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Both the four countries, based on free relations and officially called the United States, Australia, India and Japan consultations, and the Malabar exercise are presented (with doubt) as NATO Asia. The idea that the four countries could become a full-fledged military alliance was reinforced in part by US Under Secretary of State Stephen Biegun. He said that “even the beginning of NATO was marked by quite modest expectations” when the alliance was founded in 1949. However, a better way to imagine the future path of these countries towards an alliance is to compare the Quartet with today’s NATO. Many people see NATO as a military “iron alliance,” but no one expects to see Russian tanks in Germany and France, and NATO members in Eastern Europe certainly do not believe that Iceland and Portugal will rush to their aid.
In fact, today, NATO is largely a standard-setting and training organization whose military alliance is only part of the picture. Even on NATO’s own website, the first objective is political (“NATO upholds democratic values”) and only the second is military (“NATO is committed to the peaceful settlement of disputes”). NATO has programs for arms control, anti-trafficking, gender diversity, energy security and the environment. All four issues can and should be addressed by all four parties. On the tougher side of the union, military exercises like Malabar can be extended to cover various NATO missions, such as counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, and ballistic missile defense.
In practice, the only NATO action incompatible with the future of Malabar and the Quartet is the deployment of major multinational battle groups. There are four military units the size of a battalion in Eastern Europe. In total, there are only 4,500 soldiers in these battle groups. By comparison, an American supercar aircraft carrier has a larger crew. India alone deployed ten times as many troops in Ladakh along the de facto line of control that represents the India-China border, where there were brief conflicts in May. It would be absurd to assume that India wants or needs a multinational four-nation battalion to strengthen its position on the border with China.
Naval exercise Malabar
Almost every country in the region faces China’s “salami cutting” tactics aimed at undermining the sovereign right of the chosen state to maritime territory.
What India needs (and what it wants) is greater cooperation with the United States and its allies in conducting aviation and maritime exercises. In addition to this year’s Malabar exercise, which its three partners attended, India is also conducting regular bilateral exercises with Japan and the United States. In addition, India conducts regular annual exercises with France and has started negotiations with the European Union (EU) on naval cooperation. India has acquired a Boeing P-8I marine reconnaissance aircraft from the United States and Dassault Rafale from France and needs to learn how to match the new purchases with existing Russian fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles. This takes practice.
As for other countries in the region, they would also benefit from cooperation with NATO in Asia if it were also more of a training and standard-setting organization than an armed defense force. Vietnam, for example, would never consider joining a US-backed military alliance, but the country does participate in naval exercises with India and Japan, including the United States. Historically, South Korea has not cooperated much with Japan on security, but it may find it more acceptable to engage in broader regional activities. Due to its special status, Taiwan cannot join many treaty organizations, but this would not prevent the country from participating in programs covering NATO-relevant topics such as fighting human trafficking and cybersecurity.
Naval exercise Malabar
© Zuma Press / Scanpix
A more powerful quartet could also ensure deeper cooperation between the countries’ navies, creating something akin to a long-term Malabar exercise. In the Indian Ocean and the waters of Southeast Asia, there is a constant need for ships capable of conducting search and rescue operations, fighting pirates, and simply patrolling for security reasons. Almost all countries in the region are also faced with China’s “salami cutting” tactics, which seek to undermine the sovereign right of the chosen state to maritime territory. To achieve this, China often relies on irregular forces, such as fishing fleets. Kenneth Braithwaite, the naval secretary appointed by outgoing President Donald Trump, even proposed resuming the US First Fleet and deploying it to the region. But given that President-elect Joe Biden is unlikely to support Trump’s plan to increase the number of warships to 350, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to dedicate ships to rebuilding the First Fleet, even if it finds a country that accepts. accept force.
Naval strategist James Fanell proposed a provocative alternative: the Quartet countries and their future partners could establish a permanent multinational naval force to serve on a rotating basis. Unlike NATO, individual units would not be integrated (each country would only lead its own ships), but would work together on joint security missions and gain useful experience in the field of interoperability.
A more modest Asian NATO could have less than a billion dollars at first. Budget in US dollars.
If Biden’s candidate for secretary of state, Antony Blinken, is tasked with entrusting the task to a quartet of countries, the establishment of an Asian NATO may be just what he’s looking for. But that would not require great resources. Contrary to popular belief, NATO is not a very large organization. Its permanent headquarters employs about 500 soldiers and 1,000 civilians. Another 6 thousand. civilians work “in various agencies and at strategic and regional headquarters” or, in NATO terminology, “on projects.” The total annual military and civilian budget of the Alliance is less than 2,200 million. AMERICAN DOLLAR.
A more modest Asian NATO could have less than a billion dollars at first. A budget in US dollars, a small secretariat in Japan or Australia, and only a naval force whose units would rotate on a rotational basis. Such an alliance would send a serious message to China, even if it was not clearly directed at her. As in the case of Malabar and other regional exercises, the goal of the alliance would be to raise professional standards and improve force interaction, not to fight a specific enemy. Of course, by increasing the readiness of the region’s naval and air forces, a stronger quartet of countries would be better prepared to fight China or another adversary if necessary. But, like today’s NATO, the group’s core missions would be largely peaceful rather than confrontational.
However, today, the four countries are just as redundant as they were in 2007 and 2008, when the countries first joined together, but split again after a while. The Quartet is not even having a useful debate against China. At a meeting of foreign ministers in Tokyo in October, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was the only one present to publicly blame China. Clearly, no one in Asia wants a pan-Asian military alliance to take on China like NATO once took on the Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.
Naval exercise Malabar
Fortunately, Asia doesn’t need that. Each country in the region has its own problems with China, but they do not need to be addressed through military action. Today’s more sophisticated NATO-based Asian security organization would help its members fight the challenges of the 21st century. threats such as China’s “salami cutting” tactics and cyber warfare, creating the compelling impression that none of the retaliatory actions are directed directly against Beijing. In fact, and it wouldn’t. The members and partners of the Quartet would work together just to bring about a better peace in the region. If your actions undermine China’s ambitions, it will only happen because China is the only country in the region that tends to disturb the peace.
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