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Authors: Zlatko Hadžidedić and Adnan Idrizbegović *
Less than two months remain for the transition of government in the United States of America. It is not a long period, but it is enough to trigger processes that the next US administration will not be able to reverse. There is no reason to doubt that President Trump, who still refuses to admit electoral defeat, will try to make the future of the Biden Administration as difficult as possible. In this context, let us remember that President Trump praises the abandonment of the nuclear treaty with Iran as his greatest achievement, so it would be reasonable to assume that he would do almost anything in his power to make this very step irreversible. The question of whether that includes the option of a military strike against Iran, therefore, is up in the air.
We are witnessing a current concentration of American air power in the neighborhood of Iran. This particularly applies to the B52 and F16 strategic bombers from US bases in Europe. A larger arrival of F35s in the region would increase the likelihood of an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. This probability could also increase with the announced arrival of the aircraft carrier Nimitz in the waters of the Gulf. As reported by news agencies, such a military option had already been seriously considered by President Trump and his advisers, although it did not enjoy a high degree of support among the highest US military officials. In the next term, as Trump sits in the White House, it is realistic to expect this dispute between the military and the Administration to gain in intensity, given that President Trump’s team is well known for its stubborn adherence to its original agenda.
In this context, it should be noted that the nuclear treaty with Iran was declared one of President Obama’s greatest foreign policy successes. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a detailed agreement with five annexes reached by Iran and the P5 + 1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany). The nuclear deal was backed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verified Iran’s compliance with the nuclear power-related provisions of the JCPOA. It was a groundbreaking agreement that satisfied the security concerns of Americans, Iranians, Arabs, Europeans, and others, opening the doors for Iran’s readmission to the world stage. By adopting this treaty, Iran left its position of pariah state. By betraying the treaty, President Trump has transformed America’s favorite role as leader of the free world into that of a pariah state. Does that imply its willingness to go even further in its rejection of all norms of international law, launching military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, as a logical continuation of its illegal withdrawal from the ratified international treaty?
From President Trump’s perspective, such action should prevent a quick and easy return of the United States to the treaty in the post-Trump period. A war in the Gulf should lead to an instantaneous rise in oil prices; consequently, it should also lead to the strengthening of the US dollar, linked to oil prices. In times of the declining world economy, further burdened by the crippling effects of the pandemic, this would be the most favorable impetus for the failing US economy. Rising oil prices would also have a negative effect on the manufacturing-oriented economies of US competitors in China and Europe. This increase would also strengthen military industrial interests in the United States, which commonly back the Republican Party, potentially at the expense of financiers, who traditionally back the Democratic Party.
A complete, or even only partial, destruction of the Iranian nuclear program would undoubtedly be the most favorable outcome for hardliners on both sides, and President Trump likely sees it as an opportunity to remain in power despite the threats. election results, or to undermine the government. position of the future Administration. That would undoubtedly trigger a robust return of hardline Iranians to power in the upcoming elections, likely closing the door to negotiations with Iran for the president-elect. Most likely it will give a strong push to the radicals in Tehran to renew the nuclear program, this time exclusively for military purposes. Since an attack itself would likely be launched from US military bases in the region, it would also trigger an Iranian retaliatory strike against these countries. Such a development would likely strengthen homogeneity among cornered Arab NATO countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar, pushing them further towards Israeli weapons. This would also push the gap between Sunnis and Shiites beyond the point of redress. Needless to say, most hardliners, not just in the West, would be absolutely delighted with such an outcome.
