Russian political scientist: Lavrov came to Lukashenko with an assignment

What did you talk about during this meeting and what did you disagree on? Journalists from Nastojaščeje vremia asked Katerina Šmatina, an analyst at the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, and Dmitry Oreškin, a Russian political scientist.

Moscow’s support is less secure and useful

– Looking at the fragments of the meeting, what would you say: who came to whom, who depends on what?

Katerina Šmatina: I didn’t pay too much attention to the rhetoric itself or to the open formats of the meetings that take place between Lukashenko and Moscow, because there is a certain level of rhetorical support – the format of traditional union rhetoric between Moscow and Minsk. However, I would venture to conclude that, in the long term, Moscow’s support is not as safe and useful as it might seem.

And that Moscow is soon analyzing all possible scenarios for the outcome of the events in Belarus, including the cessation of support for Lukashenko, and considering the possibility of a transfer of power, it wonders what other political forces it could support.

Dmitry Oreškin: I can say that the lack of reports and comments in the Russian media is surprising. It can only mean one thing: that they did not speak and did not agree on anything important. I think two important points are worth mentioning. First: Lukashenko must give the impression that he is preparing to meet with the protesters, to say something about the constitutional reform, to take one or another demonstration step. And the second thing: these are, of course, considerations about the state of the Union that nobody has spoken about lately, at least in Russia.

Silence on the State of the Union

– We look at the passage on the state of the Union, which Lavrov, the head of Russian diplomacy, talks about. Mr Lukashenko is talking about intensifying relations and Mr Lavrov is talking directly about the state of the Union. The President of Belarus never said that term, at least in the open passage he showed us. It is important?

D. Oreškinas: It seems to me that everything is clear here. This is probably very important, because Lukashenko is very attached to the government, he does not want and cannot share it with anyone. And it’s not that he doesn’t want to and doesn’t pay, even with his older brother. When he found himself in a real well, in serious trouble, there was no money to pay the salaries of the personnel of the power structures, to pay for gasoline, etc., he smiled to the East and got that money.

Simply put, Putin had no other choice, there were no other options. And now, in a sense, he is showing self-confidence. Respectfully, humbly, but I don’t feel like going back to the “older brother and younger brother relationship” format.

It seems to me that Lukashenko is beginning to feel that the situation will change with him anyway, at least it seems so to him, and to react quite aggressively to Russia’s statements. The behavior of Russia, in this case, is a very interesting question. Neither I nor you will know and we will know what it really is, nobody will tell us.

– What could Lukashenko’s phrase “intensify relations” mean?

K. Šmatina: I believe that in view of the rhetoric of Mr. Lukashenko, which has changed in recent months, including in relations with Russia, who accused Moscow of interfering in the internal affairs of Belarus during the pre-election campaign, the rhetoric of the sister nations has changed. Just those words don’t really mean anything. Another matter is that Lavrov’s visit to Minsk is, so to speak, the only major and politically significant high-level event for official Minsk in the context of Belarus’ withdrawal from the collective West and the new sanctions imposed on the regime to quell the protests. In the context of all the international meetings organized by Sviatlana Cichanouskaya, Mr. Lukashenko’s meeting with Lavrov is one of the few meetings that the President of Belarus can afford in the current political climate.

The horror of Maidan. Does Moscow believe in Lukashenko?

– At this meeting, Lavrov stated that Lukashenko had presented a number of initiatives and Putin was interested in them. My head was talking about a meeting in Sochi. Do you understand exactly what was being talked about then and what topics could have been explored this time?

D. Oreškinas: In Sochi in particular, there was talk of money, gas and oil, because much of Aliaksandr Grigorievev Lukashenko’s economy depends on the processing of Russia’s energy resources. And it is no secret to anyone. Because the economy, like all authoritarian regimes, is not very efficient, Lukashenko is in dire need of money. There was talk that Putin would give him money after asking for flexibility and somehow agreeing with those protesters.

So far, I have the impression that Lukashenko is neither willing nor willing to negotiate with these protesters. Russia has given him money, he believes that he will not go anywhere, because Russia is very afraid of the example of a real democratic change that is taking place independently of the government, what he calls the “horror of the Maidan”: God forbid if that happens. Therefore, it seems to me that Lukashenko has decided to follow the example of Venezuela.

