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Since the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir, the civilian Council of Ministers headed by Abdullah Hamdok has been tasked with realizing the aspirations of the Sudanese people who took to the streets to protest for a better future. At the same time, they are economically hampered by the legacy of Sudan’s affiliation to transnational terrorism. Meanwhile, the presence and influence of Sudan’s military officers remains significant, especially in the face of a myriad of security concerns, whose political ambitions have not diminished.
A recent outbreak of violence in El Geneina, a city in the Sudanese province of Darfur, has now claimed one hundred thirty lives. It is the worst incident since the end of the 13 years of the combined UN and AU peacekeeping mission deployed in Darfur and the signing of a peace agreement between the transitional government and the main rebel groups in Darfur. In response, the Sudanese authorities sent troops to restore order, along with a delegation that including both a prominent member of the military-led Sovereign Council, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, and Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, a civilian economist heading the technocratic Council of Ministers. The fact that the situation required the presence of both underscores the gravity of the tragedy. Perhaps more significantly, it also sheds light on the two competing sources of authority that have tried to shape Sudan since the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir following popular protests in 2019.
Sudan from al-Bashir
While the need for reforms brought Sudanese from many spectra in society together to call for al-Bashir’s removal, translating those reforms from vision to reality takes time, especially when capital is limited. According to a statement from Finance Minister Ibrahim al-Badawi in May 2020;
“Government revenue was down 37 percent compared to previous projections, tax revenue was 21 percent lower than projected, and donor support was 36 percent lower compared to amounts forecast in the budget for December 2019 “
Reforming in the dramatic way sought by many of those who took to the streets requires capital; either donated by donors or raised nationally. This creates tension when the population seeks an improvement in living standards, a greater provision of services and the reduction of poverty. The protests that led to al-Bashir’s overthrow were inspired by government efforts to cut wheat and fuel subsidies, raising the cost of living to unsustainable levels. However, these subsidies represent almost half of the Sudanese budget according to estimates. Preserving those subsidies, to avoid a backlash, leaves the Hamdok government with financial and political constraints. This situation has turned into a vicious cycle, inspiring more demos Sudanese citizens unhappy with the glacial pace of reforms and lack of improvements they searched through the protest.
Meanwhile, events across the border in Ethiopia have presented new challenges. The two nations have long been in dispute over the al-Fashqa region, and Sudan censured Ethiopian farmers for settling and cultivating fertile land on the Sudanese side of the border. These tensions have worsened since the outbreak of the Tigray crisis. What 50,000 refugees who tried to cross the Sudanese border, Sudan has accused Ethiopian troops of ambushing Sudanese soldiers, and rape its airspace. Shortly after these incidents, Sudan began operations to reclaim “confiscated land” along the border, prompting Ethiopia’s counter-accusations of pillage and illegal occupation.
The political cooperation necessary to counter military ambitions
When combined with pressures arising from Sudan-Ethiopia border tensions, the most insidious consequence of Darfur’s deteriorating security is that it provides a convenient pretext for Sudan’s military leaders to seek further delays in the transition to governance. full democratic. Taking advantage of the discontent with the pace of reform achieved by the Hamdok civilian government, it is not inconceivable that Sudan will once again find itself governed by a military council, citing the primacy of ensuring “national security” in the face of complex and deteriorating security situations. The military sought total control immediately after the fall of al-Bashir, and many of the military appointed to the Sovereign Council were senior officers and men of importance under the previous regime. Of all of them, General Dagalo’s presence is perhaps the most controversial since he continues to be the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary formation that, along with complicity in crimes against humanity in Darfur, was also unleashed on civilian protesters in June 2019, killing a hundred people. Dagalo’s place on the Council is symptomatic of the military’s cynical desire to maintain the political influence it previously wielded.
However, this setback is not inevitable. Sudan has enjoyed an increase in political capital and the opportunity to re-engage with the broader international community. The past few months in particular have seen a plethora of major deals. Beyond the arrangement to house a Russian naval base on the country’s Red Sea coast (see my Previous analysis), Sudan also ensured its removal from the United States list of state sponsors of terrorism. This designation has long demonstrated a barrier to Sudan’s access to funds from institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, funds that will prove essential to pay off the country’s accumulated debts of $ 60 billion. To that end, a notable advantage was the Trump administration’s offer to lend Sudan almost full sum of its balance it owes the IMF, in order to better rehabilitate Sudan’s relationship with the organization. While this may appear to simply trade one creditor for another, it does give Prime Minister Hamdok an opportunity to approach the World Bank and the IMF to obtain debt relief under the auspices of programs such as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC).
Having reached this critical milestone, Sudan needs the constant and unwavering support of the international community. Now that the terrorism designation is lifted, donors and organizations that praised Sudan’s desire for change must support and reinforce these ambitions before the 2022 elections. Both the fate of Sudan’s transition to a more democratic system of government and responsible, like the legacy Some of the protests that saw the fall of Sudan’s last military dictator are at stake.
