Exclusive: Lebanon leaders warn of explosives at port in July – documents


BEIRUT (Reuters) – Lebanese security officials warned the prime minister and president last month that 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate stored in the port of Beirut posed a security risk and could destroy the capital if it exploded, according to documents seen by Reuters and senior security sources.

Debris will be seen in the port area after an explosion in Beirut, Lebanon, August 10, 2020. REUTERS / Hannah McKay TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY

Just over two weeks later, the industrial chemicals exploded in a massive explosion that devastated most of the port, killing at least 163 people, injuring 6,000 more and destroying about 6,000 buildings, according to municipal authorities.

A report by the General Directorate of State Security on events leading up to the explosion included a reference to a private letter sent to President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Hassan Diab on 20 July.

While the content of the letter was not in the report seen by Reuters, a senior security official said it gathered the findings of a judicial investigation launched in January, concluding that the chemicals were needed to secure immediately.

The state security report, which confirmed the correspondence with the president and prime minister, has not been reported before.

“There was a danger that this material, like steel, could be used in a terrorist attack,” the official told Reuters.

“At the end of the investigation, Attorney General (Ghassan) Oweidat drew up a final report which was sent to the authorities,” he said, referring to the letter sent to the Prime Minister and President by the General Directorate. of State Security, which oversees port security.

“I warned them that this could destroy Beirut if it exploded,” said the official, who was involved in writing the letter and refused to be named.

Reuters could not independently confirm his description of the letter.

The Prime Minister’s Office and the Presidency did not respond to requests for comment on the July 20 letter.

The Attorney General did not respond to requests for comment.

‘DO WHAT IS NOTHING’

The correspondence could provoke further criticism and public anger that the explosion is just the latest, if not most dramatic, example of the negligence and corruption of the government that has already driven Lebanon to economic collapse.

When protests erupted over the blast in Lebanon on Monday, Diab’s government took off, though it remains as a supply chain until a new cabinet is formed.

Rebuilding Beirut alone is expected to cost a maximum of $ 15 billion, in a country that is already effectively bankrupt with total banking system losses of more than $ 100 billion.

Aoun confirmed last week that he was informed about the material. He told reporters that he had “done what was necessary” the Secretary-General of the Supreme Defense Forces, an umbrella group of Lebanon’s security and military agencies under the presidency.

“(The State Security Service) said it was dangerous. I’m not responsible! I do not know where it was placed and I did not know how dangerous it was. I have no authority to deal directly with the port. “There is a hierarchy and all those who knew should know their duties to do what is necessary,” said Aoun.

Many questions remain as to why ammonium nitrate shipments in Beirut were reduced in late 2013. Even more baffling is why such a large stash of dangerous material, used in bombs and fertilizers, could stay there for so long.

The letter sent to the President and Prime Minister of Lebanon follows a string of memos and letters sent to the country’s courts by port officials over the past six years, tailor-made and security, and repeatedly encourage judges to order the removal of the ammonium nitrate from its position so close to the city center.

The report from the General Directorate of State Security, seen by Reuters, said that many applications had been submitted, without giving an exact number. It said the port’s manifesto department sent several written requests to the customs directorate until 2016 and asked them to ask a judge to re-export the material immediately.

“But so far no decision has been made on this matter. “After consulting with one of our chemical specialists, the expert confirmed that this material is dangerous and is used to produce explosives,” said the report of the General Directorate of State Security.

FREE MATERIAL

The road to last week’s tragedy began seven years ago when the Rhosus, a Russian-handled, Moldovan-flagged ship carrying ammonium nitrate from Georgia to Mozambique, docked in Beirut to try to charge extra for transit fees. through the Suez Canal, according to the ship’s captain.

Port authorities punished the Rhosus in December 2013 by court order 2013/1031 due to outstanding debts owed to two companies that submitted claims to the court in Beirut, which emerged from the state security report.

In May 2014, the ship was considered unworthy and the cargo was discharged and stored in what was known as Hangar 12. In October 2014, the ship sank near the port’s breakwater on 18 February 2018, according to the security report.

Moldova names the owner of the ship as Panama-based Briarwood Corp. Briarwood could not be immediately reached for comment.

In February 2015, Nadim Zwain, a judge of the Court of Appeal, who is dealing with pressing issues, appointed an expert to inspect the cargo, according to the security report.

The report said the expert concluded that the material was dangerous and requested through the port authorities that it be transferred to the army. Reuters could not independently verify the expert’s account.

Lebanese army command rejected the request and recommended that the chemicals be transferred or sold to the private Lebanese explosives company, the state security report said.

The report did not say why the army had refused to accept the charge. A security official told Reuters it was because they did not need it. The Army declined to comment.

The management of the explosive company told Reuters that it was not interested in purchasing confiscated material and that the company had its own suppliers and import licenses.

From then on, customs and security officials wrote to judges almost every six months, asking them to remove the material, according to the requests seen by Reuters.

Judges and customs officials contacted by Reuters declined to comment.

A number of customs and port officials have since been arrested as part of the investigation into the explosion.

‘BAD STORAGE AND BAD JUDGMENT’

In January 2020, a judge launched an official investigation after it was discovered that Hangar 12 was unguarded, had a hole in the south wall and unlocked one of its doors, meaning the hazardous material was at risk of being stolen.

In his final report to the investigation, Prosecutor General Oweidat gave “immediate instructions” to ensure that hangar doors and holes were repaired and security provided, said a second high-ranking security official who also demanded anonymity.

On June 4, based on those orders, state security instructed port authorities to provide guards at Hangar 12, appoint a director for the warehouse and secure all the doors and repair the hole in the south wall, according to the state security report and security officials.

The port authorities did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

“The maintenance started and (port authorities) sent a team of Syrian workers (but) there was no one to supervise them as they entered to repair the holes,” the security official said.

During the work, sparks from the welding grip and fire began to spread, the official said.

“Considering that fireworks were stored in the same hangar, after an hour a large fire was started by the fireworks and that spread to the material that exploded when the temperature exceeded 210 degrees,” said the senior security official.

A still image taken from a drone footage shows the damage two days after an explosion in the port area of ​​Beirut, Lebanon August 6, 2020. Reuters TV / via REUTERS

The official accused the port authorities of not supervising the repair personnel and of storing fireworks in addition to a large stockpile of high explosives.

Reuters could not determine what happened to the workers repairing the hangar.

“Just because the hangar is facing the sea, the impact of the explosion was reduced. Otherwise, the whole of Beirut would be destroyed, ‘he said. “The issue is all about negligence, irresponsibility, poor storage and poor judgment.”

Additional Reporting by Nadia El Gowely and Ghaida Ghantous; Edited by David Clarke

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