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The Irish question is back and once again is plaguing the relationship between Britain and Europe.
This time, the enmity revolves around a physical EU presence in Belfast. The European Commission insists that the Irish Protocol requires officials to oversee the checks and balances on property ranging from Britain to Northern Ireland, and that they need an office to work.
The United Kingdom says that the Protocol does not legally require this and that such an office would be divisive and contrary to the objectives of the Good Friday Agreement.
Some observers now believe that the problem has gotten out of control due to lack of confidence. Given that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and other leading figures in the United Kingdom boasted that there would be no controls or controls between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Commission does not trust the United Kingdom to fulfill its obligations.
“The Commission could have people based in Dundalk who could drive to Belfast every day and look over the shoulders of the UK authorities [carrying out checks]”says a source close to the discussions.” They can meet your functional requirement. But the Commission would not have had to be so aggressive if it could trust the United Kingdom to do the right thing. “
However, RTÉ News established that in February 2019, the UK enthusiastically considered the idea of an EU office in Belfast in an exchange of letters with the EU.
It turns out that the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office, Simon McDonald, wrote to his EU counterpart that the UK wanted to keep the EU embassies, not only in Belfast, but also in Edinburgh and Cardiff.
Mr McDonald himself was instrumental in outright rejection of the EU on this occasion, just over a year since he embraced the idea.
How did things come to this?
British and EU officials have a completely different memory of how the problem evolved.
In October 2018, after the Theresa May Withdrawal Agreement was concluded, it seemed clear that the European Commission offices in Cardiff and Edinburgh were to be closed, and the EU representation in London would be replaced by a delegation from the Lower status EU.
As part of this reconfiguration, Martin Selmayr, the Commission’s then Secretary General, suggested that the EU should maintain its presence in Belfast, due to the existence of the backing.
According to sources in Brussels, the problem progressed slowly and there were no major objections from the United Kingdom.
Then May’s Withdrawal Agreement failed on the rocks of repeated rejections by the House of Commons. She was forced to resign, Boris Johnson was elected leader, and in the fall of 2019 she negotiated a revised Protocol.
The problem of the EU presence in Belfast was still in the mix, according to sources in Brussels. Earlier that year, the problem had been passed to the EU External Action Service (EEAS), which is responsible for all EU delegations abroad.
The EEAS had doubts that a Belfast office was a full-fledged European Commission delegation, such as those located in capitals around the world.
The conversation then moved to the office simply by having a technical function that would reflect the work required by the Protocol that Johnson had just negotiated.
It did not seem like a controversial issue at EU level. This would be an office where the EU could ensure that the Protocol, which is designed to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland and to protect the EU’s single market, is being properly implemented.
“For most member states, they couldn’t shoot,” says an EU diplomat. “They just want an office where the Commission can go back and say it is being properly implemented.”
British officials have a completely different opinion. They consider that the problem dates back to the Commission’s first supporting text in February 2018, which provided for joint checks and controls by UK and EU officials.
The idea of joint EU-UK controls was seen as an unacceptable breach of UK sovereignty by London. As such, when the Theresa May Protocol was concluded, it provided for UK customs officials to do the checks, but EU officials regularly monitored those checks.
When Boris Johnson renegotiated the Protocol, his government toyed with the idea of fully bundling that approach and having no presence in the EU. In the end, however, that idea was abandoned.
According to London, the first time the idea of an EU presence in Belfast came up was in a letter from Helga Schmid, Secretary-General of the EEAS, on 12 February this year.
British sources say this came suddenly, at a time when the British and Irish governments had just restored the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Schmid argued that Article 12 of the Protocol, which requires EU officials “to be present during any activity of [UK] authorities “in carrying out EU customs and regulatory controls meant that the EU should have a permanent presence in Northern Ireland.
The EU would need “very particular capacities and competences on the ground, different from the more traditional competences of any other EU delegation”.
The EU expected the office to be operational by the summer of 2020, in time for the transition period to end and the new system to take effect on January 1.