Under President Trump’s orders, the ongoing withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria must be completed 5 days before the transfer of power to the Biden Administration. The withdrawal itself (total or partial) will leave a huge strategic void, for which there is no alternative to fill the void. Such an exit strategy is unprecedented in American military history, especially given the monumental costs associated with the invading enterprise that took place in these three countries. President Trump’s orders, therefore, imply that another gigantic calculus may be at stake this time, a calculus of lasting global significance. Let us remember that the absolute departure of all foreign troops from the region was, in reality, Iran’s demand after the assassination of the commander of the Iranian Republican Guard, Kasseem Suleymani. Does that mean that President Trump has accepted Iranian rules, or even supremacy, in the Gulf? Does it mean that President Trump would abandon American allies in the Middle East, from Israel to Saudi Arabia? And what will happen to the oil, until now controlled by US companies, that exploited it due to the US military presence? Of course, if President Trump isn’t literally abandoning all American positions, alliances, and interests in the region, he likely must have some other strategic reason. Perhaps cutting military spending sounds acceptable to the ears of the American public. However, it is not enough to justify the magnitude of the change.
However, the hasty withdrawal of US troops has a clear purpose: it deprives Iran of available US targets for its possible retaliatory attempts, and it inevitably redirects Iranian anger against US allies in the Gulf. Thus, the withdrawal not only increases the likelihood of President Trump’s military adventure against Iran, but also leaves the Arab allies between Iran and Israel to choose their strategic sponsor. The question is whether the recent secret meeting between the Saudi prince, Mohammad bin Salman, and the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, should be interpreted in this context.
In any event, the brunt of the American absence in the region will fall on Israel’s shoulders. The Israelis know that an attack on Iran would be an option that could provide Israel with the necessary time to adjust to these new realities and acquire projected control over its Arab neighbors. Therefore, a strategic importance of the attack would require the participation of the Israeli army. As the Israelis know all too well, the detrimental effects on the Iranian nuclear program are essential to the very existence of the state of Israel, as the Islamic Republic of Iran is finally in a position to capitalize on its enduring struggle against American dominance in the Middle. . East and gain strategic control over the entire Levant and the Gulf, to be promoted to a global player. The level of communication between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu suggests that certain promises may have been made to the Israelis that an American attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is imminent. However, the assassination of top Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, attributed to Israeli intelligence agencies, could be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the Iranian nuclear program without a full-scale attack, either because the Israelis do not believe in its viability. . , or because they are trying to avoid it, given its long-term consequences that could eventually prove unfavorable for Israel’s position.
There could be one more option up for grabs, considering President Trump’s favorite “art of a deal” strategy: a secret deal between the current US administration and Iran, with the US leaving the Shiite world. control over Afghanistan in possible association with Pakistan) to Iranian domination, in exchange for Iranian tacit permission for the plutonium generator in Arak, suitable for the development of a military nuclear program, to be bombed and temporarily destroyed by the United States. That option would buy several years for both the United States and Israel, with a significant postponement of the eventual production of a nuclear weapon by Iran. On the other hand, it would give Iran the opportunity to improve its geopolitical position as one of the two main powers in the region, in interim coexistence with Israel as the de facto leader of the Arab NATO alliance. In these circumstances, a Tehran-led Shiite bloc, separating the Sunni Arab countries from Turkey and Russian influence, could be a favorable development for the United States. The questions are, of course, to what extent it would be acceptable to Israel, and to what extent it would lead Iran to overshoot, and effectively, economic weakness.
Whatever the outgoing Trump Administration’s calculation, the incoming Administration of President-elect Biden has no interest in allowing such dangerous developments to occur. If President Trump orders an attack on Iran in the last 5 days of his term, just after the departure of US troops from the region, all of its negative consequences will be attributed to the Biden Administration, paralyzing its announced initiatives to stabilize matters. worldwide. . Because its geopolitical consequences could be numerous: a takeover of the Middle East by strengthened Iranian radicals; a possible nuclearization of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and perhaps Egypt; a new rapprochement between Iran and Russia, this time in the field of strategic nuclear cooperation, which would eventually end Western influence in Eurasia.
By going in that direction, President Trump would promote the strategy of “poisoning the well” to the future Democratic Administration, depriving it of prospects for relevant foreign policy results in its next 4 years. Eventually, that could lead to Trump’s second coming; and then to the burial of American democracy and the implementation of a one-party authoritarian regime, as the Republican radicals had wanted since the mid-1970s.
* Adnan Idrizbegović, Independent researcher, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
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