[ad_1]
ANKARA: With Turkey hinting at a possible agreement with Egypt on exclusive maritime zones in the gas-rich eastern Mediterranean, the impact of such an agreement on energy transit routes and political concessions Turkey could be forced to make have become the center of attention.
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Wednesday that the country wanted to sign an agreement on maritime borders.
But this will is currently limited to statements from the Turkish side, without a tangible reaction from the Egyptians.
Turkey’s tactical move indicates a willingness to reduce escalation policies in the region to avoid any criticism from Brussels and the administration of US President Joe Biden.
Possible sanctions against Turkey’s controversial exploratory activities in the eastern Mediterranean would be discussed at the European Summit on March 25-26, prompting it not to take aggressive action before that meeting.
This section contains relevant benchmarks, placed in (Opinion field)
But experts consider that such an agreement is still implausible, at least in the short term, because Egypt has had an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement with Greece since last year. This pact infuriated Turkey because it has had long-standing disagreements with Greece over the extension of their mutual continental shelves.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis had a phone call on Wednesday evening, following Cavusoglu’s statement, on regional issues of common concern, with a particular emphasis on energy and Mediterranean issues. East, another strong signal that Greece would do its best is not to allow a Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement to take place.
Turkey said the agreement between Greece and Egypt did not include a disputed area south of the Greek island of Kastellorizo that Turkey claims under its own EEZ.
Relations with Egypt have been strained after Mohammed Mursi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, supported by Turkey, was ousted by El-Sisi in 2013.
Last year Egypt, Cyprus and Greece issued a joint statement accusing Turkey of carrying out “provocations” in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Egypt has been involved in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum since 2019 without involving Turkey.
Turkey and Egypt have also supported opposing sides in Libya’s civil war.
“Turkey has tried to entice Egypt to sign an EEZ agreement claiming that it will receive a larger share than it will receive from a bilateral agreement between Athens and Cairo,” said Gallia Lindenstrauss, senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel, said Arab News. “Similarly, he has made the claim that the SEZ agreement between Israel and Cyprus gives Israel less than it would receive if it had signed an agreement with Turkey.”
While a relaxation of tensions between Turkey and Egypt was plausible, Lindenstrauss did not expect a serious rapprochement to take place anytime soon, so an SEZ agreement between the parties was unlikely to materialize.
In late February, Egypt and Israel agreed to connect an Israeli offshore natural gas field with liquefied natural gas facilities in northern Egypt via an underwater pipeline to meet growing demand for natural gas in Europe.
The pipeline will start at Israel’s Leviathan gas field and then head to Egypt overland before going to Crete via the Greek-Egyptian EEZ.
This route eludes Cyprus. In other words, the gas is not likely to be exported through disputed areas that could raise Turkish objections.
Emre Caliskan, a researcher at the UK Foreign Policy Center, thought Turkey’s recent efforts to improve its relations with Israel and Egypt were motivated by the need to break the alliance between Greece, Israel, Cyprus and Egypt.
“These countries have united against the growing influence of Turkey and gas searches in the eastern Mediterranean,” he told Arab News. “From the strategic point of view of Turkish politicians, the interests of Greece and Cyprus are in contradiction with Turkey’s ambitions in the region. Therefore, Turkey will try to distance Greece and Cyprus from Egypt and Israel. “
These moves require a change in Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood ideology that inspires Hamas to sideline Egypt and end the bilateral dispute. Turkey has hosted several of the organization’s members and supporters since the group’s activities were banned in Egypt.
Last month, the Israeli Defense Ministry announced the seizure of assets worth $ 121,000 sent by Turkish-based Hamas members to people in the West Bank through two Turkish companies.
“We have recently heard claims that Turkey has been reassessing its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. It is too early to assess any policy changes in relation to this. Any substantial reconciliation with Israel and Egypt will require Turkey to distance its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, ”Caliskan said.
For Caliskan, Turkey’s relations with the Muslim Brotherhood were based on ideology and also on a strategic partnership.
“Distancing Turkey’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood would affect Turkey’s influence in Libya, for example. Turkey is likely to compartmentalize its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, reducing its support for their presence in Egypt and Palestine, but will continue to support them in North Africa, especially in Libya and Tunisia. “
