The United States is gathering allies to compete with China. Beijing is ready.

As Washington prepares for what President Joe Biden calls the decisive battle of our time, for democracy and against Chinese autocracy, Beijing appears more than willing to take up that challenge.

The United States seeks to rally allies for the fight, but China makes clear that those allies will pay a price if they unite too enthusiastically. It has just imposed sanctions on European countries that had sanctioned Chinese officials implicated in the abuse of Uighur Muslims, for example. Tacit, but understood, is the threat to shut down European access to China’s huge consumer market.

And China has set out to remind Biden that he has friends. In recent weeks, Beijing welcomed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Chinese leader Xi Jinping sent a message of support to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, and China signed a 25-year cooperation agreement with Iran.

Can a new cold war be avoided? Both parties have an interest in not achieving that result and could work together on common interests such as nuclear non-proliferation and climate change. But they will have to tone down their rhetoric.

London

If a “new cold war” is brewing between the United States and China, and we haven’t got there yet, Beijing is preparing for battle.

As Washington seeks to build a common front to challenge China’s autocracy at home and assertiveness abroad, Beijing is showing its determination to hinder that movement and build alliances of its own.

The two countries still have an interest in not getting to Cold War II, a competition not only between two great powers, but also between rival power blocs across the world stage.

And in the first high-level talks between the United States and China since the election of President Joe Biden in Anchorage last month, both sides offered the possibility of finding areas of cooperation.

But such conversation was drowned out by an extraordinary public exchange of accusations by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and top Chinese foreign policy official Yang Jiechi. The main dividing line: human rights.

Mr. Blinken presented a frank list of details: the crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong, China’s pressure campaign against Taiwan, and the systematic crackdown on Uighur Muslims in the northwest Xinjiang region. Mr. Yang suggested that the United States should look at its own human rights record before criticizing others.

A few days later, when the US, Europe and Canada imposed sanctions on government officials in Xinjiang, China’s response was forceful and unequivocal: whatever pressure you or your allies exert, we will equalize and increase.

Beijing responded with its own sanctions. Significantly, they were targeted more strongly against the European Union, which in effect indicated to European countries that they risked paying a high price (access to China’s huge consumer market) if they sided with Washington.

The following day, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi welcomed his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov on a visit. When Lavrov denounced Washington for resorting to “Cold War era political-military alliances,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying backed him up. “Just look at the map,” he said, “and you will know that China has friends all over the world. What would we worry about? “

As if to recall that point, Beijing went on to demonstrate the importance of its ties with two countries that top Washington’s list of concerns and where Blinken would like Chinese cooperation.

First, North Korea with nuclear weapons. Chinese leader Xi Jinping exchanged personal messages with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un reaffirming their alliance. Pyongyang called this a show of “unity” against the “hostile” policies of the Biden administration.

Days later, Foreign Minister Wang signed a 25-year cooperation agreement in Iran, sealing what he called a “permanent and strategic” relationship that seems certain to deepen economic, infrastructure and security ties under the program. financing “Belt and Road” from China.

Closer to home, the Chinese parliament this week further tightened its grip on Hong Kong. He approved changes to the electoral system there, reducing the number of elected seats in his parliament and requiring all candidates to approve his “patriotic” loyalty to Beijing.

The irony is that, at least in the short term, China’s assertive response seems likely to reinforce rather than erode cohesion between Washington and its allies. Popular sentiment toward China in the major democracies has soured. A Pew survey of more than a dozen advanced economies late last year found that nearly 8 in 10 people did not trust Xi to “do the right thing” internationally.

A series of recent reports on Uighurs, alleging, among other things, the use of forced labor and forced sterilizations, has further hardened criticism of China’s human rights record by members of the European Parliament.

That body must ratify a long-sought investment treaty between the EU and China, sealed last December. But since Beijing imposed its sanctions on various EU lawmakers, parliamentary ratification seems increasingly unlikely.

The key question now is whether Washington and Beijing will be willing, or able, to find a way to stop before a general political confrontation and forge areas of cooperation.

China’s recent diplomatic embrace of North Korea and Iran may have been intended not just as a mockery, but as a reminder to Washington: If you want to control North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and prevent Iran from getting one, chances are you will. need our help.

And there is another broader issue where the US administration has made clear that it sees China’s partnership as indispensable: the global response to climate change.

That problem can provide an early signal of whether cooperation is still possible, and the litmus test will not involve meetings, diplomatic proposals, sanctions or rhetorical exchanges.

It will take the form of a RSVP for a virtual summit on climate change that Mr. Biden will host later this month.

Mr. Xi is on the guest list.