About ten years ago, Russell O’Brien served as Russell Wilson for Mike Glennon. Eventually Wilson transferred to Wisconsin, he stood out, and you know the rest. The Wisconsin offensive coordinator at the time was Paul Chryst. He is now the head coach. Chryst is shamelessly first. In the words of the man himself.
(The above is not an attempt to slander Paul Chryst through the unscrupulous use of an unflattering image. It is just when the keywords were present on the screen.)
As Wilson has grown as a quarterback, the belief among many is that he has been retained by an offense for the first time that, despite his exceptional play, he treats him as a game manager. In other words, Russell Wilson is a victim of a system that tries to protect him, but that robs him of the realization of his full potential. That’s right? Today I put on the Martin Prince hat and try the noblest of activities. Yes, today I will be a systems analyst.
What is wrong with the current system?
Despite running a very efficient passing offense and starting the second-best quarterback in the NFL, Seattle runs the ball too often.
Seattle ranked fourth in the NFL in expected points added per passing game. Each pass Seattle attempted added about 0.26 points. While each race lost around 0.07 points. However, Seattle was third in total running attempts and 23rd in passing attempts. This trend is not the result of Seattle regularly protecting a track. Seattle was ranked 23rd in time spent following a game, sandwiched between the 7-9 Buccaneers and the 5-11 Chargers. That is a bit broad. Let’s be more granular.
The state of the game greatly influences game calls. If we try to control that, and look only at fairly neutral game states (which I defined as occurring in the first three quarters without either team raising 17 or more points), the Seahawks rank 28th in pass attempt percentage. In 2018, Seattle was ranked 32nd. This places Wilson in the company of quarterbacks and game managers.
The team that led the NFL in passing attempts during these neutral game states was Kansas City. KC approved 67% of such plays. In the past four years, which is the span for which I have numbers, each Super Bowl winner spent more frequently than the average in these neutral game states. In fact, in the last four seasons, the Patriots, Eagles, Super Bowl winners, condemned Pats again, and KC ranked 3rd, 4th, 4th, and 1st in EPA added per pass, respectively. Efficient, high-volume passing is the foundation for winning a Super Bowl in the modern NFL. However, Seattle stubbornly refuses to pass more frequently.
What prevents Seattle from happening more often?
Brian Schottenheimer is one answer, and Pete Carroll is another, but the most likely answer is Russell Wilson himself. He has never excelled in a first pass offense. His style seems to always make him prone to shocks. The greatest value of running the ball may be that the chance of the quarterback getting hurt is minimized. While Wilson has been blessed with health, he had to be, as few quarterbacks have come close to enduring the type of punishment he has suffered.
In 2019, Wilson ranked third in the NFL in successes + sacks behind Ryan Fitzpatrick and Matt Ryan. Adding revolts and ignoring designed runs, Wilson led the NFL quarterbacks on potentially damaging plays. Of his 1,107 snapshots, Wilson ended 150 looted, beaten, or struggled.
Although Wilson is tough, he is not impervious to injury. In its eight seasons, Seattle has only finished out of the top ten in offensive efficiency (as determined by DVOA) twice. In 2016, when he played most of the season it hurt, and in 2017. Those are also the seasons that Wilson pitched more frequently and less efficiently. So I’m going to present a somewhat controversial opinion: Wilson benefits from a first-run offense, and increasing his passing attempts is not a matter of radically changing the offense, but minimizing potentially damaging plays.
How to do this is too big a question to answer in a post. It is also a thorny question. Wilson gets much of his courage from the fight. Wilson is likely to be hit fewer times, which means fighting less often, and at what point is the engagement no longer worth it?
Consider this rather strange division:
Wilson with 2.5 seconds or less in his pocket
Completion percentage: 70.5%
AY / A: 7.57
Bag percentage: 5.2%
Wilson with 2.5 or more seconds in his pocket
Completion percentage: 60.4%
AY / A: 10.23
Bag percentage: 12.5%
Simply put, when Wilson has more time to pitch, he completes fewer passes but for a much higher average, and he is fired more than twice as often. Getting rid of the ball faster will surely save Wilson from being hit. It will also limit its effectiveness.
Which leads to a disappointingly obvious solution: The Seahawks need to pass the block better. Yes. Wilson will likely never dramatically reduce his overall rate of being hit. The blows and the explosive plays come from the same well. But the Seahawks can reduce the probability of cheap bumps and bags.
Hidden in that previous division is the Seahawks’ offensive systemic flaw. For a play to last less than 2.5 seconds but end in a bag is indicative of a fundamental failure in protection. To put it in perspective, Dak Prescott was fired in just 1.1% of all those plays. Mahomes, 1.2%. Prescott, Mahomes, Tom Brady, Drew Brees and Jared Goff were fired less frequently overall than Wilson in less than 2.5 seconds. That is awesome. Stylistically similar quarterbacks to Wilson, Kyler Murray and Deshaun Watson, each with their own firing problems, were caught in just 3.5% and 4.2% of snapshots where they had less than 2.5 seconds in their pocket. These flash bags represent a third of all bags taken by Wilson, and we can only wonder how many potential flash bags were avoided by Wilson’s exceptional coding.
Yes, the solution is disappointingly obvious, but, for once, it seems to have been obvious to those who decide as well. Mike Iupati and Duane Brown allowed three combined sacks in 2019. They return. DJ Fluker and Germain Ifedi allowed nine combined sacks in 2019. They are gone. Ifedi, in particular, allowed 6.5 sacks, which is a hair above his professional average. Just don’t tell me that Brandon Shell is the alleged starter at right tackle. In 300 fewer snapshots than Ifedi, Shell allowed seven captures.
Ultimately, in order for Wilson to pass more frequently while maintaining his efficiency, he must be sure to pass more frequently. You may not be able to reduce your encoding rate without reducing your overall efficiency, but ignoring the value of pass protection because Wilson will inevitably be fired at a higher than average rate is a mistake. Wilson must risk being fired to be the best. Seattle must reduce the rate at which Wilson is fired, hit, or rushed very quickly so that Wilson is the best more often.