider the use of military power against states that violate these rules, and prepare their troops for defense against such weapons. And for the US military and government. USA In particular, Callenborn offers several measures.

First, the United States government should formally express its position that drone swarms are a weapon of mass use. Universal recognition of such a classification would facilitate the development of international standards against AFADS.

Second, the powers of organizations fighting against the development of weapons of mass destruction and the reach of the organizations themselves must be expanded. It should be assessed whether such US governmental or international organizations. USA They should not participate in the AFADS limitation as well. As it is still a new threat that has not yet shown its full potential, the first objective of such organizations should be to inhibit, to the extent possible, the development of AFADS programs and the diffusion of systems already developed. Full attention should be paid to the codification of norms contrary to existing international agreements, the export control regime of AFADS systems and the establishment of a system of sanctions for violators of these requirements.

Third, analyze verification and reliability methods. Verifying the use of AFADS is likely to be very difficult, since an essential element of such systems, total autonomy, is programmatically coded. The problems of using and managing “armed robots” in the international community have been studied for quite some time, and a series of measures have been devised to limit autonomy, which could also be applied to swarms. For example, a management system could be established that would require a shooting permit from a human manager, as well as a system for sharing information to ensure transparency in decision-making. Management methods must be developed in coordination with the international community and its contributions.

Furthermore, the international community needs to discuss whether the unauthorized use of AFADS is a serious enough reason to consider military intervention in the conflict. This discussion should focus on the scope of swarm use and the type of target (military or civil). Suppose that if a swarm of 10,000 drones were to exterminate civilians, then military intervention would probably be justified, but if two drones attack a military base involved in a military conflict, external intervention would probably not be necessary. It will probably not be possible to establish a specific threshold from which external forces should already intervene, but the international community could agree on a wide range of factors that would justify or disapprove of such intervention. Furthermore, the use of such weapons could be punished not only with bullets and explosions, but also with sanctions or other political means.

The key is to understand that autonomous, armed and self-moving drone swarms pose a great threat to global security, and without clear international standards and political will to implement them, life in the world will be more dangerous.