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A genuine and inclusive national dialogue must be urgently initiated. This could help build consensus on some critical and controversial political issues. These include: ruling a post-September Ethiopia; ensure free, fair and peaceful elections and set their calendar; cultivate trust in public institutions; incorporate the views of all stakeholders into a new constitution; and shaping an accommodative political destiny for Ethiopia. (Photo: National Geographic)
INSTITUTE OF SECURITY STUDIES
The aftermath of the Hachalu Hundessa assassination underscores the challenges facing Ethiopia’s transition to democracy.
The June 29 murder of popular Ethiopian singer Hachalu Hundessa of the Oromo ethnic group has rekindled ethnic violence in the country. More than 200 people have died and businesses and personal property have been destroyed mainly due to attacks by mobs with mostly ethnic overtones. The government has arrested several opposition leaders, accusing them of fueling the unrest. Political divisions have also intensified.
These post-Hundessa assassination political and security developments have amplified existing fundamental problems facing Ethiopia’s democratic transition. In a presentation in March, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) principal investigator Semir Yusuf highlighted three main challenges: the contradictory nature of the Ethiopian state; the fragility of opposition parties and civil society organizations; and increased competition between nationalist groups.
First is the contradictory nature of the Ethiopian state. Historically, governance structures have been unusually strong and, at the same time, have had weaknesses. On the one hand, successive regimes have built a robust state machine that could repress and control citizens. Local government coercive apparatuses have also been used to mobilize people into wars of unprecedented levels.
On the other hand, the State has also experienced a crisis of legitimacy, where its very existence has been questioned, especially by some ethno-nationalist detractors. More recently, the state, once known for its internal coherence and autonomy, lost part of both.
State fragility continues to hamper attempts to achieve political stability and an effective rule of law
Among other things, informal groups in certain regions infiltrated administrative and security structures, leading to a loose or broken chain of command and control in the latter. According to informants, the divided loyalties of officials threatened the legitimacy and stability of the political system, leading to the complicity of state personnel in generating conflicts.
Internal disputes between the government and party officials have contributed to incoherent state and party structures. The ruling party has been reconstituted as the new Prosperity Party, but a fully coherent and stable party structure has not yet been achieved.
Both international human rights groups and many in the opposition have accused state agents of frequently violating the human rights of citizens, making a smooth transition difficult. These concerns have increased in the last two years. Since the arrest of the main opposition activists and politicians, and in the riots after Hundessa’s death, the number of complaints has skyrocketed.
At the same time, the fragility of the state continues to hamper attempts to achieve political stability and an effective rule of law. Various reports document the lack of police action in the face of imminent ethnic violence following the murder of Hundessa, as has been the case in various conflict situations before. Even the government has acknowledged the inaction or complicity of its officials and security personnel.
Excessive and insufficient police and military actions coexist in Ethiopia
Informants say that when people asked the police to stop the violence, some officers claimed they were not ordered to do so. This suggests the lack of a centralized and effective national security system. Therefore, excessive and insufficient police and military actions coexist in Ethiopia.
The constraints facing the state are also evident in the challenge the Tigray region poses to the power of the federal government. Following political squabbles between the two, their relationship has deteriorated to a new low with the declaration of the Tigray Regional Council (CVR) to hold regional elections before the end of their five-year term.
The statement denies the House of Federation (HoF) ruling in June to extend the terms of the federal and regional governments, postponing all preparations for national and regional elections until COVID-19 is deemed to be under control. The CVR’s decision has enraged the ruling party.
The extension of the ruling party’s mandate has also sparked opposition across the country, primarily in Tigray, whose ruling elites and some opposition parties consider it against the spirit and letter of the constitution. Tigray’s sense of autonomy is advancing rapidly, constituting a clear affront to the legal and political order that the federal government wants to impose at the national level.
The fragility or recklessness of opposition parties is also a major challenge for Ethiopia’s smooth transition.
The fragility or recklessness of opposition parties typify a second major challenge for a smooth transition. Responding to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s call for national forgiveness, political reform and opening up civic space, opposition parties reentered the political scene in 2018. Several had clear shortcomings, partly self-created and self-created. partly as a legacy of past government repression. Most were organizationally weak, with vague positions on various issues.
COVID-19 and the state of emergency established to contain it have further diminished its power. Weak parties have mustered the ability to incite popular unrest, most recently due to disagreement over the HoF’s decision to rule Ethiopia after September. But they have not developed the ability to communicate clear political goals or coordinate opposition movements. And so activists and opportunistic elites are organizing protests that lead to more disorderly and chaotic protests.
The third big challenge is the increasing polarization of nationalist politics in the country since 2018. Rival nationalisms have been a hallmark of Ethiopian politics for five decades, but the degree of competition has peaked in recent years.
Rivalry between nationalist groups for control of land, self-administration, security concerns and other issues have sparked violence. The latest increase in ethnic fighting in Oromia is in part a continuation of this trend, intensified by the death of Hundessa. It is also a trigger for new divisions along ethnonationalist lines.
Getting the troubled transition back on track requires government efforts to enforce the rule of law while professionalizing and depoliticizing the justice system and the security apparatus. To ensure effective enforcement of the law, the ruling party must establish a negotiated vision and plan. Strong command and control also needs to be restored within the security sector.
A genuine and inclusive national dialogue must be urgently initiated. This could help build consensus on some critical and controversial political issues. These include: ruling a post-September Ethiopia; ensure free, fair and peaceful elections and set their calendar; cultivate trust in public institutions; incorporate the views of all stakeholders into a new constitution; and shaping an accommodative political destiny for Ethiopia.
The national dialogue process would also symbolize inclusion in the transition process. This could help build confidence in the democratization approach and help give it the broad political legitimacy it needs.
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