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The recent fierce fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the latest in a long conflict, has apparently come to an end. This bloody compromise, dubbed the ‘Second Nagorno-Karabakh War’, lasted six weeks and ended with a truce negotiated by Russia, which began on November 10, 2020. Armenia, as the losing side, agreed to return the majority of the territories it occupied in the early 1990s as a result of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
The centuries-long dispute between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the enclave last resurfaced in the late 1980s during the last years of the Soviet Union, to which Azerbaijan and Armenia still belonged. In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh, which was populated mainly by ethnic Armenians, announced its secession from Azerbaijan and its intention to join Armenia. This led to a bloody war, at the end of which, in 1994, Armenia completely occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and some other Azerbaijani territories beyond the disputed enclave. Subsequent 25-year peace talks mediated by the United States, France and Russia under the OSCE umbrella have failed to achieve a peace treaty.
The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, in addition to being a new phase in an old regional conflict, has significant geopolitical significance. It expresses the multidimensional nature of the conflict and the complex dynamics governing the interaction of all stakeholders, especially Russia and Turkey. Now that the war is over, for now at least, it is worth examining the main geopolitical outcomes of the conflict.
Winners and Losers in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War
Azerbaijan’s military superiority in this war ensured that the Armenian government had no choice but to agree to return to the opposite side all internationally recognized territories outside of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia also agreed to return most of the southern part of the enclave, including the ancient city of Shusha, the second largest city in the enclave that is situated in a strategically dominant position overlooking Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. In other words, Azerbaijan has regained control of three-quarters of its territories lost in 1994. Armenia retains control only over the northern and central parts of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin Corridor that connects the enclave with the mainland of Armenia, whose security must be guaranteed by Russian “peacekeepers”, and 2,000 have already been deployed. In exchange for the Lachin Corridor, Azerbaijan also gets free access to its Nakhichevan enclave, which is separated from the mainland by Armenian territory. Another significant gain for Baku is that the internationally unrecognized and self-proclaimed Armenian client quasi-state ‘The Republic of Artsakh’ has come into existence.
One international player who will benefit from the conflict is Russia. Until now, the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh was the only one in the former Soviet space where Russia was not directly involved in any way. Given the Kremlin’s neo-imperial ambitions, the apparent success is that Russia has still become the guarantor of the deal, thus enhancing its geopolitical position in the region. Moscow will preserve and even intensify its influence in Armenia, for which the Russian peacekeepers have become vital. But these are not the Kremlin’s only achievements of the war. The Nikol Pashinyan-led government of Armenia came to power in January 2019 as a result of a peaceful democratic revolution that swept away the corrupt, Moscow-backed authoritarian government. However, Armenia’s military defeat significantly reduced government support in the country. Russia, Armenia’s main ally, stopped its intervention, as if it wanted to teach a fundamental lesson to all its allies and clients: look what happens when forces outside the Kremlin come to power. However, it could be said that Moscow saved Armenia from total defeat, making it even more dependent than ever. For now, Pashinyan’s attempts to develop multi-vector foreign policies and distance the country from Moscow have come to an end.
Another and perhaps the biggest geopolitical beneficiary of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War is Turkey, the growing regional power that has now increased its geopolitical role in the region, a role Ankara has been so eager to play. Many experts believe that Turkey was crucial not only to prepare and support Azerbaijan militarily and politically, but also to encourage its ally to launch the offensive to restore its territorial integrity. Now, Turkish military personnel will be stationed at various monitoring centers in the recently reclaimed areas of Azerbaijan. Turkey also gained a strategic transportation corridor to Azerbaijan and Central Asia with which Ankara has strong historical and cultural ties.
In other words, Turkey has entered the region not only as an essential stakeholder, but rather as a geopolitical game changer.
Some questions remain, such as: Why did Armenia finally accept the deal? The previous ceasefire agreements did not last a day. This time, however, it is different, and it appears that the agreement has been and will be observed by both parties. Given the military situation and the main stakeholders, it would be reasonable to suggest that Russia and Turkey agreed first and then made Armenia accept it. Another question is: Why did Azerbaijan accept the agreement? In fact, he gained a lot from it, but why stop the offensive when you are winning, you have military superiority and there is a good chance of taking back all the disputed territories? The answer is the same: Russia and Turkey, as regional power brokers, pushed President Aliyev to accept the deal, as both Russia and Turkey achieved their goals and reached consensus. It seems that President Aliyev realized that Vladimir Putin would not allow him to take back Nagorno-Karabakh completely, as it would be contrary to the Kremlin’s geopolitical interests in the region. Perhaps Aliyev also understood that a complete victory in Nagorno-Karabakh would make his country too dependent on his ally Turkey. In the current situation, however, the competing regional superpowers are counteracting each other. As a result, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War has brought a new geopolitical configuration to the region, which may last for some time until new local, regional or global forces break this fragile balance of power. However, a more active participation of global players such as the United States, the EU and possibly others would increase the chances of lasting peace in the region.
The opinions expressed in this article belong solely to the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institution with which the authors are associated.
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