McDonald sent a somewhat stark response that an office would not be appropriate.
Schmid sent out a stronger follow-up letter on March 25. Article 12 of the Protocol gave the EU certain rights.
“It is necessarily at the discretion of the EU to determine to what extent it wishes to exercise these rights,” he said.
He added: “At least during the initial phase of implementing the Protocol, the EU will want to make use of these rights on an ongoing basis. To do this effectively, an office in Belfast with technical staff is indispensable.”
Furthermore, the United Kingdom was obliged to facilitate EU officials “to ensure that the EU is in a position to exercise its rights effectively”. [My emphasis]
The second letter did not provoke a rethink by the United Kingdom. On Monday, Schmid received a second rejection from Penny Mordaunt MP, a minister of state and general of payments.
Mordaunt stated that Article 12 did not require an EU delegation office, “or any other permanent EU presence in Northern Ireland.”
Furthermore, since the two main unionist parties refused to sign a joint letter from the leaders of Sinn Féin, the SDLP, the Alliance Party and the Green Party supporting the office, it meant that the idea had “generated controversy.” [which] from our point of view it would be divisive in political and community terms. “
This was three days before the first meeting of the Specialized Committee, which brings together EU and UK officials to implement the Protocol.
While the videoconference was seen by both sides to be constructive, indeed more constructive than expected, the strongest exchanges were on the issue of the EU office.
“The EU side had a rather sharp response,” says one source informed in the video conference, “greatly regretting the British approach, stressing the importance of this office in implementing the Protocol.”
The UK side responded equally sharply. Implementing the Protocol was quite difficult, one official said, without “unnecessarily” introducing the idea of an EU office in Belfast, a request that had divided Northern political parties into completely predictable community lines.
The videoconference was joined by officials from France, Germany, Spain, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland, and a senior official from the Northern Ireland Executive.
The Irish official said the government here viewed the office as “logical” given the demands of Article 12 and in no way undermined the Good Friday Agreement, “no less important given the continued EU support for the peace process.”
The official said Ireland hoped that “such a presence could be accommodated in a way that meets the needs and sensitivities of both parties.”
Although they see the roots of the confrontation differently, all parties say they are dismayed that the problem has escalated so rapidly, especially when there is already such a deep level of mistrust about the implementation of the Protocol.
Sources in Brussels suggest that any objection raised by London from the time Boris Johnson signed the revised Protocol in October last year was not about union concerns, but the fact that if Belfast had an office in the EU, Scotland also I would like one.
Helga Schmid’s letter of February 12 suggests that she was trying to reassure the United Kingdom that Belfast was a special case and that there was no reason for Scotland to have a similar presence in the EU.
“The situation with regard to Ireland and Northern Ireland is unique compared to that of the other United Kingdom delegate nations, and therefore deserves a specific solution,” he wrote to Sir Simon McDonald.
“As the situation with respect to Scotland and Wales is fundamentally different compared to Northern Ireland, we do not foresee EU presences in Edinburgh or Cardiff.”
However, it turns out that there was an earlier exchange of letters between Schmid and McDonald on the subject. This time it was in February 2019.
In the context of the UK protests that the request for an EU presence in Belfast was an unexpected lightning bolt, the February 2019 correspondence provides a remarkable turnaround.
Schmid had written to McDonald back then saying that the EU wanted to maintain an office in Belfast because of the Protocol, which was still Irish backing at the time, and because of continued EU PEACE funding for Northern Ireland.
Contrary to his resounding rejection this year, McDonald not only agreed with the idea, but also seemed enthusiastic. Nor was enthusiasm limited to the idea of an EU presence in Belfast.
According to an excerpt from his letter sent on February 11, 2019, McDonald wrote: “The UK government supports the continued presence of EU offices in Edinburgh and Cardiff, along with London and Belfast, given the long relationship the EU has has with all delegated nations … “
Granted, this was an aspiration under Theresa May’s administration, and the approach under Boris Johnson is very different.
