Forward-looking federal solidarity, not power politics and legalism, is needed to resolve the Tigray dispute



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Although the Federation Chamber has not ordered a military intervention, its latest moves in the dispute with Tigray are of questionable legality and effectiveness.

men the latest development in a growing dispute between the federal and Tigray governments, this week the upper house of parliament made three important decisions. First, the Federation Chamber ordered the federal government to cease all interactions with the Tigray State Council and the cabinet, which it considers unconstitutional due to an “illegitimate regional election.” Second, he said federal fiscal transfers to the region would be suspended. And finally, in order to ensure the continued provision of basic public services, he said that the federal government would deal directly with wereda, urban and kebele governments.

The discord between the government of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal administration, which is controlled exclusively by the Prosperity Party (PP), has raged for more than two years due to disputes arising mainly from the struggle for power within the previous government. coalition. Mekele’s decision to hold elections for its Council of State on September 9 in explicit defiance of federal authority seriously exacerbated the situation.

Furthermore, as argued by the June parliament decision to extend the mandates of all governments until the elections delayed by COVID-19, Tigray decided that after October 5 (the date it calculated as the end of the governments’ legal mandates above), the federal Parliament and Cabinet had no legal authority, and that federal proclamations, directives, and regulations issued after that date would not be applicable in Tigray.

In recent months, Addis Ababa had tried to avoid autonomous regional voting. The President of the House of Federation (HoF), Aden Farah, first sent a letter on June 30 warning that the federal government would take any necessary measures, including military intervention, to avoid the damage to the constitutional order that would bring the illegal choice. That later he said the elections would have no legal effect. More recently, President Aden said that federal authorities could install a transitional administration in Tigray.

Although the reasons given by the Federation Chamber for extending the terms of regional governments are not convincing, Tigray’s decision to ignore that decision was not constitutionally justified. This is simply because, as a constitutional arbiter, only the upper house can say what the constitution is or means, no matter how distasteful or unconvincing its interpretation may be to the rest of us. The Tigray government certainly cannot unilaterally decide what the correct interpretation of the constitution is.

However, now, the HoF has issued the three orders that are of questionable constitutionality and effectiveness.

Three strikes

Although the federal government does not recognize the Tigray government, it appears that the HoF is prepared to accept that Tigray will have what it considers to be an “unconstitutional” government for an indeterminate period. Although military intervention would likely be catastrophic, so it is by no means advised, this does not make any legal sense: the constitution does not provide for periods of unconstitutional rule. Instead, as the guardian of constitutional order, the HoF has a duty to ensure that the unconstitutional situation is resolved in accordance with Article 14 (1) of Proclamation 359 (2003), which governs federal intervention in regional states.

The second order from the HoF for the federal government to interact directly with the local authorities does not seem feasible, as the regional government would try to avoid it and it is unlikely that the local authorities will be willing to interact directly with the federal government, overlooking their regional bosses.

Furthermore, the federal system was deliberately designed so that the central government does not have direct contact with the local government. During constitutional writing, there was a debate on whether local government should be recognized as the third level of government. The argument in favor of recognition was to prevent regional states from using them as their own administrative agents, rather than being a democratically responsible level of government close to the people.

However, as is the case in many federal dispensations, constitutional recognition of local government was viewed as a zero-sum matter by the regions for two main reasons: First, constitutional recognition of local government would result in the lowering of the status of local government. regional government. states as political units and reduction of the powers they could exercise and the resources they could control and mobilize. Second, and most importantly, there was a fear that the federal government would use constitutionally recognized local governments as back doors to interfere with regional states and undermine their autonomy.

This was why the framers of the constitution attempted to strike a balance by requiring states to establish democratically constituted local governments that still operate within their exclusive regional competence. So the HoF order is exactly what the editors feared and tried to avoid, and it would set a dangerous precedent.

The final order, suspending federal budget support to Tigray, goes against the spirit of federalism, as the transfer of revenue to the regional states is an expression of “federal solidarity.” In any federal system, the most lucrative sources of revenue are reserved for a federal government because it has a mandate broader than that of the regions, is in charge of managing the national economy, must maintain fairness throughout the federation, and is in a best position to manage revenue.

The states are left with the least lucrative sources of income. Implicit (sometimes explicit) in this arrangement is that the federal government has a duty to share the revenue it collects with the regions. In fact, the federal government is not supposed to have sole ownership over the revenue it collects; it is simply a custodian of funds that is co-owned by the estates.

Therefore, in some federal constitutions, not only is the central government required to share the revenue it collects with the regions, but the minimum amount it must transfer is also legally defined. Of course, the Ethiopian constitution does not explicitly state such transfers as a federal obligation, but it is implicit in the design of the system. The HoF’s decision to simply suspend all federal revenue transfers is therefore a violation of the constitutional covenant.

More importantly, as a mechanism to restore constitutional order, suspension of federal transfers is ineffective. Instead, it would lead to a reduction in the provision of basic services to the population, while undermining the principle of “federal solidarity.”

Principle-based approach

While the constitution should be the framework for resolving tensions, given the precarious political situation in the country, it would be unwise and dangerous to insist on strict adherence, such as arguing that the HoF should order federal intervention. We are not in normal times and we need to find creative ways to help us get out of this dilemma peacefully. Tigray should be prepared to work with the federal government, despite its divergent constitutional interpretation. The HoF or the federal government in general must transcend specific constitutional provisions and appeal to general principles in constitutions to try to break this political deadlock.

Broad constitutional principles exist for a reason: They serve a purpose that specific provisions do not help us achieve. It may well be that the three orders of the HoF are intended to prevent federal intervention in Tigray, which is commendable, although it should be noted that Tigray leaders have suggested that any budget cut would amount to a declaration of war. Regardless, the upper house and the federal government could do more considering the unthinkable consequences of not resolving the dispute peacefully.

As an institution whose role is to “promote the equality of the Ethiopian peoples… and consolidate their unity”, the HoF should refrain from ordering the government to take measures that divide us. Instead, it should look for ways to scale down and move us toward greater cohesion.

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Main photo: Chief Justice Meaza Ashenafi presides over Chief Justice Aden Farah; HoF.

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