– Katerina, what initiatives do you think Putin and Lukashenko agreed?

K. Šmatina: It is certainly not naive to think that these initiatives, the exclusive idea of ​​Lukashenko, all the more so since all the talks in the framework of the State of the Union, are certainly not a Belarusian initiative. If we talk about the talks in Sochi, the most interesting were the leaks in the media, including Kommersant, about what was going to be discussed, the possible scenarios for the transfer of power and the fact that Moscow has not yet ruled out a change in the main political figure of Belarus.

The fact that Mr Lukashenko has not managed to stabilize the situation during those months, I think, surprises both Belarus itself and the Kremlin. I think it is very important for Russia that any change in Belarus does not come as a clear victory of democratic protest, because such a situation could increase the risks for Russia, incite protests, and when it comes to supporting constitutional reform, I think it is quite a comfortable setting. Moscow speaks, and Lukashenko obeys.

– After all, Moscow constantly talks about Lukashenko’s legitimacy as president. Do you think the Kremlin still believes that Lukashenko is behind schedule and needs to develop a relationship with him?

D. Oreškinas: I think that no one loves Lukashenko in Moscow in the first place, because he has repeatedly left “Moscow” on ice “for monetary and political reasons.” I think Moscow understands very clearly that Lukashenko is, as a very possible thing, not a long-term perspective, but only average at best. That is the most important thing: it is not so important what Moscow thinks, the most important thing is that there is no alternative in the minds of our most influential bosses. There no longer seems to be a more appropriate option than to persuade Lukashenko to do something, at least for the sake of sight, to throw any ideas at the protesters.

I think Putin has very few options. He cannot remove Lukashenko without a military coup. And there is no intention to do so. And Aliaksandras Grigorjevičius does not sign other options. I find your situation very difficult. As if biting his lip, he waits for what comes next, as if he is standing on a keg of gunpowder. Lavrov’s task was probably to move him at least a little in some way. It seems that Lukashenko is speechless and ready to drag the whole of Belarus with him.

“Putin kills what he calls the ‘Russian world’

– Public opinion polls in Belarus show that the attitude of the country’s population towards Russia is changing, and even in the context of the prospects for the state of the Union. Does this worry the Kremlin? Can this trend be reversed?

K. Šmatina: It all depends on the public opinion polls we rely on. The ones I know of are being done by independent researchers, speaking of a fairly friendly Belarusian approach to Russia, and those friendly relations are largely independent of the region: be it Grodno or regions closer to the Russian border. However, Belarusians continue to consider themselves a nation, culturally and otherwise close to Russia.

Another important point is that many protesters do not fully understand why the Kremlin continues to support Lukashenko and is not concerned about the bloodshed by innocent people on the street, resulting in unprecedented brutality. Belarusians understand that, in principle, Lukashenko remains in power only because Moscow continues to support him. And this factor changes the opinion of Belarusians about Russia, pushing them even further.

– In your exclusively human context, do you think that Russian-Belarusian relations will influence future relations between the two countries?

D. Oreškinas: Inevitably it will have. The Kremlin is forced to support Lukashenko because it believes that there are two forms of evil: Maidan and Lukashenko. Of course, the Maidan intimidates the Kremlin more. He is seeking a compromise, trying to force Lukashenko to step into negotiations, but the situation does not seem critical enough for the latter to do so.

As for the relationship, yes, it seems to me that with such actions, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is killing with his own hands what he calls the “Russian world”. To put it mildly, Ukraine is very disappointed in Russia. Now it is Belarus. We have also heard about Moldova recently, there is no need to even remind Georgia.

The Russian world is becoming toxic not only in the eyes of the West, but also in the eyes of the countries of the former Commonwealth of Independent States. It will turn out very quickly in the eyes of the Russians themselves. For example, in my eyes. And not because he is Russian, but because of Putin.

It is only necessary to understand very well that Putin’s corridor of opportunity is very narrow. In his priority system, he cannot allow Maidan, the West, to dictate terms to Lukashenko, who is no longer retiring from the presidency, whom Putin still considers the legitimate leader of the country. If he is considered a legitimate president, what else can we talk about?