However, this puts a huge question mark on the UK’s claims that Helga Schmid’s request in February this year was the first they heard about the EU presence in Belfast.
An EU official told RTÉ News: “This cannot have been taken by surprise by the UK. The possibility of opening an office in Belfast has long been discussed at this stage. The EU has been consistent on this point. “
Why did the EU not insist that the office requirement be specified in Article 12 when the Protocol was renegotiated last year?
According to various sources, the EU wanted the Protocol to remain as intact as possible, and that any changes to the text would be a “request” from the United Kingdom, and not one from the EU.
In other words, the Commission believed that if Brussels reopened the text on Ireland, then other member states, most likely Spain, and its position on Gibraltar, would want another part of the Withdrawal Agreement to be opened as well.
Therefore, Brussels believed that it was better to leave such demands to the United Kingdom. “There was nothing renegotiated that was not at the request of the United Kingdom or as a direct consequence of it,” says a source familiar with the negotiations.
British sources flatly reject it and say the reason the EU did not request that an EU office be inserted into Article 12 is because London would have immediately rejected it.
That may have been true under Boris Johnson’s harsher line, but it wouldn’t have been true under Theresa May, as evidenced by the February 2019 correspondence between London and Brussels.
The UK is expected shortly to come up with ideas on what it believes to be a more appropriate agreement for EU technical experts operating under the Protocol. It is understood that London will propose an ad-hoc agreement where officials travel for several days and leave again, staying in hotels.
A source suggests that the UK, and all other member states, would be subject to Common Agricultural Policy spending audits by EU audit officials who would fly, conduct inspections for several days, and fly again.
According to sources, monitoring of how British customs, VAT and veterinary officials are carrying out checks and controls under the Protocol should be possible under the same model.
However, the EU says there is no comparison between annual audits for a policy that has been in place for years, and with which the UK as a member was legally aligned, and what is required in the Irish Protocol.
“We are taking over an entire region of the UK,” says a leading EU source, “and we are basically trying to apply a dual system to it, where it is de facto in the EU’s common customs territory, and is legally part of the territory. UK customs. And it will have dual VAT systems, etc. It has never been done anywhere before. “
The problem is dead or very much alive, depending on which side you are talking to.
“It is definitely not closed,” says an EU source, “and both sides remain committed to the issue. I don’t think the EU will let it go.”
London is of the opinion that the matter is closed, although if the EU sends a third letter, of course there would be an answer.
But the EU is taking it seriously.
On Thursday night, the European Commission distributed a nine-page note to member states detailing what the UK needs to do to comply with the Protocol.
The note said that the Protocol was the “greatest challenge” in implementing the Withdrawal Agreement, given its “technical complexity and political sensitivity”.
Essentially, a completely new regime would take effect on January 1, 2021 (unless, of course, the UK decides to extend the transition period) and the most dramatic changes needed “timely and comprehensive preparation” and required “adaptations more extensive by companies. ” “
The first priorities were customs procedures, sanitary and phytosanitary controls (SPS), a dual VAT system, based on the EU rules for goods and the UK rules for services, new rules for fishing fleets that land fish directly in the North and other technical preparations.
The creation of IT systems and databases for customs, VAT and excise should already be underway by June 1, just four weeks.
As such, the note emphasized “discussions about [European] The union presence in Northern Ireland must also be advanced as a matter of urgency. We need clarity on administrative arrangements before we can recruit staff, organize the adoption of their duties, etc. “
It is difficult to see how this can be solved amicably. By jumping so fast on the idea that the EU request had caused “controversy” and was “divisive”, the UK has provided extensive coverage to unionists to vociferously reject the idea of an EU office in Belfast.
Thus, the EU presence in Northern Ireland has become not only a representative of the trust issue, but a symbol that will antagonize both nationalists / unionists and remaining / leaving fault lines.
History reminds us that in Northern Ireland, symbols are the last thing to fix.
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