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November 19, 2020
Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the government’s plans on November 16 to create a naval facility in Sudan to serve the needs of the Russian navy in the region and serve as a logistics hub. The Russian Defense Ministry signed the respective agreement on the construction of the facility with Khartoum. Given the nature of the decision-making of the Russian authorities, most experts believe that the decision on the establishment of the facility was made long before its formal announcement. The question, then, is the pace of construction of the facility, something that will largely depend on the Kremlin’s priorities in the future. And there are factors that can lead one to doubt at least whether Russia is really serious about expanding its presence in the region.
The first factor in this context is Russia’s limited economic, military and logistical capabilities. According to the former chief of staff of the Russian navy, retired Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, the most primitive installation in the Red Sea will take three to four months to complete.
As Al-Monitor already noted, no specific details of Russia’s presence in the Red Sea have been released so far. More specifically, we still do not know what kind of base Russia would like to establish in Port Sudan. For example, the Soviet-era logistics facility in Vietnam had actually served as a suitable military base. Does Russia intend to deploy a large-scale facility containing infrastructure for military purposes? Or is this new base just a PR stunt that would simply be comprised of facilities that provide occasional service to Russian ships, which are rare in the region anyway? The agreement to facilitate the passage of Russian ships was reached with Sudan last January, although Moscow has such an agreement with many countries, including Nicaragua, a rogue ally of the United States.
There are objective obstacles that can hinder the rapid deployment of the facility. All means to protect the base – air defense systems, electronic warfare tools together with infrastructure equipment for social purposes (hospital unit, desalination units) – can be delivered in two ways. First, these components can be airlifted to Port Sudan, 20 kilometers from the coast, via the Khmeimim air base, the route used by the Russian military as an “African hub”. The other option is to use the sea route. The difficulty, of course, is that Russia does not have many long-haul ships at its disposal, even if we take into account the possibility of those ships receiving service at the Russian Syrian naval base, Tartus.
An expert dealing with the Russian energy sphere, who spoke to Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, suggested that a possible choice for the location of the facility may be the least suitable from an energy supply point of view. The Sudan facility will be deployed near a city of 600,000 that has an oil refinery and the country’s largest pier. At the same time, the city will contain a single oil and diesel heat and power plant with a capacity of 337 megawatts. All of this creates problems with the power supply to the facility since, like the Syrian airbase in Khmeimim, it would have to run on diesel generators using fuel that would have to be shipped from Russia. There are not many energy resources in Sudan and their costs are quite high anyway.
Furthermore, the point of the agreement that allows Russia to station four of its ships, including nuclear-powered ones, at the facility may sound very good in theory. However, in practice, the infrastructure of Port Sudan and the Red Sea in general is not well equipped for the mooring and maintenance of nuclear powered submarines. The Iranians use diesel-electric submarines, while the Chinese are perhaps the only ones in Djibouti prepared to carry out large-scale bottom dredging operations. Meanwhile, Russian surface ships with nuclear power units do not carry Kalibr-type cruise missiles that Russian experts believe will scare off other regional players.
As Alexey Arbatov, director of the Center for International Security of the National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations Primakov, pointed out that boosting Russia’s prestige in the region can lead to additional costs, even if the possibility of expanding the gold mining operations in the country. On top of all this, Moscow will have to be aware of the potential risk of political instability in Sudan, given the potential for full-scale conflict to break out in the country.
The second factor When reflecting on Russia’s ambitions in the region, one must take into account the competition with other players. China, in particular, has been expanding its presence in the region and has brought its One Belt, One Road project to African countries. While the Kremlin may think that competition is a positive development and participating in it may improve Russia’s global position, there are certain dangers that arise from such competition.
Radical Russian patriotic media has already suggested that the naval base in Sudan is nothing more than an anti-Turkish step. Seen from this perspective, Russia spoke out in its decision to establish the naval facility, while Ankara is still struggling to regain its influence after the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir. As a result, Turkey has not been able to establish its own naval base in the country, mostly due to Khartoum’s growing ties with the United Arab Emirates and Egypt after the revolution. Had Turkey established the facility, it would have helped it project its power more effectively alongside the Turkish facilities in Qatar and Somalia. Turkey’s official position has been to dismiss any reports from the Gulf countries suggesting that Ankara has military plans in Sudan. The agreement on the reconstruction of the Suakin port, Turkish authorities said, was aimed at turning the island into a tourist attraction, especially for Hajj pilgrims. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry continues to claim that negotiations at the seaport have not been broken, and Turkey’s Agency for Cooperation and Coordination continues to restore Ottoman-era artifacts left on the island.
Now, there is a precedent for Russia to take an anti-Turkish stance in political disputes and even side with anti-Turkish blocs in the region. An example is Libya, where Russia supported strongman Khalifa Hifter, who has ties to Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. And even if those Moscow actions did not have serious adverse consequences on relations with Ankara, the Turkish factor may be a variable in shaping Russia’s behavior, at least to some extent. In fact, some experts suggest in private conversations that they do not rule out that the phrase in the agreement that says “the Sudanese side can use the facility to tie up the Russian navy” – if Moscow grants it such access – may mean that the facility too can be used by warships of other foreign powers; for example, Egypt.
In addition, Port Sudan is located opposite Mecca in Saudi Arabia. From this point of view, Russia’s actions can easily be interpreted as destabilizing, especially since, as some experts predict, Russia can deploy reconnaissance assets at the facility, as well as special forces and private military companies. In particular, Russian mercenaries are already present in Sudan and their numbers are likely to increase further.
In third place, And perhaps most importantly, Sudan’s complaints against the actions of the Donald Trump administration also play a role. The idea of building the Russian facility in the Red Sea gained traction the moment Trump first promised to remove Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, but then extended the national emergency regarding Sudan for a year after let Khartoum make concessions. in the form of payment of compensation to victims of terrorist attacks and agreed to normalize relations with Israel.
Therefore, it is logical to assume that the Sudanese may be ready in the future to use their ties with Russia as currency in relations with the United States if the Joe Biden administration agrees to lift the existing sanctions. Sudan may decide to reverse its decision on the military base, even despite Khartoum’s interest in receiving military equipment from Russia.
In any case, any Russian activity abroad is reduced to the desire to demonstrate its strength against the United States. Biden’s team cannot avoid the subject of relations with Sudan. At the very least, it will have to try to induce Arab countries to normalize ties with Israel, something a new American administration would likely interpret not just as a product of the Trump administration, but as a long-term process. So the question is whether or not Moscow, like Sudan, is ready to use its new base as currency in international politics.
“This is the time to restore our naval presence,” said Vladimir Komoedov, a retired Russian admiral and former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, commenting on the news of the facility’s construction. He said the facility will be another of Russia’s facilities deployed in the context of US and NATO supremacy in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans, as well as in the air, at sea and underwater. “
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