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President Xi Jinping recently told the UN General Assembly that China is aiming for carbon neutrality by 2060, in addition to its previous goal of reaching the carbon emissions peak by 2030 that it promised for the 2015 Paris Agreement. The global press greeted this announcement with enthusiasm, with headlines exclaiming “an unexpectedly forthright commitment to advance global action against the climate crisis”, “a significant step in the fight against climate change”, “a bold attempt to lead the world to future low carbon level ”, and so on. The Guardian
Gullible Western environmentalists and government officials hope China will play a leading role in the “fight” on climate change, especially since President Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement. However, China’s announced plans to reduce dependence on coal conflict with data showing that consumption and production are trending upward rather than downward.
China’s annual carbon dioxide emissions nearly tripled between 2000 and 2019, and now account for just under 30% of total global emissions, making the country the largest emitter by far. The United States, the second largest emitter, accounts for 14.5% of global emissions, while India, the third largest, contributes 7.3%.
After some reduction in the demand for coal for some years, demand increased from 2016 to 2019 by 3.3%, and its demand rose in June this year to near its maximum levels in 2013. In the first half of 2020, China approved 23 gigawatts of new coal power projects, more than the previous two years combined; In 2018 and 2019, China commissioned more coal power than the rest of the world combined.
As the largest contributor to carbon dioxide emissions, China would be expected to come under intense international pressure to reduce them. But the country is skilled in international diplomacy. Since the first negotiations in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that began in 1994, the country has positioned itself as the defender of the interests of the “Third World”, along with other large developing countries such as India. , Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia. .
The Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005, established a two-track system whereby developed countries in “Annex 1” adopted binding emission commitments, while developing countries “not included in Annex 1” did not. they only had no such commitments, but were expected to be recipients of Annex 1 group “climate finance” aid for assistance in climate change mitigation and adaptation.
In this way, the objectives of climate policy effectively became an exercise in massive international income redistribution. As German economist and UN climate policy official Ottmar Edenhofer put it in 2010, “Climate policy has almost nothing to do with environmental protection anymore. The next world climate summit in Cancun is actually an economic summit during which the distribution of the world’s resources will be negotiated ”.
It’s no wonder that Republicans in the United States Senate never approved such an outcome from the start, which explains President Obama’s adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 through the back door of defining the participation of the United States in the Paris Agreement as an “executive agreement.” and not an international treaty. As part of this no-deal, developed countries were expected to underwrite annual transfers of $ 100 billion as part of the “climate finance” section of the Paris Agreement.
The Paris Agreement was hailed as the “breakthrough” of President Obama’s understanding with China that the latter would also join the global effort to cut emissions. The president of the Council for the Defense of Natural Resources, based in the United States, stated that the two countries are “on an unstoppable path to protect ourselves from climate change, the main environmental challenge of our time.”
Perhaps most ironic about the announcements of the Paris Agreement to “save the planet” is the fact that the emission reduction commitments of developing countries like China and India mean little in practice. Green policy promises for future implementation are a free way to get diplomatic benefits at zero cost. As part of the non-binding requirements of the Paris Agreement, China promised to peak emissions “around 2030” but did not offer any commitments regarding the level of that peak or the subsequent rate of emission abatement.
It was hardly noticed amid the fanfare over China’s latest promise to be carbon neutral by 2060, the body of research showing China’s emissions would peak anyway by 2030 in a business-as-usual scenario ( BAU). A survey of about 260 participants reported by Bloomberg found that 90% of respondents said that China’s carbon emissions are likely to peak in or before 2030. An analysis by Bloomberg New Energy Finance concluded that the commitment to regarding the intensity of emissions is actually less ambitious than BAU. A similar conclusion was reached for India.
However, it would be wrong to understand this state of affairs primarily as one of countries like China and India that are “spoilers” in the global crusade for climate change. The governments of developing countries such as China and India are fully aware of the deep contradiction at the heart of energy planning between the long-term green energy promises and the immediate economic growth goals and budget priorities of the government. These countries will not sacrifice national economic growth and the aspirations of their citizens for the supposed global good.
For the Communist Party of China, staying in power is its top priority. Regime stability and political legitimacy are ultimately linked to continued economic growth and improvements in living standards for ordinary people. Economic growth, in turn, depends on continued access to fossil fuels. China’s planners know full well that no country in the world since the Industrial Revolution has developed without the use of fossil fuels. The history of successful economic development has essentially been moving up the “energy ladder,” moving from the ancient use of foraged wood, crop residues, and cow dung to modern fuels like high-quality propane, gasoline and diesel, and a reliable network. electricity. But the western environmental movement has focused on coercing poorer countries to adopt quixotic decarbonization policies based on unreliable intermittent renewable energy technologies with absurd “hopping” analogies.
It is no wonder, then, that Asian planners have at times reacted strongly. Not long ago, Arvind Subramaniam, formerly chief economic adviser to the Indian government, declared that India cannot allow the West’s “carbon imperialism” to block rational planning of the vast energy infrastructure necessary for agriculture, industrialization, modern urbanization and mobility.
At the Durban climate conference in 2011, China’s lead negotiator Xie Zhenhua made the point even more directly, asking Western governments “what qualifies you to give us a conference on what to do?” The Chinese government, like its counterparts in India and other developing countries, knows that forgoing national economic growth for a supposed global good is not a sustainable political strategy.
While China speaks a good game on climate change, it will surely try to get rich before it gets old.
